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     American organizations that opposed apartheid in South Africa extended their 
opposition to racial discrimination in the US into world politics.  More than three decades 
of organizing preceded the legislative showdown of 1986 when Congress overrode 
President Ronald Reagan’s veto to enact economic sanctions against the apartheid 
regime.  Drawing on the tactics and moral authority of the civil rights movement, the 
antiapartheid movement mobilized public opinion with familiar political symbols while 
increasing African-American influence in the formulation of US foreign policy. 
    Three conflicts in particular shaped American antiapartheid activism: the debate 
between those holding an integrationist vision of the civil rights movement versus the 
advocates of a Pan-Africanist view as expressed in the Black Power movement; the 
tension between the antiracist credibility American leaders sought to project to the world 
and the anticommunist thrust of American foreign policy which led to a tacit alliance 
with South Africa; and the dispute over whether nonviolence or armed liberation 
provided the best strategy for ending apartheid. 
     Three antiapartheid organizations that debated and dealt with these conflicts were the 
American Committee on Africa (ACOA), the American Friends Service Committee 
 
(AFSC), and TransAfrica.  Each group worked against apartheid for more than a decade, 
combined direct action with other tactics, and included antiapartheid activism in larger 
efforts concerning Africa and US foreign policy.  The efforts of these organizations 
provide a window through which to examine the conflicts that marked the antiapartheid 
struggle. 
     Cultural expressions reinforced public sentiment against apartheid.  Novels, plays, 
movies and music provided a bridge for Americans who strove to understand the 
struggles of those who lived under apartheid.  Via the page, stage, screen, and recording 
studio, apartheid’s opponents found a platform to transmit their message to a broad 
audience of Americans. 
     The similarity of apartheid to American racial segregation provided activists with 
metaphors to mobilize constituencies that had opposed American racism.  Direct action in 
particular helped dramatize American entanglement with apartheid.  By extending the 
moral logic of the civil rights movement, the antiapartheid movement was able to invoke 
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For now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face; 
Now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known. 
First Corinthians 13:9-13 
For it is the dawn that has come, 
as it has come for a thousand centuries, never failing. 
But when that dawn will come, of our emancipation, 
from the fear of bondage and bondage of fear,  
that is a secret. 
Alan Paton 
     Many people contributed to this dissertation, helping me to keep facing the glass even 
when I feared it was too dark to see.  My thanks to all who assisted me and facilitated my 
intellectual sojourn. 
     At the University of Maryland my advisor James Gilbert expertly guided me through 
each phase of this process; his suggestions deepened my analysis and strengthened my 
argument.  Alfred Moss provided inspiration and encouragement.  Bill Bravman and the 
late Marie Perinbam shaped my ideas about Africa and its importance in the world.  Gary 
Gerstle, Sharon Harley, and Paul Landau provided insightful criticism.  Mary Kay 
Vaughan and Ann Jimenez helped me navigate the bureaucratic shoals on which I often 
foundered.  The Department of History as well as the Committee on Africa and the 
Americas provided crucial financial support for my research. 
     Prior to my years at Maryland, my ideas and commitments were shaped at George 
School, principally by history teacher Francis Bradley.  At Juniata College members of 
the Peace and Conflict Studies Program, particularly Andrew Murray, William Vocke, 
and the late Martin Clark, prepared me to think critically while acting globally.  The late 
Frederick Binder challenged my intellect as well as my ideals. 
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     Much of the research for and organization of this dissertation took place while I was 
teaching at Goshen College.  My history colleagues John Roth, Steven Nolt, and Lee Roy 
Berry helped me to keep my cultural analysis serviceable.  Jan Bender-Shetler’s editorial 
suggestions were especially useful.  The staff of the Good Library and the Mennonite 
Historical Library provided priceless assistance by helping me to gather the many sources 
I consulted. 
     The staff people of the American Friends Service Committee Archives, TransAfrica, 
and the Moorland-Spingarn Research Center at Howard University were all extremely 
helpful and professional.  Marcia Segal gave guidance on how to track down the last 
pieces of the puzzle at the Library of Congress.  My colleagues at the College of 
Southern Maryland, especially Christine Arnold-Lourie and Victoria Clements, have 
shown me how to balance teaching with the pursuit of scholarship.  My friend Allen 
Smith prodded me to think like a historian who cares enough about activism to be critical 
of it, while Alex Winter and Bonnie Bick reminded me not to succumb to the paralysis of 
analysis. 
     My parents, Abram and Patricia Hostetter, who indulged my insistence that we spend 
family vacations visiting every historic site listed in the AAA Tourbook, and thus are 
largely responsible for my engagement with history, have been more supportive than I 
could have imagined.  The legendary forbearance of my siblings Andrew (deceased), 
Rebecca and Samuel, who shared those historical field trips whether they liked it or not, 
as well as my sons, Benuel Hostetter and Taylor Johnson, who now suffer the same fate, 
allowed me to piece together my vision of history. 
     My wife Suni Johnson has been infinitely patient, and was often more assured of the 
eventual success of this project than I.  Without her it would have been impossible.  
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Though it sometimes seemed like it was a thousand centuries in coming, the dawn of this 











Through the Glass Starkly: Americans Confront Apartheid 
 
To list the extensive economic relations of the great powers with South Africa is to 
suggest a potent nonviolent path.  The international potential of nonviolence has never 
been employed.  Nonviolence has been practiced within national borders in India and the 
United States and in regions of Africa with spectacular success.  The time has come fully 
to utilize nonviolence through massive international boycott which would involve the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Great Britain, France, the United States, Germany 
and Japan.  Millions of people can personally give expression to their abhorrence of the 
world's worst racism through such a far-flung boycott…The time has come for an 
international alliance of people of all nations against racism." 
 
Martin Luther King Jr., December 10, 19651 
 
     Apartheid, Afrikaans for apartness, is the term for the system of racial segregation by 
which the white minority in South Africa oppressed the black majority and other people 
of color.  From 1948 through 1994, apartheid served as the operating principle of 
government in South Africa.  Because of the global outcry against apartheid as the 
world’s most egregious example of racism, it remains a term of political opprobrium 
years after its official demise.  The term continues to be invoked in books, articles, and 
speeches to emphasize the political gravity of issues such as the continued segregation of 
American education and housing, the oppression of lesbians and gays, the devastation 
caused by AIDS, the world-wide threat of environmental destruction, the global 
maldistribution of wealth, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.2  The resilient resonance of 
                                                
1 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., (Address to the South Africa Benefit of the American 
Committee on Africa at Hunter College, New York City, 10 December, 1965) American 
Committee On Africa (ACOA) Records, Amistad Research Center, Tulane University, 
New Orleans, Microfilm, Part 2, Reel 17, Frame 553.  Hereafter referred to as ACOA 
Records. 
 
2 Listed below is a sampling of titles that invoke apartheid: 
Z. Jaffrey, AIDS in South Africa: The New Apartheid.  (London: Verso, 2001); 
 
2 
the term reflects the searing reality of apartheid while underscoring the success of the 
global antiapartheid movement in shaping the vocabulary of political culture. 
     Martin Luther King Jr. stands out among the most renowned American opponents of 
apartheid.  King’s 1965 assessment of the apartheid regime’s vulnerability to 
international sanctions and condemnation proved, in the end, to be correct.  It took, 
however, more than twenty years for the US to implement fully the kind of sanctions 
King advocated.  King consistently spoke out against apartheid during his dozen years of 
prominence as the leading voice for African-American civil rights.  Beginning in 1957, 
he lent his name to the cause and spoke often in support of antiapartheid campaigns.3  In 
his 1964 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, the American civil rights leader 
connected his efforts to those of African National Congress President Chief Albert Lutuli 
of South Africa; Lutuli had been awarded the same prize in 1960.4  King even tried to 
travel to South Africa to dramatize the connection between the struggles for racial justice 
there and in the United States, but the apartheid government denied him a visa.5 
                                                                                                                                                       
Titus Alexander, Unraveling Global Apartheid: An Overview of World Politics. 
(Cambridge: Polity/Blackwell Publishers, 1996); 
W.N. Eskridge, Gaylaw: Challenging The Apartheid of the Closet. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); 
D.S. Massey and N.A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the 
Underclass.  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); 
R.D Bullard, et al., Residential Apartheid: the American Legacy. 
CAAS Urban Policy Series, v. 2 (Los Angeles, CA: CAAS Publications, 1994). 
 
3 Lewis V. Baldwin, To Make The Wounded Whole: The Cultural Legacy of Martin 
Luther King (Minneapolis: Augsberg Fortress, 1992), 207. 
 
4 Martin Luther King, Jr., (Address delivered in Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize, 
Oslo Norway 10 December 1964).  Nobel Emuseum, 
http://www.nobel.se/peace/laureates/1964/king-acceptance.html (1June 2003). 
 
5 Lewis V. Baldwin., Toward the Beloved Community: Martin Luther King Jr. and South 
Africa. (Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, 1995). 
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     King’s advocacy of nonviolence, his commitment to active solidarity with those 
fighting apartheid despite American Cold War commitments in the region, and his vision 
of a universal antiracist position helped define the terms of debate during the quarter 
century of antiapartheid activism that followed his Hunter College address.  King 
couched his call for global human rights in the principles most Americans claim to 
cherish, arguing that freedom, dignity, and justice6 should apply to those suffering 
discrimination in Selma, Alabama, and Soweto, South Africa, alike.  Following his 
assassination in 1968, King’s legacy loomed large for those striving to sway public 
opinion and change American policy toward South Africa. 
     South Africa drew the attention of American activists for a range of reasons.  Initially 
it provided a promising model for nonviolent revolution that pacifists and integrationists 
hoped to apply to the racial situation in the US.  The optimistic attention paid to the 
struggle in the 1950s changed after the massacre of 69 unarmed protesters at Sharpeville 
served notice to civil rights activists that the path they were forging was fraught with 
danger and uncertainty.  The 1960 Sharpeville Massacre and subsequent state of 
emergency in South Africa provided a stark reminder of the racial apocalypse America 
might face should nonviolence fail to bring about peaceful change. 
     US opponents of the South African racial oppression created the most widespread and 
successful foreign policy dissent movement of the 1980s.  Organized political pressure on 
federal, state, and local governments, public institutions, and private corporations to end 
American economic and political ties with South Africa achieved maximum force during 
the Reagan administration.  The antiapartheid movement succeeded in constraining 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
6 King, Jr., Nobel Peace Prize Address. 
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Reagan’s anticommunist rationale for supporting the South African government by 
emphasizing the antiracist moral imperative established by the civil rights movement.  
Akin to the protest against American intervention in Vietnam, the US antiapartheid 
movement maintained its momentum because it sustained a focus on South Africa as “an 
essential issue of American foreign policy and national identity."7 
     Over the course of three decades of organizing, American antiapartheid activists 
created many organizations and mobilized a coalition composed of a wide range of 
constituencies.  While organizers, journalists, and scholars from a variety of perspectives 
have analyzed these efforts, the US antiapartheid movement’s significance to American 
political culture has gone largely unexplored. 8  Historian Van Gosse, in his work on the 
Fair Play for Cuba Committee, has pointed to the need for investigation of the campaigns 
that activists sustained throughout the Cold War era;9 apartheid became the most salient 
of African issues during that time.  Few historical studies on the antiapartheid movement 
have carried their analyses past the mid 1960s, when the initial radiance of African 
                                                
7 Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield, An American Ordeal: The Antiwar 
Movement of the Vietnam Era (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992), 408. 
 
8 Penny Von Eschen, Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-
1957 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); 
James H. Meriwether, Proudly We Can Be Africans: Black Americans and Africa, 1935-
1961 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002);  
Brenda G. Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and US Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996);  
Ronald W. Walters, Pan-Africanism in the African Diaspora: An Analysis of Modern 
Afrocentric Political Movements (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1993). 
Philip V. White, "The Black American Constituency for Southern Africa, 1940-1980," in 
Alfred O. Hero and John Barratt, The American People and South Africa: Publics, Elites 
and Policymaking Processes (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1985). 
 
9 Van Gosse, Where the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War America and the Making of a New 
Left (New York: Verso, 1993). 
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independence had begun to fade and the American civil rights movement had passed its 
zenith.10 
     Cold War considerations conditioned the calculations of US policy makers who saw 
South Africa in strategic terms.  As a provider of strategic resources like uranium, as an 
economic ally, and a bulwark against the encroachment of Soviet influence in southern 
Africa, the apartheid regime provided many attractive inducements to US policy makers.  
At the same time, as with segregation at home, American entanglement with apartheid 
provided a venue for foreign and domestic critics to censure US policy as well as 
corporate involvement.  Antiapartheid activists eventually helped overcome the confines 
of the two-dimensional Cold War construction of the US relationship with South Africa 
by demanding that the moral mandate of the civil rights movement apply to the 
formulation of foreign relations as it had been applied to end segregation at home. 
     The objective of this dissertation is to evaluate the relationship of antiapartheid 
activism to American political culture.  By examining and comparing the actions of 
several of the key, long-lived national antiapartheid organizations and analyzing their 
efforts in the context of the cultural expressions that shaped public awareness of 
apartheid, this study will address several key questions:  What prompted these groups to 
challenge apartheid?  What conditions shaped and informed the tactics and strategies 
each pursued?  How did Cold War connections to Southern Africa figure into 
                                                
10 The key studies that chronicle the antiapartheid struggle on the American side are:  
Baldwin, Toward the Beloved Community; Donald Culverson, Contesting Apartheid: 
U.S. Activism, 1960-1987 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999); 
Robert Kinloch Massie, Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the 
Apartheid Years (New York: Nan A. Talese/Doubleday, 1997); Audie Klotz, Norms in 
International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid (New York: Cambridge, 1995); 
Meriwether, Proudly We Can Be Africans. 
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organizational decisions?  What role did nonviolent direct action play?  How did they 
convey the importance of a faraway struggle to Americans?  How did activists with 
divergent views on the nature of American race relations work together toward the same 
goal?  How did music, films, books and athletic competitions serve to transmit the 
antiapartheid message?  How did antiapartheid activism influence the evolution of the 
symbols and vocabulary of what sociologist Robert Bellah has called the “American civil 
religion?” 11  In the end, what did apartheid mean to Americans? 
     Working to end South African racism while facing the legacy of American racial 
discrimination compelled antiapartheid activists in the US to create a style of alliance and 
cooperation that contributed to the rise of multicultural politics.  Civil rights advocates in 
the US opposed apartheid in South Africa because of the parallels they saw between 
apartheid and Jim Crow segregation.  Activists extended the moral example and methods 
of the civil rights movement to US foreign policy deliberations about South Africa.  
Nonviolent direct action connected opponents of apartheid to their peers in South Africa 
and the American South.  As more African Americans gained leading positions in 
American society as a result of the civil rights movement, they and their allies sought to 
establish themselves in the international arena.  Antiapartheid activists operated 
synergistically with cultural workers who wrote books, sang songs, and performed in 
plays and films that explicated the evils of apartheid to the public at large. 
     The effort to end US support for apartheid spurred institutional divestment and 
sanctions legislation because it constructed and communicated foreign policy dissent in 
                                                
11 Robert Bellah, “Civil Religion In America,” Daedalus, (Winter 1967), reprinted in 
Robert Bellah, ed., Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1970), 171. 
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the vocabulary of American civil religion.  In its outward advocacy as well as in its 
internal debates, the American antiapartheid movement helped to promote 
multiculturalism as a public norm in academia, business, government, and the 
entertainment industry.12  As a renewed form of American civil religion, a key element in 
the inception of multiculturalism can be traced to the praxis born from the clash of 
integrationist universalism and Pan-Africanism within the antiapartheid movement.  
Multicultural politics reflect the modus vivendi negotiated by black and white activists 
during the course of the antiapartheid activism whereby they divided leadership and labor 
within the American antiapartheid movement. 
     The history of American antiapartheid activism is not a single story.  It is composed of 
scores of individual acts, hundreds of committees and coalitions, and dozens of 
campaigns.  Rather than a comprehensive accounting for all antiapartheid activism, this 
study attempts to discern the key trends set by leading activist organizations and how 
they intertwined with presentations of apartheid in popular culture.  Through examination 
of the experience of formal, long lasting activist organizations, the larger contours of the 
antiapartheid movement’s development become evident, revealing two themes.  One is 
the chronicle of how small organizations worked for years to bring the issue of apartheid 
to the attention of the national conscience and consciousness.  The other is the complex 
manner in which those same groups worked to oppose racism abroad while contending 
with the legacy of prejudice and discrimination at home, even within their own 
organizations.  In the process the issue of apartheid became not just a focus of concern 
                                                
12 C.E. Sleeter, P. McLaren, and NetLibrary Inc., Multicultural Education, Critical 
Pedagogy, and the Politics of Difference(Albany: State University of New York Press). 
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but an arena where disputes in the broader civil rights coalition were projected into the 
realm of foreign policy dissent. 
     The antiapartheid movement’s accomplishments in the 1980s grew from experiments 
begun in the 1930s by the leading African-American activists of the era.  For example, 
Pan-African intellectual W.E.B. Du Bois, long the most prominent black activist scholar 
in America, initially included South Africa among his many concerns at the time of the 
First World War.  Du Bois grew more militant in the aftermath of World War One, 
broadening his famous contention that “the colorline is the problem of the twentieth 
century”13 by positing that “The Negro problem in America is but a local phase of a world 
problem.”14  Always controversial, through his Pan-Africanism Du Bois exemplified his 
own maxim regarding the “twoness” of blacks in America:  
One ever feels his twoness, - an American, a Negro; two souls, two 
thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, 
whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. 15 
 
He wrote numerous articles and books on African topics and provided leadership to the 
Pan-African Congresses of 1919, 1921, 1923, 1927 and 1945. 
     Allied with Du Bois in his concern about Africa and apartheid was the multitalented 
celebrity activist Paul Robeson.  Robeson’s career as a singer and actor had made him the 
most famous African-American in the world by the late 1930s.  As a result of his 
personal experience of racism and the knowledge he gained during his travels in Africa, 
the Soviet Union, and elsewhere, Robeson had become a leading radical by the time of 
                                                
13 W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (New York: Signet, 1982, 1903), xi. 
 
14 W.E.B DuBois, The Color Line Belts the World, in D.L. Lewis, W.E.B. Du Bois: A 
Reader (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1995), 42-43. 
 
15 Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk, 45. 
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World War II.  His renowned 1939 radio performance of “Ballad for Americans” 16 
marked the height of his popularity in the US; the patriotic paean helped popularize a 
multicultural vision of America.  The multilingual Robeson combined a commitment to 
internationalism with a desire to reconnect with his African origins.  Robeson’s desire to 
“be African,”17 and his outspoken radicalism, combined with his celebrity status to make 
him both a forerunner of the black power activists of the 1960s and a target for Cold War 
era repression.  Robeson’s political involvements illustrate the conflicts and 
contradictions that those who joined the fight against apartheid would face from the 
fifties through the nineties.18 
     Jack O’Dell, who served as a key advisor to Martin Luther King and Jesse Jackson, 
describes Robeson’s significance for black activists after World War II.  O’Dell met 
Robeson after a concert when O’Dell was a high school student in New Orleans in the 
late 1940s.  Robeson impressed O’Dell on a political and a personal level because “he 
sang songs from China, the Soviet Union, Negro spirituals; had a great presence.  But I 
was most impressed when, after the concert, he spent an hour signing autographs for 
students.”  Robeson became O’Dell’s political model because “I liked his militancy, I 
                                                
16 John Latouche and Earl Robinson, Ballad For Americans, 
http://www.cpsr.cs.uchicago.edu/robeson/links/NYlabor.ballad.lyrics.html (18 May 
2003). 
 
17 Sterling Stuckey, Going Through the Storm: The Influence of African American Art in 
History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
 
18 Paul Robeson, Here I Stand, (Boston: Beacon Press: 1958) and Martin Bauml 
Duberman, Paul Robeson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988). 
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liked his stance, I liked his integrity and he was a powerful symbol.”19  O’Dell cites 
Robeson as one key influence in his decision to join the Communist Party, an association 
that would create political difficulties during his post-Party political activism. 
     Du Bois and Robeson joined forces in the Council on African Affairs (CAA), which 
historian Hollis Lynch has described as “the most important American organization 
concerned with Africa”20 during the 1940s and early 1950s.  Originally founded as the 
International Committee on African Affairs in 1937, the organization served as an 
educational bureau devoted to the dissemination of information about Africa.  Well-
known figures from the African-American community such as Alain Locke, Ralph 
Bunche, Mary McLeod Bethune, and Alphaeus Hunton worked with the Council in its 
early years.  The group’s mission shifted in a more activist direction with reorganization 
into the CAA in 1942.  The most prominent person associated with the Council was 
Robeson, a founder who served as chair and public spokesperson from 1942 onward.  Du 
Bois was also central to the work of the CAA; when he left the NAACP in 1948 he made 
his office at the Council's Harlem headquarters. 
     At the end of World War II, as demands for independence emanating from colonized 
Africa grew louder, the CAA led the promotion of anticolonial concerns in the US.  
South Africa was always primary to the Council’s work.  At it peak in the late forties, the 
CAA hosted African independence petitioners, led delegations to the State Department, 
                                                
19 “Jack O’Dell on Fighting Racism in the 1940s,” Interviewed by Sam Sills, 8 May 1993, 
History Matters Website, http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/6927/ (accessed 1 December 
2003). 
 
20 Hollis R. Lynch, Black American Radicals and the Liberation of Africa: The Council 




organized mass rallies, picketed the South African consulate in New York, and 
disseminated literature designed to increase awareness about Africa.  The Council’s 
criticisms of US Cold War policy and its leftwing alliances attracted pressure from the 
government while fostering dissension among its leaders.  International activism, and 
suspicion of links to Soviet-backed Communism, led to the revocation of Robeson and 
Du Bois' passports.  This, combined with government harassment of the Council 
regarding its status as an agent for foreign powers, neutralized the CAA as an active force 
by 1952.  The CAA collapsed under the McCarthyite pressure brought on key members, 
which, in turn, caused the deterioration of its funding and popular support.  The Council's 
fate served as an anticommunist warning to those groups that took up the South African 
cause in later years. 
     The divisions within the Council foreshadowed the debates in the antiapartheid 
movement that developed after the CAA’s official dissolution in 1955.  The CAA 
presaged a race-conscious style of anti-colonial activism that became stronger in the 
1960s.  The CAA’s brand of Pan Africanism blended concern about all of Africa with a 
political worldview generally in line with the politics of the Communist Party.  In one 
sense the CAA fulfilled and surpassed the chief accomplishment of American 
Communists in the 1940s: it moved from being an integrated educational alliance to a 
black–led activist organization that espoused radical views.  Thus the tension between the 
universalism of the integrationist dream and the transnational solidarity of the Pan-
African ideal that marked the evolution of the American antiapartheid movement first 
appeared in the CAA.  The struggle within the CAA provides a microcosmic view of the 
process that produced the black-led antiapartheid coalition of the 1980s.  As these two 
12 
tendencies vied with each other, American antiapartheid activism developed a twoness of 
its own. 
     This study examines the evolution of this tension within the US antiapartheid 
movement by analyzing several long-lived activist organizations and how their efforts 
intertwined with the presentation of apartheid in American popular culture.  The story of 
American antiapartheid activism is not a single story.  It is composed of scores of 
individual acts, hundreds of committees and coalitions, and dozens of campaigns.  
Themes that define the broad contours of this movement can be discerned looking at 
national groups and popular culture.  The records left by the movement organizations 
provide a primary record of the debates, decisions and directions that comprise the 
workings of the movement. 
     Three antiapartheid organizations that debated and dealt with these conflicts were the 
American Committee on Africa, the American Friends Service Committee, and 
TransAfrica.  Each group worked against apartheid for more than a decade, combined 
direct action with other tactics, and included antiapartheid activism in larger efforts 
concerning Africa and US foreign policy.  These groups served as what sociologist Aldon 
Morris calls “movement halfway houses,”21 training activists and providing the tools 
necessary to launch and sustain a host of campaigns, though not necessarily building their 
own mass membership in the process.  The efforts of these three organizations provide a 
                                                
21 In his appraisal of the American civil rights movement, Morris asserts, “A movement 
halfway house is an established group or organization that is only partially integrated into 
the larger society because its participants are actively involved in efforts to bring about a 
desired change in society.  The American Friends Service Committee, the Fellowship of 
Reconciliation, the War Resisters League and the Highlander Folk School are examples 
of modern American movement halfway houses.”  Aldon Morris, The Origins of the 
Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change (New York: The 
Free Press, 1984), 138. 
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vantage point from which to compare and contrast the tactics, strategies, successes, 
failures, conflicts and controversies that marked the American antiapartheid struggle.  
The accounts of each of these organizations form the first three chapters of this 
dissertation. 
      Chapter One chronicles the American Committee on Africa (ACOA).  Initiated in 
response to the mass civil disobedience of the Defiance Campaign in South Africa, 
ACOA organized against apartheid from 1952 until apartheid ended in the early 1990s.  
As a small, New York City-based organization with a limited budget, ACOA conducted a 
wide range of actions against apartheid.  Virtually alone in its antiapartheid efforts until 
the late sixties, ACOA experimented with a number of antiapartheid tactics including 
shareholder motions and direct action against companies doing business with South 
Africa.  Begun by activists with connections to the civil rights movement, pacifist 
organizations, and organized labor, ACOA operated from the assumption that its staff and 
supporters would be a racially integrated group.  ACOA suffered criticism for being led 
by whites, despite several projects directed toward mobilizing African-American 
activism.  ACOA’s strategy evolved over time in relation to events in South Africa and 
the US.  Through trial and error, ACOA developed a niche from which it provided 
support and specialized knowledge to the antiapartheid network and the development of 
transnational advocacy. 
     Chapter Two covers the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC).  Reflecting a 
long held concern for South Africa among Quakers, the AFSC employed active 
nonviolence within the context of an internationally supported liberation movement.  As 
the struggle against the white racist regime in South Africa intensified, the strategies of 
AFSC's South Africa Program staff and South African Friends (Quakers) diverged.  
14 
Because of Philadelphia-based AFSC’s involvement in the movements for civil rights 
and against the Vietnam War, its ideological emphasis shifted from relief work to 
nonviolent pursuit of justice and liberation.  AFSC's South Africa Program reflected this 
change.  South African Friends and AFSC staff clashed over differing understandings of 
the application of nonviolence to the antiapartheid struggle.  Critics in the US opposed 
AFSC’s support for economic sanctions.  The controversy around AFSC’s South Africa 
Program encompassed debates about race relations within an anti-racist social movement, 
the relationship of first world pacifists to armed third world liberation movements, and 
the role of pacifist witness in a transnational liberation struggle.  In response to the 
challenges faced by its South Africa program, AFSC developed a stance best described as 
liberation pacifism.  
     Chapter Three tells the story of TransAfrica.  Based in the Washington, D.C., 
TransAfrica began in 1976 at the behest of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), as 
the African-American lobby group for African and Caribbean concerns.  While working 
on a number of issues related to the African diaspora, TransAfrica gained prominence 
during the 1980s as the initiator of the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM) that led a 
yearlong protest at the South African Embassy in Washington, DC.  Led by activist 
lawyer Randall Robinson, TransAfrica represented a coming of age for African-
American involvement in foreign policy.  Utilizing a network of black elected officials to 
mobilize opposition to US policies favorable to apartheid, TransAfrica combined high 
profile direct action in Washington, DC, with grassroots lobbying and support from 
prominent African-Americans, effectively rallying African-Americans as an ethnic 
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interest group opposed to apartheid.22  TransAfrica’s assertion of a new variant of Pan-
Africanism exposed the possibilities as well as the limits of what Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak has termed “strategic essentialism,”23 a political strategy that emphasized the 
special bond between black Africans under apartheid and the historic discrimination 
against African Americans. 
     Neither policy makers nor activists control the way in which ideas are understood by 
the broader public, but information made manifest in a variety of cultural forums provide 
a crucial background for debates and decision-making.  Cultural critic Melani McCalister 
has noted that cultural representations “do not inject ideologies into their audiences, but 
they do figure in the process of constructing frameworks that help policy make sense in a 
given moment.”24  Americans learned about and understood the situation in South Africa 
in ways that jibed with their own experience.  The oppression of apartheid resonated with 
many Americans because it looked familiar.  Images of white police and soldiers beating, 
shooting, and gassing black protesters created a context in which the term “apartheid” 
came to symbolize the racial Armageddon many Americans feared at home.25  The 
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similarity of apartheid to American racial segregation provided activists with messages 
and metaphors to mobilize constituencies that opposed American racism.  
     Chapter Four evaluates and contextualizes the significance of antiapartheid activism 
and the way it reverberated amidst the changes in American political culture from the 
fifties through the nineties.  Antiapartheid activism exemplifies the larger “crucible of 
race” in American life delineated by historian Gary Gerstle.26  It provides a concentrated 
case study of political activism that crossed racial boundaries and international borders, 
as well as long-lived foreign policy dissent that spanned the Cold War era and survived 
the splintering of the civil rights community in the late 1960s.  The link between culture 
and protest began long before the concerts and congressional antiapartheid legislation of 
the 1980s.  In its heyday the Council on Africa Affairs had combined protest and 
lobbying to draw attention to the situation in South Africa.  Direct action, including 
demonstrations, marches, and nonviolent civil disobedience, added an element of 
political theater to the campaign for sanctions and divestment.  Organized protest took 
place in conjunction with a variety of cultural expressions from South Africa that helped 
to stoke opposition to apartheid.  Novels, plays, movies, and music provided a bridge for 
Americans who strove to understand the day-to-day struggles of those who lived where 
racism functioned as the central operating principle of the government.  Transmitted via 
the page, stage, screen, and recording studio, the protest of apartheid’s opponents reached 
a substantial audience of Americans.  
     The methods, symbols, and vocabulary utilized by the civil rights movement were 
applied to the antiapartheid struggle.  Nonviolent direct action, in particular, helped 
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dramatize American entanglement with apartheid.  By extending the moral logic of the 
civil rights movement, the antiapartheid movement was able to invoke themes of equality 
and freedom central to the idealistic vocabulary of American political discourse.  
Participation of blacks and whites in the antiapartheid movement helped to integrate the 
rites and practices of civic participation and protest, at once exporting American ideals 
while consolidating the domestic gains of the civil rights movement in the symbolic 
terms of American civil religion. 
     The notion of civil religion has been hotly contested since sociologist Robert Bellah 
raised the issue in his 1967 article “American Civil Religion.”  Bellah contended that 
there are “certain common elements of religious orientation that the great majority of 
Americans share…this public religious dimension is expressed in a set of beliefs, 
symbols, and rituals that I am calling the American civil religion.”  Among the key rites 
that exemplify civil religion for Bellah are Presidential inaugurations, Memorial Day, and 
the Fourth of July.  Bellah proposed a periodization in which the American Revolution 
and Civil War mark the first and second “time of trial” watersheds that forged the terms 
of American civil religion.  In Bellah’s view, the third time of trial – the post World War 
II era – was shaped by the challenge of striving toward “responsible action in a 
revolutionary world” where new nations are “seeking to attain many of the things, 
material and spiritual, that we have already attained.”27 
     Bellah expected new trials to change civil religion as had happened during the 
Revolutionary and Civil War periods.  He asserted: 
Out of the first and second times of trial have come…the major symbols 
of the American civil religion.  There seems little doubt that a successful 
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negotiation of this third time of trial—the attainment of viable and 
coherent world order—would precipitate a major new set of symbolic 
forms.”28 
 
With apartheid ended and the cold war over, it is possible to revisit Bellah’s thesis to 
compare history with his concerns and predictions.  Did new symbols arise in the wake of 
the crises of the 1960s, or have Americans lost the unifying “symbolic forms” of civil 
religion that make possible the human progress in America’s history that Bellah 
emphasizes?  How did America’s ascendance to global power in the post World War II 
era shape the development of civil religion?  In what ways did Bellah’s “third time of 
trial” correspond with the concerns of the antiapartheid movement? 
     Some critics understood Bellah’s argument as advocacy for an idolatrous secular 
religion substituting the symbolism of government for the signs of faith.  Bellah failed to 
persuade his detractors in part because he did not fully connect his argument to two 
related changes during his third “time of trial:” the symbolism that emerged from the civil 
rights movement reconfigured civil religion while the source of the symbols of civil 
religion became increasingly rooted in the realm of popular culture.  Bellah’s focus on 
the high religion of statecraft, such as presidential pronouncements, prevented him from 
facing the fact that the transmission of American civil religion took place via movies, 
television, and popular music.  While Bellah added the speeches of Martin Luther King to 
his list of the liturgies of civil religion,29 he did not evaluate the organization of the 
renewed version of civil religion, nor did he fully comprehend where its congregants 
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attended services.  The antiapartheid movement, in both its organizational and popular 
culture facets, provides the prime example of this integrated covenant. 
     Chapter Five is an examination of key incidents in the 1980s where antiapartheid 
activism contributed to the integration of American civil religion through an analysis of 
several key events and trends.  Measures directly related to apartheid such as the activism 
of Jesse Jackson and Jerry Falwell, political activity that contributed to the passage of the 
1986 Comprehensive Antiapartheid Act, the initiation of the Martin Luther King Jr. 
holiday, the emergence of “African American” as the preferred term for blacks in the US, 
and the significance of the 1990 Nelson Mandela tour of the US are evaluated in light of 
how each episode contributed to the evolution of multicultural politics in the US. 
     The American civil rights revolution produced profound social change and left 
unresolved social problems.  In his evaluation of the significance of the upheaval of the 
1960s, historian James Gilbert has speculated that the social movements of the 1930s and 
the 1960s each provide important lessons.  Gilbert muses about the political possibilities 
“if the moral energy of the 1960s were ever joined to the political shrewdness of the 
1930s.”30  Antiapartheid activism is one key trend where these political tendencies 
intersected.  Though the predominant political trend of the 1970s and 1980s is the rise of 
a renewed conservatism, the joining of pragmatism and spirit imagined by Gilbert can be 
seen in the work of the American antiapartheid movement, which merged international 
solidarity with the application of a multi-tactical nonviolence. 
     The process by which American activists, black and white, responded to apartheid 
while confronting the legacy of segregation at home contributed to the evolution of 
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multicultural politics.  The key accomplishments of the antiapartheid movement, such as 
divestment, and government-imposed sanctions, served to heighten awareness of the 
connection between American foreign policy and racial politics at home.  Antiapartheid 
activism transformed key elements of American civil religion, integrating the specific 
demand for racial justice with a universal embrace of liberty.  Historian George 
Fredrickson describes the antiapartheid movement as “Birmingham and Selma on a world 
scale.”31 
     US antiapartheid activism produced a successful foreign policy dissent movement that 
also reflected the struggle over the definition of race in American political, social, and 
cultural life.  At its height in the mid-1980s the antiapartheid movement represented a 
coming of age for a black-led movement that could influence American foreign policy 
and the final unified act by the civil rights coalition that cohered around the issue of 
apartheid.  It achieved its greatest impact when it defined South Africa’s conflict in terms 
familiar to Americans.  The development of transnational advocacy against apartheid and 
the evolution of a pacifist stance that supported the political goals of armed liberation 
movements shaped and inspired the widespread movement of the 1980s.  The lasting 
impact of opposition to apartheid registered in the altered terms of American civil 
religion, which was reinforced by representations of the antiapartheid struggle popular 
culture.  The adoption of the term African American as the preferred term for describing 
Americans of African descent resulted from the assertion of a Pan-African consciousness 
that had been raised by the South Africa issue.  The significance of American 
                                                
31 George Fredrickson, Black Liberation: A Comparative History of Black Ideologies in 
the United States and South Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 276. 
 
21 
antiapartheid activism lies in its contribution to the ending of apartheid as well as its 
impact on American race relations. 
     For four decades, American antiapartheid activism attempted to put Martin Luther 
King’s vision of “an international alliance of people of all nations against racism” into 
practice.  Americans who joined the struggle merged their solidarity with those who 
faced “the world’s worst racism” with concern that American race relations might 
devolve into a similar civil cataclysm.  The transnational dimension of American 
antiapartheid activism provided impetus for the multicultural politics that sprang from the 
effort to realize King’s global united front against racism.  It also intertwined with the 








“For the Freedom Struggle is One:” The American Committee on Africa. 
 
“For the Freedom Struggle is one – Mississippi, South Africa.” 
Mary Louise Hooper1 
 
     The order crackled through the plane radio, “Listen carefully and note this important 
message.  You will not be allowed to land at Strijdom Airport or any other airport in 
South West Africa unless all documents of crew and passengers meet all local legal 
requirements.”  The Afrikaans accented voice from the airport in Windhoek, Namibia’s 
capital city, concluded “We know the reason for your mission and should you land 
against these instructions, you shall have to bear the consequences.”2 
     The pilot of the single engine plane, American David Bobman, declared, “This is a 
gritty situation,” and then banked the plane back toward Zambia where it had taken off 
several hours earlier.  The passengers, who were American antiapartheid activists, began 
an animated conversation with the pilot about flying on toward the Windhoek.  They 
wanted to complete the nonviolent confrontation with South Africa’s illegal occupation 
of Namibia that they had traveled across the ocean to commit.  The pilot, who had not 
been informed about the group’s plan to enter Namibia without visas or South African 
clearance, pointed out to his passengers that he owned the plane and did not want it 
confiscated by the South African authorities.  Duly chastened, the five activists resigned 
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themselves to the defeat of their mission and turned their attention to finding an unpaved 
landing strip in the desert of Botswana in order to refuel for the return trip to Lusaka, 
Zambia.3 
     The team that had come from the US in December of 1967 to challenge South Africa’s 
continued administration of South West Africa (Namibia) reflected the provisional state 
of antiapartheid activism at that time.  The participants – Howard University nutritionist 
Flemmie Kittrell, Ph.D., Quaker agricultural consultant Lyle Tatum, medical expert John 
Holoman, MD, economic development specialist Samuel Ashelman, and executive 
director of the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) George Houser – together 
composed the ad hoc “Committee for the Development of Independent South West 
Africa.”4  The group had formed in response to the decision by the United Nations to 
declare South Africa’s continued occupation of South West Africa illegal.  In 1966, UN 
Resolution 2248 had terminated the South Africa’s League of Nations Mandate, which 
had been taken over from Great Britain.  South Africa ignored the resolution and 
continued its occupation.5  The activists intended to enter the territory without visas in 
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order to confront South Africa’s willful violation of the UN.  Participants in the action 
had been recruited because they had medical and development expertise applicable to 
Namibia’s needs.6  The action received coverage in the Washington Post, the New York 
Times, The Times of Zambia, and the South African media.7  The Committee wanted to 
ensure the validity of their project and therein delegitimize South Africa’s continued 
occupation.8 
     George Houser, the coordinator of the group, linked the mile high confrontation to his 
involvement twenty years earlier in the original “Journey of Reconciliation.”  In 1947 
Houser, along with fellow pacifist civil rights activist Bayard Rustin, had organized an 
integrated group of nonviolent activists to travel through the American South on public 
busses to test the willingness of the federal government to desegregate interstate travel.  
That action, arranged by the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the Fellowship of 
Reconciliation (FOR), drew media attention during its two week duration and provided a 
training ground for activists who became well known leaders in the civil rights and peace 
movements in later years.9 
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     The once-and-done action of the Committee for Development illustrates the manner 
and method that Houser and the ACOA pursued to spread the antiapartheid message to 
the American public.  The delegation was deliberately interracial like the 1947 Journey of 
Reconciliation and subsequent 1961 Freedom Ride organized by CORE.  The effort also 
took inspiration from antiwar activists who, in early 1967, had sailed to North Vietnam to 
deliver medical supplies.10  Like many antiapartheid projects involving Houser and the 
ACOA, the confrontation in the sky showed a commitment to inter-racialism and 
experimental nonviolence.  Houser’s involvement was central, as it would be to the 
majority of projects in ACOA’s first two and a half decades. 
     ACOA organized against apartheid in South Africa from its founding in 1953 until 
apartheid ended in 1994.  Virtually alone in its antiapartheid efforts from the mid-fifties 
until the mid-sixties, ACOA experimented with a number of tactics and strategies.  
Begun by activists with connections to pacifist organizations, the civil rights movement, 
religious groups, and organized labor, ACOA operated from the assumption that its staff 
and supporters would be a racially integrated group, still an uncommon arrangement at 
that time.  Through trial and error ACOA developed a niche from which it provided 
support and specialized knowledge to the antiapartheid network.  By cultivating contacts 
in Africa, nurturing a network of activists in churches and colleges, and steadfastly 
representing the key aims of the South African antiapartheid movement to the US 
government and the media, ACOA grew into an institution crucial to the success of the 
US antiapartheid movement. 
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     The formation of ACOA amid the politics of the McCarthy era influenced its 
trajectory, and the response of other activists to it.  Because ACOA served as the longest-
lived of the specialized organizations opposed to apartheid it underwent the longest 
evolution and endured the most criticism.  Despite efforts to mobilize African-American 
activism, ACOA suffered criticism for being directed by whites.  ACOA’s progress from 
its time alone in the fifties and early sixties to its position as the venerable veteran of the 
movement in the seventies and eighties provides an important reflection of the political 
evolution of those who joined concern for African-American civil rights with outrage 
about South African apartheid.  Three key questions shaped ACOA’s development.  How 
could advocates of nonviolence adapt their strategy to solidarity with the South African 
liberation movement?  By what arrangement could ACOA involve and mobilize the 
African-American community to oppose apartheid?  Given the strictures imposed by 
Cold War policies and considerations, how could ACOA foment dissent and influence 
American foreign policy? 
     The early coalition of ACOA’s supporters who gravitated towards the emergence of 
independent Africa matured after the Sharpeville Massacre March 21, 1960.  Though not 
always successful, ACOA experimented with different arrangements for recognizing the 
demands of Pan-Africanist activists and cooperating with a variety of black-led 
organizations.  ACOA refined liberal internationalist opposition to apartheid through 
innovative tactics such as pressure for institutional divestment, boycotts, and stockholder 
resolutions.  In so doing, ACOA served as a movement halfway house11 on an 
international scale and a movement leader, cultivating specialized allies to further 
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antiapartheid efforts while providing information and guidance to a national network of 
localized activism.  ACOA grew beyond the expedience of its early anti-communism to a 
position that emphasized the moral commitment of the civil rights movement to the 
corresponding struggle against apartheid, thus creating a new blend of transnational 
advocacy. 
     The history of the early years of activism in the US against apartheid in South Africa 
reflects the significant debate over the nature and direction of liberal internationalism 
during the Cold War.  Opposition to apartheid in the 1950s, like civil rights activism of 
that decade, grew within the context of Cold War politics.  Those who chose to speak out 
against apartheid in the 1950s and early 1960s presaged the mobilization of intellectuals, 
cultural celebrities, religious people, workers and students that actively rejected US 
intervention in Vietnam.  Rather than just a dark age of consensus and quiescence, the 
period between the end of World War II and the rise of the Vietnam era anti-war 
movement can be understood as a period of creative experimentation and fluid activist 
identity that helps to explain the blossoming of the antiapartheid movement in the 
seventies and eighties.  ACOA managed to cultivate action and advocacy in a time of 
constricted public dissent. 
     George Houser played an essential role in leading and developing ACOA.  Born in 
Cleveland, Ohio, in 1916, Houser, the son of Methodist missionaries, grew up in the 
Philippines and the US.  While in college he spent a year as an exchange student in 
China.  During the late thirties Houser worked with a group of Methodist youth activists 
and joined the Young Peoples Socialist League affiliated with the Socialist Party of 
Norman Thomas.  He gained notoriety in 1940 as a member of the Union 8, a group of 
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Union Seminary students who refused to register for the draft.12  Houser served a sentence 
of a year and day at Danbury Federal Prison, in Connecticut, where he helped initiate a 
prisoner strike in opposition to racial segregation in the penitentiary.  Upon release, 
Houser worked for FOR and became one of the founders of CORE.  Houser applied his 
commitment to and experience with Gandhian nonviolence to CORE’s efforts to end 
segregation.  CORE’s experiments with nonviolence in the late 1940s and early 1950s 
established important precedents for the civil rights direct action groups that followed.13 
     As ACOA’s executive director from 1955 though1981, Houser’s ideas and abilities 
shaped the organization more than any other individual.  Houser’s journey from draft 
resistance through the founding of ACOA and into transnational advocacy illuminates the 
developmental trajectory of American antiapartheid activism.  His experience with 
CORE in the 1940s shaped his style of leadership and influenced the direction of ACOA.  
Not only did Houser play a key role in the organization from its inception until his 
retirement, he has also written extensively about the experience.14 
     CORE began in 1942 in Chicago as the Committee on Racial Equality.  The 
Committee changed its name to Congress in 1943.  As a FOR staff person, Houser 
worked with his FOR colleague James Farmer to initiate CORE’s multifaceted approach 
for using Gandhian nonviolence as a way to mobilize an interracial movement to confront 
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racial segregation.15  The organization that took shape among seminarians and activists in 
Chicago evolved into a national network of CORE locals in Northern and Border States.  
CORE conducted the initial experiments with nonviolent direct action for civil rights that 
would be emulated by others in the civil rights movement beginning with the 1955 
Montgomery Bus Boycott.  Houser joined with FOR co-workers Farmer, Bayard Rustin, 
and others to cultivate CORE into a disciplined cadre of Gandhian nonviolent activists 
committed to applying the idea of satyagraha, or truth force, to defeating segregation.16  
Detailed to CORE by FOR leader A.J. Muste, Houser juggled his role as CORE’s 
executive secretary from 1945 through 1955 with other duties as co-secretary with 
Bayard Rustin, of FOR’s Racial and Industrial Department. 
     In 1945 Houser authored Erasing the Colorline, a pamphlet that explicated CORE’s 
opposition to segregation and commitment to inter-racialism in all its activities.  With an 
introduction by A. Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car 
Porters, Houser’s Colorline enumerated CORE’s experiments with nonviolent direct 
action in the early 1940s.  Colorline bracketed documentation of CORE’s brief but lively 
history with an introduction and conclusion that emphasized faith in the power and 
practicality of nonviolence.  In his forward, Randolph characterized the nonviolent direct 
action of CORE as “applied Christianity” and “applied democracy.”17  Randolph’s 
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introduction presaged Houser’s long relationship with the black labor leader and the 
importance of Randolph’s participation in early antiapartheid organizing. 
     Houser’s formulation for wiping away the “colorline” that W.E.B. Dubois had defined 
as “the problem of the twentieth century” 18 implicitly, if unintentionally, counterposed 
CORE’s strategy to Du Bois’ evolving Pan-Africanism.  In its public actions and internal 
culture CORE emphasized inter-racialism, wherein members tried to live out the 
colorblind society they hoped to implement in the future.  Illustrative of the dedication of 
CORE’s members and supporters to their inter-racial ideal is James Farmer’s description 
of his May 1949 wedding.  Farmer, CORE cofounder and one of the leading African-
American pacifists of the time, married Lula Peterson, a white member of CORE he had 
met in the course of his work as an organizer.  The ceremony took place at a Manhattan 
ballet studio among a congregation of “more than a hundred friends of all colors, mostly 
socialists and pacifists, or members of New York CORE, in attire ranging from blue jeans 
and shorts to business suits and cocktail dress.”  The officiant at the humanist service, for 
which Peterson and Farmer had written their own vows, was an ordained Methodist 
minister, the Reverend George Houser.19 
     In the early fifties Houser began to connect his concern about segregation in the US to 
the struggle against apartheid.  Fellow war resister Bill Sutherland, who, like Houser, had 
served time in prison during World War II for his refusal to cooperate with the draft, 
made the first connections between Houser and Bayard Rustin at FOR and the African 
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National Congress (ANC).20  Through correspondence with ANC spokesperson Walter 
Sisulu and consultation with Z.K. Matthews, Houser and his FOR colleagues became 
supporters of the Defiance of Unjust Laws Campaign by organizing Americans for South 
African Resistance (AFSAR). 21  Matthews, President of the Eastern Cape ANC, served as 
Luce Visiting Professor of Theology at Union Theological Seminary in New York for 
the1952-53 academic year.22  During the eight months of the Campaign over 8000 South 
Africans were arrested in a national campaign of civil disobedience in opposition to the 
increasingly harsh rule of the apartheid regime. 
     AFSAR brought attention to the Defiance Campaign by organizing picket lines at the 
South African consulate in New York and raising funds in the US to support those 
arrested and harassed in South Africa.  On April 6, 1952, when thousands in South Africa 
assembled to express their commitment to the launching of the Campaign, AFSAR held a 
rally at the Abyssinian Baptist Church in Harlem.  Addressing the assembly were Adam 
Clayton Powell Jr., Reverend Donald Harrington of Community Church, and Reverend 
Charles Trigg of Salem Methodist Church of Harlem.  Also speaking, in one of his last 
public appearances, was the actor Canada Lee, who had recently returned from South 
Africa where he had acted in the film version of Alan Paton’s Cry, the Beloved Country.  
Lee had been the victim of anti-communist blacklisting; as a result he had publicly 
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renounced Paul Robeson as part of his strategy to obtain more work.23  According to Bill 
Sutherland, Bayard Rustin handled organizing with the black community in Harlem. 24  
The afternoon rally was followed by a motorcade to the South African consulate for a 
picket line.  About 800 people attended the rally where AFSAR raised $300 for the 
campaigners in South Africa.25 
     The Council on African Affairs (CAA) also organized support for the Defiance 
Campaign with a street rally in Harlem that attracted hundreds.26  CAA Education 
Director Alphaeus Hunton, recently released from the six-month prison term he served 
for his contempt of court conviction, contributed a pamphlet on the Campaign titled 
Resistance.27  CAA had contacted AFSAR’s organizers about possible cooperation in 
support of the South African resisters but had been rebuffed.  Replying for AFSAR, 
George Houser cited concern about CAA’s identification with the Communist Party as 
the reason for AFSAR’s refusal to join forces.28  Distrust between certain members of the 
Council and the founders of AFSAR stretched back to the World War II years, when 
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CAA founder Max Yergan had worked with the Communist party to wrest control of the 
National Negro Congress from A. Philip Randolph, prompting Randolph to resign as 
president of the group.29  The legacy of turmoil fomented by Yergan within the CAA in 
1947-48 led to resignations by many of the CAA’s most prestigious members.  Further, 
CAA’s troubles with the government’s 1953 decision to require CAA to register as an 
agent of a foreign power under the McCarran Act, also fostered mistrust among ACOA’s 
founders, of whom many were long-time allies of Randolph. 
     To support and publicize the Defiance Campaign, George Houser authored Nonviolent 
Revolution in South Africa, published under the joint auspices of FOR, CORE, and 
AFSAR.  The 29-page booklet, replete with an introduction by Z.K. Matthews and photos 
of Campaign direct actions, analyzed the effort from a pacifist perspective.  Houser 
emphasized the connection between the ANC-led Campaign and the path-breaking 
nonviolent actions of Mohandas Gandhi in South Africa nearly a half century earlier.  
The endorsement of Gandhi’s son Manilal, who lived in South Africa, imbued the 
Campaign with special significance for the American Gandhians.30 
     Recounting the successful use of nonviolent civil disobedience throughout South 
Africa that increased the ANC’s visibility and membership, Nonviolent Revolution gave 
special emphasis to the efficacy of nonviolence and the involvement of Communists in 
the campaign.  Writing in January 1953, in the midst of McCarthyism, Houser 
emphasized that American solidarity could help ward off Communist manipulation of the 
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Campaign, though he did not specify how American support would do this.  Houser 
propounded a pacifist analysis of colonialism, asserting that the Europeans in Africa 
clung to their imperial ways out of fear that letting down their guard would facilitate a 
violent end to white rule.  While violent rebellions like the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya 
seemed to prompt an even harsher colonial backlash, in Houser’s view the use of mass 
civil disobedience in South Africa provided a viable model for confronting colonialism in 
the rest of Africa.  Nonviolent Revolution anticipated that the Defiance Campaign would 
provide inspiration for the continent, asserting, “It can only be hoped that this will be a 
nonviolent revolution such as the one that has begun in South Africa.”31 
     Following the 1953 government crackdown that brought an end to the Defiance 
Campaign, the founders of AFSAR decided to establish their work on a more permanent 
basis.  In May 1953 AFSAR became the American Committee on Africa (ACOA).  The 
initial executive committee of ACOA included George Carpenter, the Africa Secretary of 
the National Council of Churches, James Farmer of the League For Industrial 
Democracy, Unitarian ministers Donald Harrington and Homer Jack, A.J. Muste of FOR, 
Walter Offut of the NAACP, labor leader A. Philip Randolph, Norman Thomas of the 
Socialist Party, Peter Weiss of the International Development Placement Association, and 
civil rights lawyer Conrad Lynn, who had been a participant in the Journey of 
Reconciliation, and George Houser.32  Absent at this point was longtime Houser ally 
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Bayard Rustin, who had traveled to Africa in 1952 and had proposed a program shift that 
would have committed FOR to an African program with himself as the key organizer.33 
    ACOA’s founders sought to create a new political position from which to pursue their 
agenda regarding Africa.  Historian Brenda Gayle Plummer has distinguished ACOA 
from the CAA, emphasizing that ACOA pursued the same pro-independence agenda as 
the CAA minus the “Marxist critique of imperialism.”  Instead of the fiery anti-
colonialism of Du Bois and Robeson, the ACOA relied on “a subtle fusion of religious 
and humanist theory and practice” rooted in “Gandhianism and Christianity.”34  Joining a 
broad range of liberals, humanitarians and civil rights leaders united by their concern for 
Africa and their anti-Communism, ACOA maintained a pragmatic approach to African 
issues amid political changes at home and abroad.  The “subtle fusion” of noncommunist 
liberals and religious pacifists arose in the vacuum left by the demise of the Popular Front 
arrangement of the CAA.  Despite its explicitly anti-Communist stance regarding co-
operation with the CAA, the ACOA also suffered Cold war constraints.  ACOA’s first 
director George Shepherd, who had been outspoken in support of African independence 
while he worked in Uganda in the early fifties, had his passport revoked without 
explanation for two years.35  
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     The goal established at the time of ACOA’s initiation was to address the absence of 
"Tomorrow's Continent" from "America's conscience."  They reaffirmed their concern 
about apartheid, stating, "apartheid is not a problem of tomorrow to South Africa's ten 
million non-whites" while expanding their concern "from Morocco through Mau Mau to 
Malan."  While documents for the public emphasized the positive role of the ACOA as a 
means to "bridge this gap between Africans and Americans...to broaden the channels of 
communication between Africa and America,"36 internal communications show that the 
AFSAR veterans developed a distinct political vision.  They intended for ACOA to be a 
link to Africa and provide education on Africa among Americans.  In the evaluation of 
ACOA’s founders these issues had not been addressed in the US except for the efforts of 
"the Communist-oriented Council on African Affairs."37 
     One obstacle to developing a credible presence in the US of advocacy for Africa was 
the inexperience of ACOA’s founders with the continent.  In his memoir Houser 
acknowledges that, prior to the appeals of Bill Sutherland, his only connection with South 
Africa had been reading Alan Paton’s Cry, the Beloved Country.38  To address this 
limitation George Houser, in 1954, under the auspices of FOR, embarked on a six-month 
journey to eight colonized areas and South Africa.  Houser went first to London where he 
met with various representatives of the independence movements as well as prominent 
Pan-Africanist George Padmore, who provided him with letters of introduction to Kwame 
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Nkrumah of Ghana and other leaders.  Houser’s excursions were circumscribed by 
concerns of the colonial authorities and thus he could not visit British controlled Kenya, 
then in the throes of the Mau-Mau rebellion.  His travels in Portuguese-controlled Angola 
were also limited.  Houser gained a wide range of impressions and contacts but his time 
in South Africa made the deepest impact.39 
     Spending about three weeks in South Africa, Houser traveled from Pretoria to Cape 
Town.  During his sojourn he met with a number of antiapartheid activists including 
Arthur Blaxall, Walter Sisulu, Trevor Huddleston, Manilal Gandhi, Albert Lutuli, Oliver 
Tambo, Z.K. Matthews, as well as Matthews’ son Joe.  Traveling in areas proscribed to 
whites and meeting with ANC leaders like Tambo and Sisulu gave Houser a taste of the 
“police state atmosphere”40 wrought by apartheid.  During the latter part of his trip 
Houser suffered surveillance by undercover police who at one point detained and 
interrogated him.  Whereas Houser’s 1954 trip to the continent would be the first of many 
for him, the apartheid regime refused to allow Houser to visit again; he did not return to 
South Africa until 1990.41  Houser’s encounter with the wrath of the South African 
government started an unfriendly relationship between Pretoria and ACOA that would 
last until the end of apartheid. 
     The emergence of ACOA at the time of CAA’s decline provoked short-term rivalry 
and long-term distrust on the part of W.E.B. Du Bois as well as those who emulated his 
Pan-Africanism.  Du Bois, whose passport was suspended from 1952 through 1958, 
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decried the demise of black predominance in academic dealings with Africa right at the 
moment when colonialism had begun to crumble.  Politically isolated and cut-off from 
the civil rights organizations that had been his base for almost five decades, in 1956 Du 
Bois expressed anger at those he supposed might colonize the field he once commanded:  
The American Committee on Africa is a right-wing organization with 
Christianity and some big money behind it.  Naturally, it is doing some 
good work and publishing some facts about the present situation, but 
fundamentally it is reactionary ...You cannot depend on it to tell the whole 
African story...We have nothing in America that is at all worthwhile.”42 
 
ACOA was not the only target of Du Bois’ frustration; he also criticized his fellow 
African-Americans and the emerging scholarship on Africa.  Historian Philip White has 
cited Du Bois’s dissatisfaction with the new generation of trendsetters in the black 
community that came to the fore in the fifties: “This new leadership [of black 
businessmen, bureaucrats, and white-collar employees] had no interest in Africa.  It was 
aggressively American.  The Pan-African movement lost almost all support.”  Du Bois 
bemoaned the lack of black involvement with African Studies, stating, “Today the 
American interest in Africa is almost confined to whites.  African history is pursued in 
white institutions…while Negro authors and scholars have shied away from the subject  
[which earlier had been their special preserve].”43 
     Many among the integrated group of ACOA’s founders, such as A. Philip Randolph, 
had struggled with Communists and their allies in vying for leadership of the civil rights 
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movement.44  Because the ACOA emerged as the key organization dealing with 
independent Africa and voicing opposition to apartheid at the time of CAA’s dissolution 
there may have been a sense that ACOA, representing anticommunism, and by extension 
anti–Pan-Africanism, had usurped the field at the precise moment it gained importance to 
the US and the world.  In this circumstance Du Bois and his more radical partners 
perceived ACOA as having colonized the concern about Africa for untrustworthy liberal 
purposes. 
     One of Du Bois’ associates was also among ACOA’s founders: historian Rayford 
Logan.  Logan earned his Ph.D. in history from Harvard in 1936 and taught at Virginia 
Union College, Atlanta University, and Howard University.  He had been associated with 
Pan-Africanist activities since the 1920s when he had worked as Du Bois’ interpreter 
during the Pan African Congresses of 1921, 1923, and 1927.  He had also been Du Bois’ 
assistant on the unrealized Encyclopedia of the Negro.  Logan’s intellectual output 
included works on the League of Nations, Africa, African-Americans, and Haiti.  He 
joined CAA in 1944 so as to be involved with other anti-colonialists and to show that “as 
a Liberal I would not be frightened by red-baiting.”45  
     In the wake of the 1948 expulsion of Max Yergan from CAA by Paul Robeson and his 
allies, Logan withdrew from the organization along with other prominent members such 
as Channing Tobias, Mary McLeod Bethune, and Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.  Later that 
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same year, on the request of NAACP executive secretary Walter White, Logan took over 
Du Bois’ UN portfolio at the NAACP barely a month after White had dismissed Du Bois.  
While articulating an eclectic independent position for himself regarding the Cold War 
and Africa, Logan chose to join with the majority of civil rights activists who supported 
the Truman Administration’s Cold War policies in order to protect gains in the domestic 
civil rights arena.  Logan was the only major black figure to work actively with both 
CAA and ACOA, though Adam Clayton Powell and Channing Tobias endorsed both 
groups.  In 1954 Logan served as ACOA’s first public speaker, acted as an early liaison 
with the State Department, and remained identified with ACOA into the 1960s.46 
     The initial mandate of the Committee encompassed educational activities, particularly 
the production of the monthly Africa Today,47 and political action, such as 
communicating with the State Department and registering as a Non-Governmental 
Organization (NGO) at the United Nations.  Work at the UN proved to be particularly 
significant in the late fifties as representatives of colonized countries of Africa arrived in 
New York to put petitions before the international organization.  ACOA provided 
political and practical support for the petitioners; a number of frugal future presidents and 
prime ministers spent the night on George and Shirley Shepherd’s couch.48  During the 
late fifties and early sixties George Houser developed contacts and relationships with the 
leaders of independent Africa such as Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika (which became 
Tanzania) and Kenneth Kaunda of Northern Rhodesia (which became Zambia).  The 
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newness of the UN and its significance as a forum for the nations emerging from colonial 
status provided an opportunity for ACOA to be the “bridge” between Africa and the US 
that had been imagined at its founding. 
     In the wake of the Defiance Campaign, interest in South Africa from the small and 
insular American democratic left of the 1950s began to grow.  The journal Dissent, 
founded in 1954,49 devoted its summer 1956 issue to Africa.  Among the articles included 
was an interview with ANC President Chief Albert Lutuli by George Houser, and an 
analytical article by Houser titled “Is South Africa Near Revolt?”  Houser evaluated the 
Defiance Campaign from a Gandhian perspective, pointing out that the surge of 
membership that resulted from the Campaign had made the ANC “a genuine movement 
of mass revolt.”50  Drawing on his 1954 trip to South Africa and contacts with South 
Africans, Houser asserted that while revolution in the near term seemed unlikely, he had 
sensed a foreboding on the part of all those with whom he had spoken.  Houser 
downplayed the issue of Communist involvement with the resistance to apartheid while 
emphasizing the reluctance of Chief Lutuli and others in the ANC leadership to allow 
white membership for fear that it would be an avenue for Communist penetration of the 
movement.51 
     Dissent also published the Call issued for the 1955 Congress of the People that 
adopted the Freedom Charter.  Z.K. Matthews, upon returning to South Africa in 1953, 
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proposed the process that produced the Charter in order to capitalize on the membership 
surge that the Defiance Campaign had produced.  The eloquent appeal called upon “The 
People of South Africa – Black and White” to “speak together of freedom.”52  Some 
2,844 delegates gathered for an outdoor meeting at Kliptown, near Soweto, June 25 and 
26 of 1955 to debate and ratify the Charter.  Also attending the racially diverse meeting 
were scores of security police who interrupted the singing of the ANC anthem Nkosi 
Sikelel’ iAfrica (God Bless Africa) in order to stop the meeting, confiscate papers and 
film, and check the papers of all participants.53  In keeping with its anticommunist 
posture, Dissent published the Call a year after the adoption of the more radical and 
specific Freedom Charter the Call had announced.  The Charter, which Dissent did not 
publish, demanded not only equal rights for all but also declared that “The People Shall 
Share in the Country’s Wealth” and “the country’s resources shall be transferred to the 
ownership of the people as a whole.”54  Both the government and leftists within the 
antiapartheid movement interpreted this broad demand as a call for socialization of the 
country’s mineral wealth.  Dissent’s choice of the less specific Call made clear that even 
a little magazine of the left hesitated to imply an endorsement for the full platform of the 
ANC and its allies even though the antiapartheid mobilization in South Africa had 
produced the largest nonviolent anti-racist movement on the planet. 
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     The Freedom Charter enshrined the principal of “black and white together equals”55 as 
a central tenet of the ANC and its Congress Movement allies.  It proved to be an 
ideological affront to the architects of apartheid because the leaders of the movement 
elevated the integrationist ideal at the very moment that the Nationalist government made 
separation of the races, through relocation and destruction of black townships like 
Sophiatown, its governing principle.  Thus the Freedom Charter and its continuation of 
the spirit of the Defiance Campaign prompted the government to arrest 156 leaders of the 
congress and charge them with treason.  The ensuing adjudication became known as the 
Treason Trial, which lasted from 1956 through 1961.  During those years the trial became 
the primary focus of the antiapartheid movement in South Africa as well as for its 
supporters abroad. 
     The lengthy proceedings of the Treason Trial received scant attention in the US, 
though The New Republic published an article by Alan Paton written within the 
limitations imposed by the South African government.56  The ACOA made an effort to 
bring world scrutiny to the trial by arranging for the Dean of Harvard Law School, Erwin 
Griswold, to be an observer.  Griswold spent part of July and August observing the initial 
proceeding of the trial.57  Upon his return he spoke to an ACOA-organized press 
conference at the Carnegie Endowment Center in New York.  ACOA created the South 
Africa Defense Fund to raise money for the Treason Trial defendants in response to an 
appeal from South African opponents of apartheid such as Paton, as well as Anglican 
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clerics Ambrose Reeves and Trevor Huddleston.  ACOA arranged fundraising tours for 
Reeves and Paton.58  Another important contact in South Africa was American activist 
Mary Louise Hooper, who mailed information to ACOA not easily available given the 
censorship of fear created by the South African government.  After being detained by the 
Interior Ministry in March of 1957, Hooper fled to Rhodesia.  Upon her return to the US 
she became ACOA’s West Coast representative.59 
     American interest in Africa grew in the late 1950s as African states started to gain 
independence.  In 1957 scholars initiated the African Studies Association (ASA).  The 
State Department established a separate Bureau of African Affairs in 1958.  
Organizations dedicated to exposing Americans to African life and culture sprang up, 
such as the American Society of African Culture (AMSAC), the African American 
Institute (AAI), and Operation Crossroads Africa.60  Within this new milieu ACOA 
struggled to stay afloat financially and strove to define itself ideologically.  The ACOA 
board had chosen not to be a grass-roots organization where the entire membership voted 
on the policy direction of the group.  Rather, it depended on a voluntary and at times 
fragile coalition consisting of a board whose members came from a variety of political 
and religious organizations and perspectives, and prestigious supporters who lent their 
name and reputation to the organization for purposes of publicity and legitimacy such as 
Eleanor Roosevelt, ACLU founder Roger Baldwin, Michigan Congressman Charles C. 
                                                
58 Houser, Rain, 120-121. 
 
59 “About Mary Louise Hooper,” Short biography, ACOA Records Part 2 Reel 6, Frame 
992. 
 
60 White, "The Black American Constituency for Southern Africa, 1940-1980,” in Hero 
Jr. and Barratt, eds., The American People and South Africa, 85-86. 
 
46 
Diggs, theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, and Martin Luther King Jr.  A small professional 
staff performed the day-to-day work.  A network of financial contributors kept the 
organization solvent, but just barely.61  
     For its first Human Rights Day action in 1957 ACOA initiated a "Declaration of 
Conscience Campaign" to draw American and international attention to the situation in 
South Africa.  Martin Luther King Jr., Eleanor Roosevelt, Jackie Robinson, labor leader 
Walter Reuther, and Episcopal Bishop James Pike joined with an international group of 
prominent liberals and activists to make clear their opposition to apartheid.  The 
Campaign, along with ACOA's support for the defendants in the Treason Trial, 
reinforced the enmity of the South African government toward the Committee.  As a 
result of its activities the South African Minister for external Affairs denounced ACOA 
for its "decidedly pinkish tinge."  The Campaign, which generated hundreds of events 
across the US, demanded that South Africa "honor its moral and legal obligations as a 
signatory to the United Nations Charter by honoring the Declaration of Human Rights."62  
The Human Rights Day gathering became an annual forum and fundraising event used by 
ACOA to bring attention to Africa, particularly South Africa. 
     American pacifists and liberal internationalists turned their attention to Africa in the 
1950s in hopes of working with the nascent independence movements and governments.  
Pacifist concern for Africa grew in large part from anticipation that anti-colonial 
struggles would follow India’s nonviolent example.  Nonviolent action by Kwame 
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Nkrumah’s Positive Action Campaign in Gold Coast (Ghana), along with the Defiance 
Campaign in South Africa, raised the hopes of those in the international pacifist network 
that there would be an opportunity to share skills and work nonviolently to build 
postcolonial Africa.  A.J. Muste, Bayard Rustin, Houser and other members of the ACOA 
board attended the 1958 Positive Action Conference in Ghana.63  Houser reported in the 
FOR publication Fellowship that the conference call, authored by George Padmore “put 
emphasis on nonviolence.”  The conference agenda declared, “The main purpose of the 
conference will be to formulate concrete plans and to work out the Gandhian tactics and 
strategy of the African Non-Violent Revolution.” 64  With Nkrumah’s support and 
encouragement Rustin, Muste and other pacifists participated in a 1959 protest against 
French nuclear weapons testing in the Sahara that garnered international attention.65  
Plans for nonviolence training centers in Ghana, Zambia, and Tanzania, supported by the 
newly independent governments, meant to provide a venue for experienced international 
activists to convey their wisdom to African recruits, fell short.  Despite problems of the 
new governments and incipient nationalism that prevented the realization of a pacifist 
internationalé rooted in Africa, many of the key players in the effort kept their attention 
focused on the continent. 
     The news of the March 21, 1960, Sharpeville Massacre in South Africa caused a surge 
of concern in the US about the increasingly violent and repressive apartheid regime.  
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ACOA's antiapartheid efforts put it in the forefront of organizing popular response in the 
US to the shooting of 69 unarmed, nonviolent protesters of the Pan Africanist Congress 
(PAC) by the South African security forces.  The Committee organized a public meeting 
at New York’s Town Hall auditorium that brought together an integrated audience to 
express their outrage with the brutality at Sharpeville.  Speakers included civil rights 
attorney Thurgood Marshall, Hastings Banda, who became President of Malawi, and 
Kenneth Kaunda, the leader of the Zambian independence movement.66  
    ACOA also convened an emergency conference at the end of May 1960.  The 
gathering had initially been planned around an appearance by ANC spokesperson Oliver 
Tambo, but he could not attend because the State Department delayed his visa.67  Instead 
Jackie Robinson, the first African American to play major league baseball, served as the 
keynote speaker, addressing an assemblage of over 300.  Robinson emphasized the need 
for international action, comparing it to the pressure of northern supporters of the 
southern civil rights movement.  Robinson stated: 
…it is not the Negroes of the South who protest against influences in the 
North.  Rather it is those segregationists who wish to maintain their 
special privileges.  And so it is in South Africa too.  The Africans and the 
other non-whites and the liberal white people who know that change must 
come about do not protest against the pressures from the outside, which 
play upon the South African situation.  They welcome it and ask for it. 68 
 
The conference produced twenty-four recommendations for individuals, organizations 
and governments to penalize South Africa including boycott, divestment, restricted 
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contacts and exchanges, and economic sanctions.69  The South Africa Emergency 
Conference marked the first time that American activists proposed advocacy of economic 
sanctions as a policy option for bringing an end to apartheid.70 
     In response to the uprising that followed the massacre at Sharpeville, the South 
African government declared the first State of Emergency, further restricting the rights of 
Africans and banning the PAC and ANC.  Both organizations decided that nonviolence 
had proved insufficient in the face of state repression and organized guerilla military 
wings for the purpose of confronting the apartheid regime through armed struggle.  Thus 
the ACOA and antiapartheid advocates in the US found themselves in a new and 
potentially difficult position.  Initially attracted to the South African struggle because of 
the commitment to nonviolence and “non-racialism,” American advocates of the 
Gandhian approach had to contend with the reality that their old allies had now taken up 
the gun. 
     The ACOA, though never an explicitly pacifist organization, did not promote or 
endorse the use of violence.  Faced with the new reality of armed struggle in South Africa 
after Sharpeville, a transformation that would soon consume many liberation movements 
across the continent, the ACOA began to advocate economic boycott and sanctions as the 
method by which “outsiders”71 could maintain pressure on South Africa while adhering to 
nonviolence.  ACOA’s early contact with African leaders such as Lutuli, Kaunda, 
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Nyerere, and Nkrumah, all of whom had utilized nonviolence in their struggles with 
colonialism, dissuaded ACOA from either discounting or romanticizing armed struggle.  
The pacifist expectation during the fifties that Africa would provide the base for 
launching a practicable pacifist internationalé shifted to a focus on the application of 
international nonviolent pressure against apartheid. 
     ACOA entered the 1960s as the most experienced and credible US organization 
dedicated to opposing apartheid and supporting liberation throughout Africa.  The 
turbulent years to come challenged ACOA to respond to the many changes in Africa as 
well as in the domestic political landscape.  The choices made by the Committee 
followed from the precedents that the staff and board set in the early years of the group.  
The success of the US civil rights movement in the years following Sharpeville produced 
new opportunities for ACOA’s antiapartheid activism.  At the same time, events in the 
US, which gained global attention, often overshadowed the clandestine struggle in South 
Africa.  The attraction to Africa as a new realm of political involvement that briefly 
united Cold War liberals with a variety of intellectuals and activists gradually dissipated 
as the first flush of independence began to fade. 
     The early interest in African independence, as represented in the board and endorsers 
of ACOA, had encompassed a fairly broad spectrum of liberal and leftist political figures.  
Elected officials such as Senator Hubert Humphrey,72 Senator Edmund Muskie, 
Congressman Charles Diggs, and Pennsylvania Governor George Leader were publicly 
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associated with the Committee.  Intellectuals soon to gain a radical reputation such as 
Immanuel Wallerstein also worked with ACOA.73  By 1960 two figures central to the 
success of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and the southern civil 
rights movement, Stanley Levison and Bayard Rustin, also appeared on the list of 
endorsers included on ACOA letterhead and literature.74  The Kennedy Administration 
had pressured Martin Luther King to remove Levison and Rustin from any advisory 
positions because of past association with the Communist Party.75  Their appearance 
among ACOA’s endorsers indicates that the reflexive anti-communism of the 
Committee’s early years had begun to ease in the wake of the first wave of African 
independence and the successes of the domestic civil rights movement.  
     A consistent internal objective for ACOA was retention of a black staff person at the 
executive level.  For three months in 1960 C. Sumner Stone served as associate director 
for a short stint that ended when he was hired by the Washington Afro-American 
newspaper as editor.76  The integrated board of ACOA conducted a persistent search to 
engage black staff people.  The low pay and ACOA’s peripheral profile proved to be an 
obstacle to meeting this goal.  George Houser lamented this problem in his memoir, 
recognizing the desirability of having a black leader for the organization.77  The potential 
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that mobilization of the black community could provide to antiapartheid activism 
prompted ACOA to pursue a number of strategies to achieve that goal. 
     In mid 1962 ACOA proposed to the leaders of established civil rights organizations 
that they form an organization through which the black community could voice its 
concerns regarding Africa.  The American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa 
(ANLCA) included in its “call committee” prestigious and recognizable figures such as 
James Farmer of CORE, Dorothy Height of the National Council of Negro Women, 
Martin Luther King, Jr., of the SCLC, A. Philip Randolph of the Brotherhood of Sleeping 
Car Porters, AFL-CIO, Roy Wilkins of the NAACP, and Whitney Young of the National 
Urban League.  Theodore Brown, who had long served on Randolph’s staff, became the 
executive director of the new organization.  According to Brown, approximately 100 
people attended the first conference in December 1962, which passed resolutions, 
including a call for US sanctions on South Africa.78  That same month the Call Committee 
of ANLCA garnered a meeting with President Kennedy in December of 1962 where they 
urged the President to consider imposing economic sanctions on South Africa.79 
     ANLCA’s style paralleled that of the SCLC by providing elite black leadership to a 
broader movement.  The close involvement of ACOA with ANLCA’s launching drew 
criticism from a new generation of Pan-Africanists.  The Liberation Committee for Africa 
(LCA), a Pan-Africanist group that had formed in 1961, expressed skepticism about the 
ability of ANLCA to inspire the black community to act for Africa.  Reacting to the 
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initial call for the 1962 conference, which the LCA learned of from an announcement in 
Jet magazine, the September 1962 issue of the LCA magazine Liberator raised questions 
about the initiation of the Conference by ACOA.  The LCA pointed out the difficulty that 
ACOA had encountered in retaining a black staff person at the executive level.  The 
Liberator article also pointed out that of the names listed on the official ANLCA 
stationery only George Houser had any special expertise regarding Africa.  Concerns 
about the lack of inclusion of Africans and blacks in the initial planning and hosting of 
the conference at the Arden House conference facility of Columbia University prefaced 
six suggestions to make ANLCA more pertinent to the concerns of “Afro-Americans.”  
Included in the six points was the Black Nationalist demand for discussion of “Concrete 
steps toward establishing direct cultural and economic ties between the people and 
governments of Africa and the Afro-American community, including plans for voluntary 
repatriation to Africa.”80 
     While ANLCA did not live up to the radical demands articulated in Liberator, the 
group did have several key accomplishments.  ANLCA held conferences in1964 and 
1967, serving as the most visible expression of concern about Africa by black leaders.  
ANLCA also took a step toward recognizing the contribution of women to civil rights 
and solidarity work by including Dorothy Height among the group of leaders, thus 
distinguishing it from domestic civil rights coalitions of the time that focused on male 
leadership.  In January 1965 James Farmer, representing ANLCA, toured sub-Saharan 
Africa, speaking in Ethiopia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Nigeria.81  As an expression of 
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opposition to apartheid, as well as trepidation about the possible mistreatment of African-
American sailors, ANLCA opposed provisioning US aircraft carriers at South African 
ports.  As a result of Congressional pressure fostered by ANLCA, carriers bound for 
Vietnam and elsewhere were refueled at sea rather than docking at Cape Town.  Also as a 
result of ANLCA’s intervention the State Department appointed a number of African-
Americans to ambassadorial posts in Africa.  Despite ANLCA’s modest victories, its use 
of “Negro” rather than black or Afro-American moored it in a particular historical 
moment.  Although ANLCA had been conceived as a black-led organization intended to 
unify and mobilize concern for Africa in the black community, it never developed grass-
roots support or funding.82  It quickly became a relic of the civil rights movement model 
of the early sixties. 
     As the leading antiapartheid organization in the mid-sixties ACOA was in a key 
position to work with the emerging student movement.  In 1965, attention to South Africa 
grew in the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS).  In the 1962 Port Huron Statement, 
its foundational document, SDS had criticized US ties to apartheid and US relations with 
South Africa, charging that the US “permitted economic investment to decisively affect 
our foreign policy: fruit in Cuba, oil in the Middle East, diamonds and gold in South 
Africa (with whom we trade more than with any African nation).”83  In 1965 SDS, along 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
82 George M. Houser, “Freedom's Struggle Crosses Oceans and Mountains: Martin Luther 
King, Jr., and the Liberation Struggles in Africa and America,” in Peter J. Albert and 
Ronald Hoffman, We Shall Overcome: Martin Luther King Jr. and the Black Freedom 
Struggle (New York: Pantheon, 1990), 186-187. 
 
83 Port Huron Statement - http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~hst306/documents/huron.html 
(6 August 2003). 
 
55 
with ACOA and the National Student Christian Federation (NESCAFE),84 expressed 
opposition to apartheid through a demonstration at Chase Manhattan Bank in New York 
City. 
     Timing their action to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the Sharpeville 
Massacre,85 the demonstrators demanded that Chase end its loans to South Africa and 
encouraged individuals and organizations to terminate Chase accounts.  Adapting the 
nonviolent tactics of the southern civil rights movement to an issue of international scope, 
the demonstrators had first pursued meetings with the bank leadership in order to make 
clear their demands.  Under the slogan “Chase Manhattan, Partner in Apartheid”86 300-
600 participated in the picket line at Chase’s Wall Street Headquarters.87  Demonstrations 
also took place in Boston, Washington, Detroit, and San Francisco.88  In Manhattan forty-
four people were arrested for sitting-in at the entrance of the bank.89  Chase was targeted 
not only for its involvement with South Africa, but because under its president David 
Rockefeller, Chase had projected an image of enlightened liberalism that the students 
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believed was sorely limited.90  Chase substantiated the accusations of SDS by going to 
court to prevent the demonstrators from even making buttons with the “Partner in 
Apartheid” slogan.  The arrestees experienced jailhouse solidarity similar to what their 
counterparts in the south had undergone, singing and supporting one another.  Of those 
arrested, seventeen pleaded not guilty and took the case to trial.  All were eventually 
acquitted.91 
     SDS and other student groups invested significant energy into antiapartheid 
organizing.  The Chase Manhattan project preceded the April 1965 March on Washington 
to End the War in Vietnam that brought national attention to SDS.  In preparation for the 
action at Chase SDS had produced leaflets and a ten-page pamphlet that elucidated the 
connections between American business and the South African economy.  Other student 
groups shared SDS’s concern.  SNCC had sent a delegation to Africa in the fall of 1964 
that included Don Harris and John Lewis, both of whom received financial support from 
ACOA.92  In April 1965 SNCC organized a sit-in at the South African embassy in 
Washington, DC.93  During the summer of 1965 ACOA co-sponsored a project with 
NSCF where several students continued research into the US investments in South 
Africa.  The resulting documentation provided the foundation for later divestment  (the 
sale, and thus subtraction, from a institutional portfolio of stocks of companies dong 
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business in South Africa) and divestiture (withdrawal of a company from South Africa) 
efforts.  NSCF initiated discussions with the National Council of Churches (NCC) 
regarding banking and investment policies of its affiliated denominations.94  
     ACOA closed 1965 with a large gathering at Hunter College in New York City to 
observe Human Rights Day.  Over 3500 attendees listened to folk musician Pete Seeger 
and South African singer Miriam Makeba.  The featured speaker was Martin Luther 
King, Jr.  Organizer Mary Louise Hooper had been concerned that King might overstate 
the case for nonviolence and alienate African attendees.95  But King’s speech focused on 
the evils of apartheid as well as the obligations of black Americans in the world.  King 
compared apartheid to Nazism, charging that South Africa’s racial policies were “a 
recrudescence of that barbarism.”  Linking the struggle for civil rights in the US to the 
struggle for independence and freedom in Africa, King said:  
In this period when the American Negro is giving moral leadership and 
inspiration to his own nation, he must find the resources to aid his 
suffering brothers in his ancestral homeland.  Nor is this aid a one-way 
street.  The civil rights movement in the United States had derived 
immense inspiration from the successful struggles of those Africans who 
have attained freedom in their own nations. 
 
Criticizing US complicity with apartheid King lamented that “The shame of our nation is 
that it is objectively an ally of this monstrous government in its grim war with it own 
black people.”  Calling for sanctions and boycott as the only remaining nonviolent means 
for Americans and the world to gain leverage with the apartheid regime, King proclaimed 
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that “No real national interest impels us to be cautious, gentle, or a good customer of a 
nation that offends the world’s conscience.” 96 
     Interaction with the students of the New Left and the new generation of civil rights 
activists helped ACOA move beyond the parameters it had developed during the 
constricted political environment of the early cold war.  In the latter half of the sixties 
ACOA increased its antiapartheid advocacy by mobilizing pressure against American 
banks that made loans to South Africa, initiating direct action protests against 
representatives of South Africa, and developing new alliances.  This expansion of activity 
took place in the context of a new militancy among African Americans determined to 
apply the idea of black power at home and abroad. 
     During the zenith years of the civil rights movement the ideal of inter-racialism had 
been put to the test by direct action protests and made law by the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  Frustration with the limited nature of those 
achievements contributed to the demand for “black power,” creating conflict and 
confrontation between whites and blacks in many of the organizations and institutions 
connected to the civil rights movement.  This frustration exploded after the assassination 
of Martin Luther King, Jr., on April 4, 1968.  While ACOA never had a black power 
crisis97 such as those that split SNCC and roiled other groups, the new militancy did affect 
the choices and style of ACOA in short and long term ways.  The involvement of black 
activists who had liberal, integrationist connections and commitments insulated ACOA 
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from much of the anger and animus that divided other organizations.  At the same time, 
ACOA achieved only limited success in its efforts to mobilize the black community. 
     In the latter half of the sixties ACOA amplified its antiapartheid advocacy by 
mobilizing pressure against American banks making loans to South Africa.  In the fall of 
1966, ACOA joined with the University Christian Movement to launch the Committee of 
Conscience Campaign to protest the “financial and psychological support of apartheid” 98 
by Chase Manhattan, First National City and eight other banks.  Chaired by A. Philip 
Randolph, the Campaign demanded an end to bank loans to South Africa.  The 
Committee garnered sponsorship from prominent public figures while mobilizing church 
and student groups to terminate their accounts with the banks.  By the time more than 300 
demonstrators gathered at the Chase and City Bank headquarters on December 9, 1966, 
individuals and organizations that supported the Coalition had withdrawn over $22 
million dollars.99  In the course of the Campaign the United Methodist Board of Missions, 
the Episcopal Church, and the United Presbyterian Church all withdrew their accounts 
from the implicated banks.  In 1967 and 1968 the Committee protested at the shareholder 
meetings of Chase, City Bank, and Morgan Trust, avowing that continued extension of 
credit to South Africa gave the apartheid regime “the confidence and wherewithal to 
pursue policies which are contrary to everything for which democracy stands.”100  The 
Campaign realized an unexpected victory in 1969 when South Africa chose not to renew 
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the loan.  The awareness fostered among religious groups by the Campaign led to the 
founding of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) in 1974.  A 
coalition of Christian and Jewish orders and organizations, ICCR replicated the tactics of 
the Campaign of Conscience on a broad range of social issues.101 
     ACOA also extended its antiapartheid activism into the realm of sports.  South 
Africa’s participation in the Olympics had been controversial because of the 
thoroughgoing application of apartheid to South African athletics.  In apartheid-era South 
Africa blacks and whites did not compete against each other and blacks could not 
represent the country in international competition.  As a result of worldwide protest the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) banned South Africa from the Olympics in 
1964.  The South African government petitioned for re-admittance to the 1968 Mexico 
City games; in February of 1968 the IOC accepted South Africa’s claim that sporting 
regulations had been modified to meet the demands that had led to the banning.  But 
sports within the country had not been integrated.  Instead, segregated competitions were 
arranged to produce an integrated team to be fielded in the Olympic competitions.  In 
response most African nations as well as the Soviet Union threatened to boycott the 
games and the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC), led by the 
exiled author Dennis Brutus, worked to increase international pressure on the IOC.  
Eventually forty-one nations expressed their intention to boycott the Olympics in protest 
of South Africa’s inclusion.102 
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     ACOA organized opposition to South Africa’s re-instatement among American 
athletes.  Jackie Robinson and basketball star K.C. Jones, speaking on behalf of ACOA, 
demanded that South Africa continue to be banned from the Olympics, stating:  
If the IOC accepts South African tokenism, it will appear that international 
sportsmen condone South Africa’s apartheid policy.  To the nonwhite 
majority in South Africa it will be just another indication that the world is 
willing to compromise with the indignity of white supremacy.103 
 
65 prominent American athletes, including Robinson, Jones, Arthur Ashe, Wilt 
Chamberlin, Muhammad Ali, Bill Bradley, and Jim Bouton joined with the ACOA-
initiated boycott call.  The IOC reversed its decision in April 1968, officially uninviting 
South Africa.  Bouton accompanied South African soccer star Steve Mokone to the IOC 
meeting in Mexico City in order to lobby for the permanent exclusion of the apartheid 
state from international competition.  Working with Dennis Brutus and South African 
weightlifter Chris DeBroglio, Bouton and Mokone contacted international delegates to 
urge them to increase the pressure on South Africa to end discrimination in all sports.  
Even though the lobbyists played an indirect role in the proceedings, they ran into 
opposition from many delegates who seemed unconcerned with apartheid.  According to 
Bouton the members of the American delegation showed the most hostility of the 
officials they met.  US delegate Douglas Roby accused Bouton of “being paid by the 
Russians” and charged that he and his compatriots were “mixed up with the commies.”104  
Despite the unsympathetic reception from the Americans in Mexico City, ACOA 
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continued to contest South African sports exhibitions in the United States, such as South 
African participation in the Davis Cup Tennis Tournament in 1978 and the tour of the 
Sprinboks rugby team in 1981.  ACOA also worked to dissuade US athletes such as 
Muhammad Ali and Arthur Ashe from competing in South Africa.105 
     In another instance of transnational advocacy ACOA challenged the establishment of 
regular flights to the US by South Africa Airlines (SAA).  In 1968 South Africa exercised 
its option, established by treaty in 1947, to begin flights to New York.  By February 1969 
SAA established regular flights to Kennedy Airport.  SAA advertisements had invited 
“139 distinguished Americans to be among the first to fly the last ocean.”106  ACOA 
countered the SAA campaign with newspaper ads signed by more than 160 prominent 
black Americans who protested the conditions facing black tourists traveling in South 
Africa.  ACOA mobilized several hundred protesters to greet the first incoming flight at 
JFK on February 23, 1969.  Subsequent protests were held at the Manhattan offices of 
SAA and in front of the Harry W. Graff advertising agency, which had signed the SAA 
account. 
     In April 1969 the House Subcommittee on African Affairs, chaired by Congressman 
Diggs, held a hearing on the SAA issue at which George Houser testified.  Diggs initiated 
legislation to block SAA flights while ACOA generated petitions that were sent to the 
Civil Aeronautics Board.  As a result the efforts of ACOA and its allies, the Graff 
advertising agency dropped the SAA account, The Saturday Review and The New 
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Yorker stopped running SAA ads, and the ads that SAA did manage to place dropped 
mention of tourist attractions segregated by apartheid.107  While the flights to South Africa 
continued, the campaign did succeed in countering the effort of South Africa to 
“propagandize thousands of innocent tourists with the pleasures of life in the parts of 
South Africa they are allowed to see.”108  The airline issue became a point of consensus 
for antiapartheid sentiment around which the civil rights movement could unite during a 
time when unity on domestic issues had deteriorated. 
     In the 1970s the intensity and visibility of antiapartheid activism gradually increased 
as African-Americans and their allies ascended to unprecedented positions of power in 
business, entertainment, education and politics.  Reflecting this new power, in 1969 
Congressman Diggs initiated the Democratic Select Committee, composed of the nine 
black members of Congress.  In 1971 the group became the Congressional Black Caucus 
with Diggs as the first chair.  During this period ACOA developed a role as the 
organization activists relied upon to provide information and leadership in the still small 
realm of antiapartheid organizing.  During his time at Harvard Law School Randall 
Robinson, who later became the leader of TransAfrica, contacted ACOA in search of 
information to bolster his nascent activism.  In response to Robinson’s requests for 
information on Africa’s anti-colonial struggles ACOA “sent reams.”109  By 1972 the 
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Washington Office on Africa (WOA), which had begun in 1967 as ACOA’s Washington, 
DC, bureau, became an independent entity with funding from mainline Protestant 
churches.110  New ACOA staff, including SNCC veteran Blyden Jackson, Chicago-based 
activist Prexy Nesbitt, and South African expatriot Jennifer Davis, who became director 
of research, broadened connections to local organizing while deepening ACOA’s data 
and information regarding American economic connections to South Africa.111  In 1972 
William Booth, an African-American judge active in the Episcopal Church who had 
traveled to South Africa with a church study tour in 1971, succeeded Peter Weiss as 
president of ACOA.112  Working with the Congressional Black Caucus and the NAACP, 
ACOA organized opposition to the importation of sugar from South Africa, a campaign 
that refined the lobbying skills of the growing network of antiapartheid activists.113 
     During the mid-seventies a series of political shifts in southern Africa produced new 
challenges and opportunities for resisting apartheid.  In 1975 Angola and Mozambique 
gained independence from Portugal.  The struggle for majority rule in Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe) moved from guerilla warfare toward negotiated settlement and the election 
of a black-led government.  In South Africa in June of 1976 the student uprising that 
began in the black township of Soweto near Johannesburg spread across the country.  
Student resistance to instruction in Afrikaans inspired a new generation of South African 
activists who had come of age after the Sharpeville massacre and subsequent crackdown.  
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The re-enlivened awareness of the crisis in South Africa spurred by the repression of the 
Soweto uprising and the 1977 murder by the police of Black Consciousness leader Steven 
Biko led to a new wave of activism in the US.   
     Demands for colleges and universities to divest holdings in companies doing business 
in South Africa were driven home by student civil disobedience resulting in over 700 
arrests nation-wide during the spring of 1977.114  The first divestment took place at 
Hampshire College that same year.  Student activists had a key ally among the 
Hampshire trustees, long-time ACOA supporter and international activist Cora Weiss.115  
ACOA served the movement by providing data and analysis about corporate involvement 
in South Africa, as well as a staffer who served as student coordinator.  Condemnation by 
the international community of South Africa’s increasingly repressive actions gave 
impetus to the 1977 UN mandatory arms embargo; unlike mandatory sanctions, the arms 
embargo did not suffer a veto by the US, Britain, or France.116  ACOA helped to focus 
increased concern and mobilization about apartheid by initiating the Campaign to Oppose 
Bank Loans to South Africa (COBLASA) under the direction of Prexy Nesbitt.117 
     The Carter Administration, with its emphasis on human rights as a primary goal of 
foreign policy, provided a greater range of opportunities for interaction with the US 
government regarding South Africa.  Carter appointed Andrew Young to be his UN 
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Ambassador.  Young, a minister who had directed the SCLC and served as Congressman 
from Georgia, symbolized a post-Vietnam direction for foreign policy.  Young’s 
appointment presented both new possibilities and problems for ACOA and the 
antiapartheid movement.  Young, while a member of the Congressional Black Caucus, 
had already shown his concern about apartheid by hosting the children of Pan-Africanist 
Congress leader Robert Sobukwe and providing support to them as they pursued college 
education in the US in the mid 70s.118  He, however, held to an interpretation of 
nonviolence that put him at odds with those long-time antiapartheid activists who had 
accepted the necessity of armed struggle.  Touring Southern Africa in 1977, Young made 
waves among blacks and whites when he met with representatives of the black 
community in South Africa and suggested that they mobilize nonviolent economic 
boycotts as he had done as a civil rights activist in the US.119 
     While Young urged boycotts in South Africa, he did not share ACOA’s commitment 
to divestment and disengagement.  He preferred the approach of Reverend Leon Sullivan, 
who encouraged American corporations to comply with a set of voluntary principles for 
operating in South Africa.  Sullivan, a Baptist minister, had first entered the civil rights 
arena as a president of A. Philip Randolph’s March on Washington Movement.120  He 
then served as an assistant minister at Abyssinian Baptist Church in Harlem.  Sullivan 
went on to become pastor of Zion Baptist Church in Philadelphia from 1950 through 
1988.  In the early 1960s Sullivan utilized an economic boycott to break down 
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discriminatory hiring practices in Philadelphia.  To offset the lack of job skills of many 
new workers, Sullivan initiated the Opportunities Industrialization Center (OIC), a jobs 
training program, in 1964.  The OIC model eventually spread to over 140 training sites 
around the world.  In 1971 he became the first African American to join General Motor’s 
Board of Directors.121  
     Sullivan made use of his prominent position with GM to advocate a change in 
corporate behavior in South Africa.  After traveling to South Africa in 1975, where 
airport police subjected him to a strip search before he departed the country, Sullivan 
dedicated himself to ending apartheid.  In 1977 Sullivan drew up a set of principles which 
he urged companies doing business in South Africa to follow.  The six original principles 
called for “non-segregation of the races” in all work facilities, “fair and equal 
employment practices,” “equal pay” for equal work, training programs from previously 
excluded groups, and increased number of peoples of color in management positions.  
Initially there were twelve companies that adopted the principles, including IBM, Ford 
and GM, the American corporation with the most extensive operations in South Africa.  
The Carter Administration endorsed Sullivan’s efforts.122  
     Sullivan’s moderate approach to changing the apartheid regime elicited a positive 
response among many corporations but did not impress the established antiapartheid 
groups, especially ACOA.  After more than a decade of advocacy for sanctions and 
divestment, the gradualist approach championed by Sullivan seemed too little too late to 
the activists at ACOA.  That Sullivan, who had apprenticed with Randolph, found 
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himself at odds with the ACOA, which had been allied with Randolph123 for over twenty 
years, is indicative of the breadth of concern that had emerged around US relations with 
South Africa.  With civil rights allies in key positions in government, and Carter 
politically indebted to the black community for their support in his narrow 1976 victory, 
antiapartheid activism in the late 70s grew to an unprecedented level.  While suffering 
criticism for his moderation, Sullivan skillfully exploited the political space created by 
ACOA and the divestment campaign, offering a formula for reform to corporations that 
feared the prospect of total disengagement with South Africa. 
     As activism accelerated in the colleges and churches, the debate between gradualists 
like Young and Sullivan and those calling for total disengagement such as ACOA divided 
the antiapartheid community.  Carter’s decline in popularity, which occurred in large part 
because of foreign policy failures in Iran and Afghanistan, as well as the forced 
resignation of Andrew Young because of unauthorized contacts with the UN observer 
from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), eclipsed the small successes enjoyed 
during Carter’s first years.  The emphasis on voluntary cooperation with corporate reform 
as the key to change in South Africa, emphasized by Young and institutionalized by the 
Sullivan Principles did not satisfy ACOA or the antiapartheid movement.  Activists were 
even more outraged with the Reagan administration’s South Africa policy. 
     “Constructive Engagement,” the term coined by Undersecretary of State for Africa 
Chester Crocker, became the policy of the Reagan Administration as it eased constraints 
on trade with South Africa in order to shore up the apartheid regime as an anticommunist 
ally.  South Africa’s efforts to curry favor in the US included opening new consulates and 
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initiating advertising campaigns for the Kruggerand gold coins.  The new reality of a 
more open alliance with the apartheid regime motivated more action from ACOA and its 
allies.  Beginning in 1981 ACOA organized a series of conferences to educate state 
legislators and municipal decision makers as well as students, church members, and 
union activists on ways to divest public monies from South Africa.124  ACOA’s efforts 
gave impetus to state and local divestment bills across the country.  By 1991 at least 
twenty-eight states, twenty-four counties, and ninety-two cities had taken some form of 
action that amounted to at least $20 billion of divestment.125 
     After almost thirty years of leading ACOA, George Houser retired in 1981 to be 
replaced by long-time research director Jennifer Davis.  Davis worked with South 
African journalist Dumisani Kumalo to rally action for divestment. 126  As activism 
accelerated to keep pace with events in South Africa, the ACOA staff grew, making the 
interracial, international ideal that the organization had long upheld more of a reality 
among the staff and activists who did the day-to-day work.  ACOA contributed support to 
the spring 1985 mobilization on college campuses across the country that helped foster 
more divestment.  The achievement of the 1986 Antiapartheid Act, which levied 
sanctions against South Africa over Reagan’s veto, marked the high watermark of public 
awareness and outrage over apartheid.  The legislative victory proved to be Reagan’s 
major foreign policy defeat, but did not wholly derail his administration’s tilt toward the 
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apartheid state.  Lax enforcement of the sanctions and a veto of the UN-enforced 
international sanctions undermined the intent of the congressional strictures. 
     Despite the efforts of the Reagan administration to undermine the will of Congress, 
most companies were making divestiture a reality by withdrawing their operations from 
the country.  Thus the pressure applied by the worldwide antiapartheid movement, 
combined with the economic dangers of investing in an unstable environment, helped to 
force Pretoria to respond to the demands for the dismantling of apartheid.  Adding to this 
chorus for change was Leon Sullivan, who in June 1987 announced that his principles 
were no longer sufficient to the circumstances and that he now supported sanctions.  
Sullivan had been working behind the scenes to encourage more corporate pressure on 
South Africa.  Sullivan essentially endorsed the agenda that the ACOA had been pressing 
for many years.  Sullivan stated that: 
Therefore, today, as the strongest possible American nonviolent protest 
against the continuing existence of apartheid and with the maximum 
nonviolent use of moral, corporate, and governmental force against that 
inhumane system, I call on all American companies to withdraw from the 
Republic of South Africa until statutory apartheid has been abolished, and 
Nelson Mandela has been freed, and there is a clear commitment of the 
vote for blacks in accordance with agreements reached with authentic and 
representative black south African leaders.127 
 
     The coming together of the two antiapartheid currents represented by ACOA and 
Reverend Sullivan marked the merger of the themes proclaimed four decades earlier by 
A. Philip Randolph in his endorsement of CORE.  Sullivan’s implementation of “applied 
Christianity” helped foster an entirely new realm of activism that demanded 
accountability for the consequences of international corporate activity.  ACOA’s 
emphasis on “applied democracy” provided activists with the tools and data to bring 
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about divestment through the existing avenues in government, academe, and religious 
organizations. 
     Both threads of antiapartheid activism reflected the evolution of awareness on the part 
of all camps that became known in South Africa as Black Consciousness.  In reflecting 
on the death of Black Consciousness spokesperson Steven Biko, George Houser 
expressed the development of his own ideas about the relationship of blacks and whites in 
the struggle against apartheid.  He said: 
Biko’s death was a terrible loss.  I felt that what he quietly said about 
black consciousness was important not only for blacks but also for white 
people like myself to hear.  So often whites who try to identify with blacks 
in the struggle for justice develop a kind of martyr complex or tend to 
think of themselves as especially anointed leaders.  It is a good antidote to 
such a false sense of importance to be told that blacks must be in the 
vanguard and whites in supporting roles.128 
 
     In the four decades from the Defiance Campaign in 1953 to the election of Nelson 
Mandela in 1994, ACOA piloted a course that made it central to the development of the 
American antiapartheid movement.  ACOA weathered many ups and downs while 
working to build concern about South Africa.  Unsuccessful experiments such as the 
1967 Namibia fly-in served to facilitate the take-off of more practicable and inclusive 
activities such as divestment and advocacy of sanctions.  American antiapartheid activism 
in the fifties and sixties, largely inspired by ACOA, provided an important bridge 
between the experimental radicalism of CORE in the 1940s and the New Left and civil 
rights movement of the 1960s.  Antiapartheid activism continued to gain momentum in 
the seventies and eighties, with ACOA contributing continuity and institutional memory 
to the effort.  The success grew in sync with the mounting crisis in South Africa, and 
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resulted in good measure from the way in which ACOA had constructed the foundation 
on which it and others built. 
     When the vision of an African-led pacifist internationalé faded away after the 
Sharpeville Massacre, ACOA moved from support for the Gandhian struggle in South 
Africa to a position of solidarity with the political goals of those who advocated armed 
struggle against apartheid.  Doing so insulated ACOA from Pan-Africanist and black 
power critics.  ACOA’s willingness to serve as a movement halfway house allowed a 
diverse and decentralized movement to develop.  W.E.B. Du Bois’s 1956 charge that 
ACOA was “reactionary…and not at all worthwhile”129 did not prove to be accurate.  As a 
greater diversity of organizations arose in the seventies, ACOA managed to cede some of 
its privilege by facilitating a division of labor in a polycentric array of national and local 
social movement organizations. 
     ACOA refined liberal internationalist opposition to apartheid by helping to launch the 
Washington Office on Africa and the Interfaith Coalition on Corporate Responsibility.  
ACOA also served as a movement leader on an international scale, cultivating specialized 
allies to further antiapartheid efforts while providing information and guidance to a 
national network of local activists.  Growing beyond the expedience of its early anti-
communism, ACOA took a position that extended the moral commitment of the civil 
rights movement to the corresponding struggle against apartheid, thus creating a new 
blend of transnational advocacy.  A. Philip Randolph’s notion of “applied democracy” 
grew into a wide-ranging debate on the responsibility of individuals and institutions 
regarding investments.  ACOA’s trial and error approach created a political stance that 
                                                
129 Von Eschen, Empire, 143-144. 
 
73 
went beyond pacifist perfectionism and liberal internationalism.  By merging 
Gandhianism and liberal Christianity, ACOA applied the ideals and the lessons of the 
American civil rights movement to changing American foreign policy.  Because it 
involved as much diplomacy and education as it did direct action, adapting Gandhi’s 
strategy to a movement on a global scale required even longer preparation and more 
patience than the post World War II civil rights movement. 
     By no means did ACOA single-handedly end apartheid.  ACOA’s activism did help to 
create the unified freedom struggle envisioned by its founders.  ACOA developed a style 
of transnational advocacy that adapted nonviolence to the conditions of solidarity with a 
movement that used armed struggle.  By overcoming the impulse to do for others and 
instead working with them, ACOA made real the definition of solidarity coined by the 
martyred President of Mozambique, Samora Machel: "Solidarity is not charity, but 
mutual aid in pursuit of shared objectives."130  The experiment in solidarity that ACOA 
launched in 1953 achieved concrete results in the US in the 1980s.  Through long 
experience ACOA built transnational connections between antiracist struggles, in order to 
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Liberation in One Organization: The American Friends Service Committee1 
 
“Our allegiance to nonviolence does not demand from us that we shrink from taking 
sides.” 
Margaret Hope Bacon2 
 
     “We have orders to take you off this train!”3 announced the policeman to three white 
travelers who had seated themselves in the segregated third class car of the Pretoria to 
Johannesburg line.  Scarnell Lean, a South African Quaker, along with Lois Forrest and 
Ann Stever, representing the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), challenged 
the racial segregation of apartheid as part of a nonviolent, integrated Quaker delegation 
made up of four Americans and four African Friends.  Forrest and Stever were Euro-
American while the other members of the group, Jerry Herman and James Fletcher, were 
African-American.  They had all boarded in Pretoria, South Africa in order to contest the 
racial segregation of the trains that transported the labor force of the apartheid economy.  
The American passengers comprised an AFSC study group that had spent three weeks 
investigating the status of apartheid in August of 1980 as guests of the Southern Africa 
Yearly Meeting of the Society of Friends (SAYM).  Having observed and absorbed the 
daily oppression of apartheid, the delegation determined that they, along with members of 
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SAYM, would commit civil disobedience by traveling in the “nonwhite” section of a 
Pretoria to Johannesburg train.4 
     First a black, then a white conductor confronted the group, telling them they were 
breaking the apartheid law that banned integrated travel.  Meanwhile, the other 
passengers in the train car vocally expressed their appreciation for the small act of 
solidarity carried out by the Quaker representatives.  At the next stop, a conductor 
returned with police and ordered the protesters to leave the train.  Scarnell Lean replied 
that he and his traveling companions also had orders.  When the conductor demanded that 
he present them, Lean confessed he could not “because they are written on our hearts.”5  
Jerry Herman warned the conductor that mishandling of the Friends could “create an 
international incident.”6  After several minutes of discussion the police took Lean and 
Forrest by their arms and led them off the train while the rest of the group followed.  The 
policemen presented the travelers to the South African Railway Police Commandant at 
the Kaalfontein station.  After listening to the charges of the police and the response of 
the Friends, the official allowed the group to continue to travel together on the third class 
non-white car but implored them to inform authorities before doing it again. 
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     This small act of civil disobedience by a racially mixed affinity group did not result in 
arrests nor did it make many headlines.7  However, it did steady the uneasy relationship 
of AFSC antiapartheid activists and the Quakers of the SAYM.  Separated by an ocean, 
and by different interpretations of how the Quaker peace testimony should be applied to 
opposing apartheid, the two groups had labored for several years to understand each 
other’s point of view.  Debates over the direction and emphasis of AFSC’s South Africa 
Program riled some in the organization’s constituency.  The ramifications of the Service 
Committee’s involvement with civil rights and anti-Vietnam war organizing had 
complicated the traditional Quaker emphasis on diplomacy and reconciliation.  As a 
result of the changes wrought by those movements, people of color became more 
numerous among the predominantly white AFSC staff.  Most of these new employees did 
not hold membership in the Society of Friends and varied greatly in their personal 
experience of class, culture, and oppression.  The changed composition of the AFSC 
program staff altered the links between polity and policy as the more diverse race, gender 
and class experiences of the staff informed the Committee’s decision-making process.  
Accusations that the organization had strayed from its original mandate and constituency 
became more pronounced when non-Quaker staff did not conform to certain cultural 
styles and standards traditionally prized among Friends.  Negative perceptions based on 
appearance and approach worsened when emphasis on popular education meant to 
mobilize mass action in support of economic sanctions and divestment appeared to 
eclipse traditional relief efforts and Quaker diplomacy, the methods of action favored by 
many long-time supporters. 
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     AFSC’s South Africa Program combined a commitment to revolutionary nonviolence 
with the global reputation of the Committee.  This mixture proved ideologically 
combustible when AFSC’s antiapartheid work came under attack from a few Quakers in 
the US and South Africa as well from critical journalists.  Factions within AFSC 
concerned about South Africa differed in their emphasis on reconciliation and liberation.  
Advocates of active reconciliation wanted to retain what they saw as AFSC’s traditional 
role as a neutral broker.  Those supporting nonviolent solidarity with the antiapartheid 
liberation movement maintained that the stark divide between oppressor and oppressed in 
South Africa compelled them to choose sides.  Negative appraisals of AFSC’s 
interpretation of pacifism, such as political scientist Guenter Lewy’s Peace and 
Revolution: the Moral Crisis of American Pacifism8, fail to recognize the South Africa 
Program’s effective blending of traditional Quaker diplomacy with popular mobilization. 
     AFSC’s internal struggle over its South Africa Program flared around three key 
questions:  How should first world pacifists relate to armed liberation movements?  
Could AFSC improve race relations within the organization while working in an anti-
racist social movement?  Could nonviolence be used effectively within a transnational 
liberation struggle?  Intertwined with the evolution of AFSC’s strategy regarding 
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apartheid was the Committee’s critique of anti-communism, the role of its internal Third 
World Coalition, and the conflict that developed between AFSC and its critics.  AFSC’s 
detractors accused the Committee of departing from traditional active reconciliation and 
forsaking its commitment to nonviolence while AFSC’s staff and supporters argued that 
the South Africa Program exemplified an activist application of liberation pacifism,9 a 
hybrid position that combined nonviolent action and solidarity with liberation 
movements. 
     A new interpretation of nonviolence evolved from AFSC’s internal debate over how 
to oppose South African apartheid.  Combining the active reconciliation of Quaker 
diplomacy and the solidarity of liberation pacifism helped create the synergy necessary to 
end apartheid.  The AFSC program established contacts with exiled liberation 
movements, provided popular education in areas of the US under-served by other 
national antiapartheid organizations, and successfully employed its renown to bring 
attention to the South African conflict.  Despite the difficulties of this trans-oceanic 
association, AFSC contributed to antiapartheid organizing in the US, serving as a 
                                                
9 Liberation Pacifism is my term for a changed understanding of nonviolence that came 
about as a result of experimentation pursued by Quakers and other activists in the sixties.  
For more background see Alice and Staughton Lynd, Liberation Theology for Quakers 
(Wallingford: Pendle Hill Publications, 1996) and John Richard Burkholder, “Pacifist 
Ethics and Pacifist Politics,” in Michael Cromartie, ed., Peace Betrayed?  Essays on 
Pacifism and Politics, (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1990).  For 
discussion of the variety of pacifist positions and action, see Gene Sharp, “Types of 
Principled Nonviolence,” in Gene Sharp, Gandhi as a Political Strategist (Boston: Porter 
Sargent, 1979), 201-234. 
 
82 
“movement halfway house”10 that provided resources, staff, and expertise essential for a 
foreign policy dissent movement to function and flourish. 
     From its inception in 1917 as a Quaker agency committed to fostering humanitarian 
service and alternatives to war, AFSC had striven to apply its nonviolent vision to 
troubled regions of the world.  AFSC had always been headquartered in downtown 
Philadelphia near City Hall, atop which a statue of William Penn overlooks the business 
district of the metropolis he founded as a Quaker utopia.  The Service Committee located 
itself in Penn’s shadow, literally and politically, seeking to “see what love can do” in the 
unforgiving world of international relations.  Pursuit of this non-governmental diplomacy 
made AFSC the source and site of conflict among Friends.11  The relief work and 
alternative service opportunities that the Committee provided from World War I through 
World War II earned it the Nobel Peace Prize in 1947.  Subsequent engagement with 
nuclear age politics brought AFSC’s political organizing efforts to the fore, though such 
work dates back at least as far as involvement with the Emergency Peace Campaign of 
the late 1930s.12 
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     Combating racism as well as war had been a long-standing concern of AFSC.  In 1963 
AFSC rushed Martin Luther King Jr.’s “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” into print as a 
pamphlet, noting that in the past many Quakers “…were imprisoned.  Their actions 
seemed disruptive, their demands unreasonable.  But today many of the freedoms for 
which they stood are bulwarks of our society.”13  The Committee’s successful nomination 
of King for the Nobel Peace Prize had cemented its identification with the nonviolent 
direct action approach of the civil rights movement.14  Hiring choices in the seventies, 
made with this identity in mind, reflected the desire to diversify the staff through 
aggressive affirmative action. 
     With the collapse of formal European colonialism in Africa, and elsewhere and the 
rise of American protest movements in the sixties, AFSC’s international programs grew 
more critical of US policy.  The traditional Quaker intent to minister to both sides in a 
conflict prompted AFSC to counter the US war in Indochina by sending medical supplies 
to North Vietnam and organizing a clinic in South Vietnam.  Following the American 
defeat and withdrawal from Indochina, staff members radicalized by their experiences in 
the sixties sought to expand their opposition to US support for oppressive regimes around 
the world. 
     AFSC’s concern about South Africa’s racist apartheid system began even before the 
consolidation of white economic and political hegemony by the Nationalist Party in 1948.  
Representatives from AFSC first visited South Africa in 1932, establishing contacts 
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between AFSC and South Africans, black and white.15  Distinguished Quaker diplomats 
Douglas and Dorothy Steere visited South Africa in 1953 and 1955; they went on to serve 
in various volunteer capacities for the Service Committee regarding South Africa.  Also 
in 1955 AFSC sponsored a conference at Haverford College, where Douglas Steere 
taught, on fostering American exchanges with South Africa.  The US-South Africa 
Leadership Exchange Program developed from this meeting, a low-key, independent 
program that brought South African students to study in the US, exemplifying the kind of 
non-governmental diplomatic bridge-building Quakers had long practiced.16  By 1957 the 
Service Committee had established a program with representatives in southern Africa.  
George and Eleanor Loft initiated and staffed this position for three years, working from 
Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia (now Harare, Zimbabwe).  Lyle Tatum followed the Lofts 
as Quaker International Affairs Representative in the region, serving from 1960 through 
1964.17  Also working in the area from 1965 to 1967 were Jim and Dee Bristol, who 
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labored in Zambia to foster a nonviolent component to the liberation struggles of that 
period.18 
     During this time AFSC initiated its own actions in the US regarding apartheid.  In 
1965 the New York Metropolitan Regional office began a dialogue with Chase 
Manhattan Bank, where AFSC kept its account, regarding its investment strategy in 
South Africa.  Proceeding from the assumptions of traditional Quaker diplomacy, the 
New York office arranged meetings with Chase Manhattan in order to see if Friendly 
persuasion could bring about a change in Chase’s approach to South Africa.  It did not, 
and thus after several years of meetings, correspondence and internal deliberation on the 
issue, AFSC informed Chase of its displeasure with the bank’s loans to South Africa and 
closed its account.  AFSC’s action prompted a response from Chase president David 
Rockefeller.  In his letter he politely defended the bank’s role in South Africa as “the 
most effective way to achieve mutual understanding and social progress for all.”  
Rockefeller added a more pointed hand-written postscript: “As one who has frequently 
contributed to the works of the American Friends Service Committee in the past you can 
imagine that I particularly regret your decision.”19 
     By questioning American economic entanglement with South Africa AFSC risked 
being charged with favoring Soviet dominance in the region.  AFSC had been the target 
of such allegations since the twenties and thus had a special awareness of the domestic 
impact of anti-communism.  In 1969 AFSC’s Peace Education Division published 
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Anatomy of Anti-Communism.  Authored by a committee of eight academics and 
activists including Jim Bristol, the report elaborated a vision of American foreign policy 
that looked beyond the Manichean dichotomy of the Cold War.  The authors argued that 
reflexive anti-communism had led the US into the Vietnam debacle and allied America to 
repressive and undemocratic regimes around the world based solely on their opposition to 
communism rather than whether they supported democracy and human rights.  The report 
asserted that “the need now is not to ‘stop Communism’ – or to go on trying in vain to do 
so by military means – but to see the good in it as well as the bad and to see the failures 
of capitalism, even of enlightened capitalism, as we now see the good.”20  Calling for the 
US to provide credible moral leadership to match its economic and military prowess, 
Anatomy declared that: 
If the denial of individual liberty, which we profess so disturbs us about 
Communist government, is really a concern of ours, then we should show 
a similar concern when non-Communist governments reveal a lack of 
sensitivity toward those who differ politically or racially from those in 
power.21 
 
The report advocated bringing “economic pressure” to bear on “repressive nations to 
move them toward greater freedom.”22  Reiterating the call of the African National 
Congress (ANC) and the global movement against apartheid, the AFSC authors called for 
economic sanctions against South Africa in order to “avert what can become the greatest 
African tragedy of our time.”23 
                                                
20 American Friends Service Committee, Anatomy of Anti-Communism (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1969), vi. 
 
21 AFSC, Anatomy, 126. 
 
22 AFSC, Anatomy, 126. 
 
23 AFSC, Anatomy, 127. 
 
87 
    Efforts by American Quakers to address the suffering brought on by the apartheid 
regime and its counterparts had begun in the late fifties.  AFSC provided funds, material 
and expertise for several housing and agricultural development projects in southern 
Africa; funds for South Africa were channeled through the Friends Service Council, the 
British counterpart that had shared the 1947 Nobel Prize with AFSC.  Out of this 
experience developed inquiry and planning for an expanded AFSC South Africa 
Program.  In 1972 Lyle and Flo Tatum traveled to Africa and England to make personal 
contacts and explore program ideas and possibilities. 
     By 1974 the AFSC Board created the Southern Africa Representative Program as part 
of its International Division and hired Bill Sutherland to be the first person to serve in this 
capacity.  Sutherland, an African-American, served several years in prison as a WWII 
conscientious objector and then worked with the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE).  
He had actively opposed apartheid since participating in the American effort to support 
the 1952 Defiance campaign, the nonviolent general strike led by the ANC and Nelson 
Mandela.  He began living and working in Africa in 1953.24  His AFSC responsibilities 
included the cultivation of contacts with South African liberation movements then in 
exile, transmitting news to AFSC for use in education programs, and conducting speaking 
tours in the US.  He also participated in diplomatic efforts such as a Quaker delegation to 
a conference in Geneva, Switzerland, regarding the end of white rule in Rhodesia; 
Sutherland expressed frustration with the patronizing attitudes of some white Quakers 
towards himself and African delegates.  While Sutherland “considered himself an 
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advocate for genuine Zimbabwean liberation” he felt that other Quaker representatives 
“put reconciliation ahead of advocacy.”25  Sutherland divided his time each year between 
the US and Southern Africa, where he maintained an office, first in Lusaka, Zambia and 
then in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania. 
     In 1976 AFSC inaugurated the South Africa Program of the Peace Education Division 
as the domestic component of its antiapartheid work.  Staff members Lyle Tatum, former 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) activist Michael Simmons, exiled 
South African Peter 'Molotsi and Jim Bristol worked to support and amplify Sutherland’s 
efforts in Africa through AFSC’s offices in the US.  The implementation of the program 
came at a time when AFSC’s opposition to the US war in Vietnam had stimulated an 
internal reevaluation of the Committee’s goals and methods.  Solidarity with the 
Vietnamese who bore the brunt of US-sponsored aggression had rendered the traditional 
emphasis on the alleviation of suffering and Quaker diplomacy insufficient in the minds 
of many staffers and their allies.  In the case of South Africa, the South African 
government prevented relief activities by groups that supported sanctions. 
    AFSC’s search for the means to show support for the aspirations of liberation 
movements while maintaining its commitment to nonviolence proved arduous.  
Committee veteran Jim Bristol contributed his decades of experience and acumen to this 
process via several important articles.  Bristol’s pacifist credentials included an eighteen-
month stint in prison for refusing to serve in WWII and service as a guide and advisor to 
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Martin Luther and Coretta Scott King during their 1959 pilgrimage to India.26  He 
combined these experiences with the intelligence he had gathered while assigned to 
southern Africa to formulate a new pacifist rationale applicable to AFSC’s South Africa 
Program and other third world commitments.  Bristol’s “Nonviolence, Not First for 
Export” provided the most succinct and significant argument for liberation pacifism.  
First published in 1972 as an article in the pacifist journal Gandhi Marg, AFSC 
reproduced and distributed it as a pamphlet throughout the seventies.27 
     “Not First for Export” shrewdly described and predicted the situation faced by first 
world pacifists in the post-Vietnam War era.  Bristol began by stating “basic revolution is 
required in widespread areas of the world,” and proposed to “overthrow such enemies of 
mankind as illiteracy, poverty, ill-health, economic disparity, and political injustice”28 
nonviolently.  Citing Gandhi and King, he advocated revolution built on “nonviolent 
action…including such overt efforts (when strategy demands them) as obstructing access 
to buildings, disrupting traffic, and blocking the shipment of goods.”  Bristol emphasized 
his own principled, strategic preference for liberation by nonviolent means, contrasting 
the positive discipline of the nonviolent revolutionary with the likelihood that violent 
revolution leaves the freedom fighter “ill-equipped by his violence to carry out the 
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constructive aspects of revolution.”29  “Nonviolence, Not First For Export” underscored 
the connection between means and ends: 
Cannot we envisage the tremendous advantages that would be ours if we 
sought, not to permit an unjust status quo to remain dominant over the 
lives of millions of people, but to shake that status quo to its very roots, 
and finally to dismantle it by methods that would respect the lives and 
worth even of oppressors and their cohorts?30 
 
     Drawing on his own encounters in the region, Bristol used apartheid as the example 
that most clearly illustrated the moral quandary of the first world nonviolent 
revolutionary.  He stressed the need for nonviolent social change programs while 
acknowledging that American activists must “enter fully into the dilemma of the 
oppressed” if they hoped to choose valid and effective tactics.  Bristol emphasized that 
the 1960 massacre at Sharpeville, South Africa, where police killed at least 69 peaceful 
demonstrators, “convinced the Africans that the forces they confront will not yield to 
campaigns of nonviolent resistance.”31  He noted that “the dispossessed people of the 
world believe, as most people have always believed, that only armed violence can gain 
both liberation from oppression and freedom from hunger and want.”32  He pointed out 
that many Americans glorified the Revolutionary War and the Civil War on just such 
grounds. 
     Bristol cited Nelson Mandela’s explanation of the ANC’s move to armed struggle as 
an example of why liberation movements had turned to “counter-violence” in their 
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confrontation with violent oppressors.  Following the massacre at Sharpeville, Mandela 
and the ANC leadership concluded that because violence seemed “inevitable” they could 
not “continue preaching peace and nonviolence at a time when the government met our 
peaceful demands with force.”33  The Quaker activist made clear that he was explaining, 
not condoning, the choice of armed struggle by the ANC.  He continued by advising 
pacifists that, “We cannot prescribe for people in a situation totally different from our 
own, no matter how sincerely we may believe that we can see a better way for waging a 
revolutionary struggle than the one they have chosen.”34  Bristol underscored his belief 
that first world pacifists supporting third world liberation movements acted from a 
position of economic and political privilege, and therefore must not urge those facing the 
“grinding oppression” of apartheid to turn the other cheek, even when they themselves 
felt compelled to do so.  Bristol argued that white pacifists could not urge nonviolence on 
black South Africans because they were “an integral part of the very white status quo 
against which the Africans are rebelling.”  To drive the point home he asked, “just how 
arrogant and how presumptuous can white western pacifists be?”35 
     In answer to the query ‘what should western pacifists do?’ Bristol remained consistent 
with his commitment to nonviolence.  He posited, “nonviolence begins at home” and 
urged American opponents of apartheid to focus their energies upon the corporations and 
the government that he labeled “the accomplices of the oppressors.”  Urging his fellow 
pacifists to recognize that revolution “is needed first and foremost in the United States” 
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Bristol hoped they would “make the necessary sacrifices in income and…run the risks 
attendant upon the reordering of our society.”36  The article closed by reiterating Bristol’s 
thesis: “It is up to the Latin Americans and the Africans to decide how they will wage 
their struggle for freedom.  We cannot decide for them.  Certainly we dare not judge the 
morality of their choice.”37  He counseled his allies to focus on living simply and creating 
social change in the United States as the most effective way to show solidarity with third 
world liberation struggles. 
     Bristol’s article aroused interested opposition from others concerned with the 
application of nonviolence in South Africa.  Gene Sharp, author of numerous works on 
nonviolent action, responded to Bristol’s ideas in a July 1975 letter.  Sharp criticized 
Bristol’s argument, questioning its soundness and applicability because it stressed “moral 
commitment to nonviolence as a principled witness against evil” but “neglected really 
serious exploration of nonviolent struggle for use by ordinary people.”38  Though Bristol 
had traveled to southern Africa to study the possibilities of encouraging nonviolent 
action, Sharp saw the AFSC activist’s analysis as “a retreat into personal beliefs and a 
withdrawal from the attempt to extend the role of nonviolent struggle in politics.”39  He 
characterized Bristol’s advice as a recommendation for activists to merely “witness and 
resist, and not to replace and get rid of the violence.”40  Sharp, the path-breaking 
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taxonomist of nonviolence, endorsed practical tactics over symbolic witness but failed to 
prescribe any specific action for American activists beyond providing more case studies 
for third world liberationists.41 
     “Nonviolence, Not First for Export” also stimulated discussion among Friends.  
Quaker author Margaret Hope Bacon, who wrote for AFSC’s Information Services 
Division, presented her argument regarding “Quakers and the Struggle for Liberation” in 
the November 1976 Friends Journal.  Bacon, who had visited South Africa in 1964, wrote 
in the wake of the Soweto uprising that had convulsed black townships throughout South 
Africa during the latter half of 1976.  She evaluated the failure of the international 
community to rebuke the apartheid regime following the 1960 Sharpeville tragedy.  
Bacon asserted that “the weapons of nonviolence - sanctions and shunning - were not 
employed”42 and therefore South Africa’s racists weathered international condemnation 
while consolidating their power over the black majority.  Citing abolitionist Quakers such 
as John Woolman and Lucretia Mott, Bacon urged Friends to “free themselves from 
complicity” and to “exert moral pressure”43 by boycotting the products of corporations 
doing business in South Africa.  She also invoked an observation of an AFSC icon, 
Haverford professor Henry Cadbury, who had served the Committee for many decades.  
Cadbury had postulated “‘sometimes we Quakers need to act in order to know what we 
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believe.’”44  Echoing Bristol’s call for intentional downward economic mobility as a 
personal, daily Quaker witness against apartheid, she forthrightly pronounced, “Our 
allegiance to nonviolence does not demand from us that we shrink from taking sides.”45 
     To consolidate and build upon its new agenda the South Africa Program undertook a 
study tour of southern Africa in August of 1977.  Ten staffers, including Bill Sutherland, 
and six board and sub-committee members from around the US traveled to Kenya, 
Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Botswana to meet with representatives of the exiled 
South African liberation movements as well as government leaders in the host nations.  
Six of the participants belonged to the Society of Friends.  The majority of the tour 
participants were people of color and members of AFSC’s Third World Coalition (TWC). 
     The TWC began as an informal internal network of people of color working for 
AFSC.  Members identified themselves as part of the Third World global majority.  Most 
of the TWC’s constituents had been hired as program staff in the late sixties and 
seventies.  In 1971 AFSC’s Board officially recognized the TWC as a caucus and 
included it in AFSC’s complicated decision-making structure.  The Coalition held 
retreats, produced a newsletter and served as a stimulus to AFSC’s efforts to bring its 
programs and employee relations in line with its stated commitments to civil rights and a 
thoroughgoing anti-racism.  Many TWC staffers had come in contact with AFSC via its 
involvement in the civil rights movement.  They sought to employ their collective 
experience of racism, both within AFSC and in society at large, by transforming the 
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Committee’s culture to make it congruent with the programs for racial justice they sought 
to implement. 46According to Bronson Clark, who served as AFSC’s Executive Secretary 
at the time of the TWC’s founding, the formal inclusion of diverse voices in the 
Committee’s policy process helped AFSC avert the divisions and schisms that plagued its 
peace movement counterparts during the Vietnam era.47 
     The presence of more people of color on the staff brought new perspectives and 
created new conflicts for AFSC.  The TWC propounded an analysis of apartheid that 
connected the South African situation to US involvement in Indochina.  Arguing that 
“South Africa will be the Vietnam of the 70’s” Michael Simmons and other TWC 
members recommended that AFSC advocate three emphases in all of its South Africa 
oriented work: “beyond majority rule; worker and community perspective; and total 
American withdrawal.”48  These recommendations, after being vetted and translated into 
“Quakerese,” became the basic demands of the South Africa Program aimed at the US 
government and American corporations.  AFSC literature urged the US to pressure the 
South African government to make a rapid transition to majority rule, opposed overt or 
covert military involvement or sales in the region, and demanded withdrawal of 
economic interests in white ruled Rhodesia and South Africa.49 
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    During the 1977 study tour, the AFSC delegation participated in an impassioned 
interchange with a gathering of Friends from Africa and Britain in Botswana.  Under the 
auspices of the Friends World Committee for Consultation (FWCC), a body intended to 
enhance communication among Friends, the Quakers held a workshop on nonviolence in 
Botswana’s capital Gaborone.  Friends from South Africa dominated the small conclave.  
While at this conference many of the AFSC staff had their first encounter with the most 
aggressive spokesperson of the Southern Africa Yearly Meeting, Dr. Hendrik W. van der 
Merwe.  The recently convinced Friend combined the zeal of a convert with academic 
expertise and knowledge of the Afrikaner community into his interpretation of the proper 
Quaker way to nonviolently oppose apartheid.50 
     There had been disagreements and difficulties in AFSC’s relationship with South 
African Friends since the Committee initiated its southern Africa work in the late fifties.  
The Southern Africa Yearly Meeting comprised a geographically scattered and 
overwhelmingly white group of around one hundred members, with meetings in 
Botswana, Rhodesia, Zambia, and South Africa.  Almost all of the South African Friends 
were of British ancestry (the total membership of SAYM was less than the number of 
people employed by AFSC).  Van der Merwe, one of the few Afrikaners in the group, 
had first come into contact with Friends while pursuing graduate studies in the US in the 
early sixties.  After several years of contact with Capetown Quakers, he left the Dutch 
Reformed Church and officially joined the Friends in 1975.  Van der Merwe, trained as a 
sociologist at UCLA, oversaw the Centre for Intergroup Studies at the University of 
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Capetown, an academic institute that taught conflict resolution skills.  He claimed 
expertise as a mediator.51 
     His impact on the AFSC study tour proved anything but conciliatory.  Retaining his 
academic formality, he presented papers regarding the situation in South Africa and drew 
up a statement critical of AFSC’s support for sanctions and what he viewed as the 
committee’s endorsement of armed struggle.  The statement noted the opposition of 
South African Friends to “those elements” advocating “new socio-economic systems in 
terms of certain ideological commitments in which there will be no individual freedom.”  
The South African Quakers also condemned “the violence of liberation wars and the 
institutional violence of oppressive regimes in minority and majority ruled countries.  
Van der Merwe’s definition of nonviolence emphasized active reconciliation facilitated 
by neutral mediators.  He saw the measures propounded by AFSC, such as divestment 
and boycott, as coercive forms of “institutional violence…aimed at destroying the South 
African economy and thereby the power off the White regime, without any 
accompanying efforts to provide for constructive measures for the future.”  The 
pronouncement of the South African Friends characterized AFSC’s program as being 
“largely of a negative nature.”  Van der Merwe urged those outside of south Africa to be 
wary of “the extreme militant and military movements and exile groups who do not 
represent the blacks with the country of their origin” implying that the AFSC had been 
overly influenced by the positions of the exiled liberation groups such as the ANC.52 
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     In addition to his stiff, scholarly criticism of the AFSC delegation, van der Merwe 
initiated the request for a session restricted to SAYM representatives and the Quaker 
members of the AFSC delegation for purposes of achieving a Friendlier sharing of views.  
This request resulted in the exclusion of all the TWC participants, further inflaming the 
AFSC staff’s distrust of the white South African Friends.  The study tour reported to the 
AFSC Board that “South African Friends never mentioned the giving up of white 
privilege” and that “South African Friends do not see themselves as part of the 
problem.”53 
     The delegation returned from Africa angered by the patronizing attitude of South 
African Friends, spurring them to apply their experiences in Africa to ending US 
entanglement with apartheid.  Conflict with van der Merwe continued because he 
misconstrued AFSC as a funding agency and announced to a number of South African 
community organizations that they should apply for grants.  News of the death of black 
consciousness leader Steve Biko briefly overshadowed the friction with Friends in South 
Africa because they all respected Biko and mourned his appalling murder by torture at 
the hands of the South African police.  Hendrik van der Merwe had initiated a dialogue 
with Biko, who in turn respected the Friends.  In 1978 AFSC, utilizing its privilege as a 
past recipient, posthumously nominated Biko for the Nobel Peace Prize.54 
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     Building on the momentum of the visit to South Africa, Program Director Michael 
Simmons proposed that AFSC organize a South Africa Summer project for 1978.55  The 
project aimed to facilitate popular education about apartheid by joining the work of staff 
with the contributions of college and high school age volunteers at AFSC regional 
offices.  In ten cities around the US, approximately forty South Africa Summer 
volunteers, many of them African-American youth, worked to end loans from US banks 
to South Africa and called for a ban on the sale of South African Krugerrand gold coins.  
To further these demands the staff and volunteers held workshops, showed films, 
organized demonstrations, and mounted a theatrical production.  Bill Sutherland’s 
summer speaking tour served as an organizing focus for many gatherings and events.  
Overall, those involved with the project deemed it a success, though it drew criticism 
from a few Quakers who felt uneasy about the militancy of some of the staff and 
volunteers.  In Chicago, the project with the highest youth involvement, the Friends 
Meeting barred the volunteers, mostly African-American youth, from eating lunch in the 
Meeting House.56 
     Hendrik van der Merwe exacerbated his problematic relationship with AFSC through 
his participation in South Africa Summer.  During a visit to the US he accompanied a 
delegation in Chicago on a visit to Continental Bank of Illinois to explain AFSC’s 
opposition to further loans to the apartheid regime.  Rather than support the Committee’s 
position or stand aside in quiet disagreement, van der Merwe interjected his personal 
                                                
55 Michael Simmons to Southern Africa Task Force of TWC Re: Proposed Trip to 
Frontline States, PED 1977, AFSC Archives. 
 
56 Michael Simmons, AFSC Third World Coalition, Oral History Interview #509, 2 
December 1991: 34. 
 
100 
opinion, denouncing South Africa Summer’s demands as a “propaganda campaign 
against South Africa.”57  Chicago staff person Mary Ann Corley reported to the 
Philadelphia headquarters that she would not have invited van der Merwe to participate 
had she known that he would jeopardize the effort she had invested into arranging the 
meeting.58 
     To culminate South Africa Summer in August 1978, AFSC announced that it had sold 
$1.3 million worth of Committee-owned stock in American corporations with operations 
in South Africa.  The decision came after an AFSC-initiated dialogue with fifteen 
companies.  Three firms met with AFSC representatives and five others corresponded 
with the Committee; all claimed to be moving toward equitable wages and 
nondiscriminatory work sites.  Executive Secretary Louis Schneider disagreed with the 
incremental approach, stating, “We don’t think anyone should be making profit from 
apartheid.”59 
     The attention garnered by the South Africa Summer project and van der Merwe’s 
criticism of AFSC fueled a sense of unease among some US Friends that had been 
smoldering since the end of the Vietnam War.  Even prior to the Friendly fracas in 
Botswana, prominent Quaker economist Kenneth Boulding had sought to change the 
perspective of AFSC’s Philadelphia staff regarding their solidarity with liberation 
struggles.  The eclectic economist, who had helped initiate the Vietnam teach-in 
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movement, was well-known among Friends.60  He espoused the view that Quakers should 
exercise a preferential option for capitalist states.  Boulding criticized AFSC’s opposition 
to a 1976 petition that called on the new government of Vietnam to end human rights 
abuses.  He held a one-person vigil at AFSC headquarters on January 31, 1977, to protest 
what he perceived as the Committee’s departure “from the light of the Gospel and of 
science.”61  Joining other critics of AFSC publications and positions, Boulding accused 
the Committee of falling prey to “half-baked marxism (sic).”62  Blending his version of 
pacifism with anti-communism, Boulding adamantly opposed the fully cooked variety of 
Marxism as well.  Claiming to be attuned to “the beguiling flutes of freedom,” he feared 
that AFSC heard only “the militant trumpets of justice.”63  Boulding felt he had failed to 
persuade AFSC, and that the Committee had gone the way of some Friends colleges that 
had become Quaker in name only. 
     Boulding joined with a small group of Quaker allies at the 1978 Friends General 
Conference (FGC) gathering in Ithaca, New York, to make suggestions to AFSC about 
the policies and programs of the Committee.  The group, which included several Quaker 
critics of AFSC’s staff, recommended that a special committee of Friends review the 
South Africa Program.  The Ithaca group wanted to focus on the South Africa Program 
because it seemed likely that it would remain a long-term emphasis.  It also happened that 
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the South Africa Program had the highest concentration of staff of color of any 
international program.  The Ithaca group’s proposals brought the legitimacy of AFSC’s 
board procedure into question because all decisions regarding South Africa policy and 
programs had been determined through the board’s lengthy deliberations.  Those at Ithaca 
recommended closer consultation with Quaker experts in the process of drafting AFSC 
educational materials and a suspension of the normal budgeting method so that a wide-
open process of consultation and review could be initiated.  The Ithaca proposal 
amounted to a call for a constitutional convention for AFSC, where all programs would 
be subject to re-prioritization from any motivated members of AFSC’s Quaker 
constituency.  AFSC did not act upon the Ithaca proposal.64 
     Other Friends objected to the specifics of AFSC’s divestment policy.  Earlham 
College economist Herbert Ward Fraser opposed the stock sale, criticizing it as a counter-
productive “heroic witness” akin to the absolutist stance of Quaker abolitionists prior to 
the American Civil War.  In a Friends Journal article Fraser argued that the antebellum 
Quakers who had advocated buying freedom for the enslaved had been right because 
compensating slave owners could have prevented war.  He opposed divestment because 
he saw American corporations as the key liberalizing force in South Africa, and unlikely 
to be swayed by the token actions of AFSC and other church groups.  Fraser feared that 
pro-divestment Friends unwittingly supported the violent polarization of South Africa 
and thus increased the likelihood of civil war.65 
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     Opposition to AFSC’s divestment gave rise to confrontation at the Committee’s 
Annual Meeting in November 1978.  Following a workshop by South Africa Program 
staff, several esteemed Friends accused the staff of pushing divestment through without 
proper consultation with the South African Friends and the AFSC network.  Much of 
their vituperation was aimed at Michael Simmons, though several of the white Quakers 
could not remember his name.  Ron Young, the Peace Education Secretary who had 
chaired the panel, expressed dismay with the hostility toward the staff.  He informed the 
group that he had “been in meetings with corporate executives” who had behaved in a 
manner “more Quakerly than the Quakers in that room!”66 
     Additional criticism came from journalist Stephen Chapman.  In a cover story for The 
New Republic magazine, Chapman claimed that the pacifist legacy of AFSC had been 
“Shot from Guns.”  He argued that AFSC’s once noble, if impractical, pacifism had been 
sullied by its tacit alliances with political groups involved with armed struggle and 
terrorism.  “Shot from Guns” criticized AFSC’s Vietnam programs as too sympathetic to 
the new communist government and impugned the Committee’s willingness to envision 
any role for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in arranging for peace in the 
Middle East.  Chapman included special criticism of the Committee’s South Africa 
stance because it did not explicitly condemn the use of violence by the ANC or other 
liberation groups in southern Africa.  Citing AFSC’s Southern Africa Must Be Free 
brochure, he took issue with the statement that “violence has been coupled with 
nonviolence in the resistance and liberation struggle.”  Chapman objected to AFSC’s 
                                                                                                                                                       
 




concentration on the human rights records of governments that received aid and support 
from the US.  He concluded by accusing AFSC of losing sight of the religious foundation 
for pacifism, arguing that “the injunction to ‘resist not evil’ served as a reminder that 
suffering and injustice, however painful, were to be preferred over committing violence 
against one’s fellow man.”  He bemoaned the loss of the Quaker pacifist purity that had 
made AFSC’s witness morally credible in the past.67 
     “Shot from Guns” spurred AFSC to respond to the claims that the Committee had 
abandoned its commitment to nonviolence.  While acknowledging that “we cannot act 
without risking error” Board chair Stephen Cary responded to Chapman’s claims with the 
query “When the oppressed take up arms, do they forfeit our interest and concern?”  Cary 
reiterated the arguments put forward by Bristol and Bacon regarding the role of American 
pacifists in relation to violence and oppression.  Emphasizing AFSC’s search for peace 
with justice, Cary stated “from experience we can say that it is comparatively easy to 
preach pacifism from the pulpit or lectern when surrounded by serenity and good will.  
But in conditions of violence, injustice and war, it is different.”  To the charge that AFSC 
gave preference to left-leaning governments Cary responded that AFSC “had not 
developed a leftist or Marxist bias or compromised our commitment to nonviolence 
because we now emphasize social and economic rights as strongly as political and civil.”  
Cary challenged Chapman’s astonishment that he did not hear more discussion of God in 
his interviews with the AFSC staff.  The chairman stated: 
We did not discuss God, Christianity or the Gospel with the New Republic 
writer who did not express interest in our motivation or the spiritual roots 
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from which it springs…the thrust of the AFSC has always been to try to 
apply the Gospel, rather than discuss it.68 
 
     In the wake of the New Republic’s attack, the South Africa Program received a boost 
in May of 1979 when Desmond and Leah Tutu visited AFSC headquarters in 
Philadelphia.  Bishop Tutu spoke to a Third World Coalition gathering, urging them to 
continue their support for South Africa’s freedom struggle.  He reminded the group of the 
historical moment they occupied by saying “The United States learned that when it got 
involved in Vietnam, even the most powerful nation in the world ultimately could not 
succeed against the struggle of the people.”  Tutu shared stories about the resolve of 
South African youth since the Soweto uprising.  Leah Tutu also spoke, recounting the 
travails of female domestic workers under the degradation of apartheid.  The Bishop 
assured the group that though he could not advocate sanctions because to do so meant to 
risk arrest, he called for apartheid’s opponents everywhere to apply “pressure on South 
Africa, political, diplomatic, but above all economic.”69 
     Despite encouragement from the Tutus, the ripple effect from Boulding’s sweeping 
criticism and van der Merwe’s specific opposition to the South Africa Program spread to 
the 1979 gathering of the Friends General Conference (FGC).  Meeting at Earlham 
College in Indiana, the liberal formation of Friends accommodated the request of Quaker 
journalist Chuck Fager for several ad hoc discussions to air grievances concerning AFSC.  
The gatherings produced a statement signed by 130 people that raised concerns about 
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staff accountability, adherence to the Quaker Peace Testimony, and AFSC’s role in 
providing service opportunities for young people.70  Southern Africa and Vietnam came 
up as areas where some Friends thought AFSC had abandoned traditional Quaker non-
partisanship, taken sides and supported violence.71 
     Amidst praise and criticism, for much of 1979 the South Africa Program was 
embroiled in disagreement over the issue of sending another study group to South Africa.  
The controversy had begun soon after the 1977 study group returned.  Some board 
members felt that such a visit must be undertaken because it had been promised during 
the planning of the 1977 trip, while others emphasized that South African Friends had 
invited AFSC to visit.  Many Third World Coalition staff members opposed the mission 
because they thought that nothing could be gained from it and that people of color would 
have to be granted “honorary white” status in order to enter the country.72  International 
Division staffer Peter 'Molotsi had been wary of meeting with any South Africans, even 
outside of South Africa, because of his role in the Pan Africanist Congress prior to his 
post Sharpeville exile.73  Midwest Regional Office South Africa Program staff person 
Marcyliena Morgan strongly opposed such a tour.  She pointed out that of the possible 
reasons for such a trip – assisting with nonviolent aspects of the resistance movement, 
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providing medical supplies and services, or collecting information on the involvement of 
US corporations in South Africa – none could be pursued under the legal constraints of 
the apartheid regime.  As for reciprocating the visit of South African Friends, Morgan 
expressed exasperation with the notion that another round of visits deserved funding 
“when money can never be found to implement more educational programs around South 
Africa.”  Morgan sardonically declared, “All is not lost though.  We’ll have more slide 
shows of someone’s vacation to South Africa, and we’ll hear how the South African 
Friends do what they can for the Blacks.”74 
     The Southern Africa Program Representative also opposed the controversial second 
trip.  In Bill Sutherland’s analysis the only effective nonviolent option for AFSC involved 
advocating that Americans join in the boycott and divestment movement.  In his 
correspondence with Philadelphia, Sutherland foresaw no opportunities for AFSC to 
mediate or reconcile the opposing sides with which AFSC had no history.  He feared that 
even the minor cooperation with the apartheid regime needed to arrange a study tour 
could be construed as an endorsement of the government’s position.  Based on his 
appraisal of the position paper that van der Merwe had presented at Gaborone, Sutherland 
warned AFSC that it could be seen as collaborating with the apartheid state, and thus 
undermine his delicate, behind-the-scenes efforts to develop the trust of the liberation 
movements.75 
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     The most scathing critique of the rationale for the second trip came from South Africa 
Program director Michael Simmons.  Simmons, who had spent over two years in prison 
for resisting the draft,76 detected a paternalistic double standard.  In his view it seemed 
that those in the AFSC constituency who raised concerns about the South Africa Program 
and the Third World Coalition staff’s commitment to nonviolence looked upon the white 
Friends in South Africa as a besieged group doing their best to assist their black 
countrymen.  Simmons demanded “how many Quakers in South Africa refused the 
privileges of their race?  Can we distinguish the lifestyle and character of South African 
Quakers from other whites in South Africa?”  He wanted to know “why does AFSC 
continue to focus on the messenger rather than the message?  Are Friend’s concerns 
coming from a Quaker context or a white context?  Why would some view the two as 
synonymous?”77 
     Despite the TWC’s vehement opposition, plans for the trip proceeded.  The 
resignation of Michael Simmons and his replacement by Jerry Herman proved to be one 
change necessary to make the trip possible.  Herman, an African-American, decided to 
participate in a small, integrated AFSC delegation to South Africa.  He had been involved 
with AFSC in St. Louis and had worked for the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference (SCLC) in Chicago in the late sixties.  Also taking the diplomatic position 
was James Fletcher, a prominent black Friend from New York.  Fletcher, who had earned 
a Harvard MBA and worked on the financial staff of IBM, had been active with the New 
York Yearly Meeting Race Relations Committee and co-edited a book about the trail 
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blazing work of black Friend Barrington Dunbar.78  Along with Lois Forrest and Ann 
Stever, Herman and Fletcher prepared to travel to South Africa to meet with Friends and 
to study the situation.  When apprised of the tour’s purpose and agenda, the South 
African government proved slow in providing the necessary authorization.  Visas arrived 
only five days prior to the group’s planned departure in August 1980.79 
     As guests of the South Africa Yearly Meeting, the delegation spent three weeks 
traveling extensively in South Africa as well as Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Namibia.  In 
South Africa the group made a wide range of contacts, including government officials, 
religious leaders, black organizers, students, and conscientious objectors.  Fletcher and 
Herman spent a night in the black township of Soweto, a choice that caused some 
consternation among white Friends who feared for their safety as well as what they might 
do without oversight.  The group reported that they failed to meet with any “ordinary 
Afrikaners” or representatives of the Asian community.  The delegation managed to meet 
approximately half of the members of SAYM.80 
     The interactions of the delegation with the Quakers of southern Africa prompted both 
empathy and disappointment.  The AFSC representatives noted that a higher percentage 
of South African Friends participated in efforts for social healing and change than did 
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American Quakers.  Many supported strikes and boycotts despite the risks involved.81  
Yet the white privilege enjoyed by most Quakers manifested itself during some of the 
visits the delegation made to the homes of Friends.  James Fletcher reported instances in 
which “they would be receiving me as a guest in their homes and yet speak or act in 
racially insensitive ways toward their black hired laborers or servants.”  Fletcher found 
these situations hurtful because “as a Friend I have high regard for and high expectations 
of Friends everywhere.”82 
     An interview with Desmond Tutu culminated the trip.  Tutu underscored the need for 
prayer and pressure to bring an end to the oppression of apartheid.  He reiterated his 1979 
challenge to AFSC to educate and agitate for more international pressure on South 
Africa, though he still felt constrained from advocating sanctions.  Tutu expressed his 
gratitude for the work of Bill Sutherland, endorsing the quality information and insight 
that Sutherland provided.  Tutu’s counsel helped motivate the delegation to urge AFSC to 
redouble its efforts in the areas of “international pressure, education and training, and 
reconciliation.”  While thinking internationally in terms of policy related actions, the 
delegation focused its hope for reconciliation on the local level.  They contended that “we 
do not imagine small efforts will significantly alter the potential of violent confrontation; 
yet we must have faith that they will have some positive influence which can contribute 
to the new, liberated society.”83 
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     In explaining the risk they took when they boarded the segregated train car in Pretoria 
they declared “Our delegation found it necessary to act in some small way, to stand with 
oppressed people.”  The Americans invited South African Quakers from Johannesburg 
and Soweto to join them.  Two whites and three blacks agreed to participate in the 
nonviolent civil disobedience their guests proposed.  One of the white Friends missed a 
train connection and so did not take part.  When detained by the railway police, the 
affinity group received the enthusiastic approval of the African passengers who cheered, 
waved and leaned out the windows of the train to show their support.  As the Kaalfontain 
commandant released the group with assurance that “of course, you may travel with your 
friends; I just wish you had told someone in authority first,”84 he unwittingly affirmed the 
delegation’s combination of nonviolent confrontation with active reconciliation. 
     Throughout the 1980s AFSC continued to act upon the instructions of Bishop Tutu.  
The Committee worked in coalition with other religious and solidarity organizations.  It 
produced important publications including Automating Apartheid,85 an analysis of how 
US computer companies supplied hardware and software to the South African Security 
forces, and Challenge and Hope,86 a concise overview of the history and injustice of 
apartheid produced by AFSC staff in consultation with other experts.  These treatises 
emphasized the role Americans could play in bringing down apartheid, countering the 
Cold War rationale then touted by the Reagan administration.  To that end Jerry Herman 
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reinvented AFSC’s role as a movement halfway house, organizing “coherency 
workshops”87 to foster a cooperative division of labor among antiapartheid organizations 
and prevent duplication of effort.  AFSC utilized its regional offices to nurture 
antiapartheid activism around the country, especially in areas like the South where, 
compared to urban areas and cities with more liberal universities, little organized 
educational activity and protest had arisen.88  Most importantly, AFSC nominated Bishop 
Tutu for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1981; Tutu won the prize in 1984.89 
     Hendrik van der Merwe continued his efforts to facilitate reconciliation in South 
Africa.  In 1984 he put his white skin privilege at risk by befriending Winnie Mandela 
and helped to arrange some of the first contacts between the ANC and the government.  
The credibility he had labored to establish with most parties in the apartheid conflict 
enabled him to become an important mediator in the late eighties and early nineties.  Van 
der Merwe became a significant ally of the Mandelas, assisting several of their children 
with college entrance requirements.  He continues to defend his position regarding active 
reconciliation and has never relented in his criticism of AFSC’s approach.  In a 1997 
article he repeated his objection to AFSC’s support for sanctions: 
In spite of growing acceptance of mediation and a negotiated settlement 
on the part of black South African leaders, I found antiapartheid activists 
more and more opposed to mediation and conciliation.  I was later tempted 
to interpret this difference in terms of their different position and interests: 
the black leaders wanted a settlement so they could return home; the 
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antiapartheid activists feared a settlement that would deprive them of their 
cause and job security.90 
 
Van der Merwe maintains that his efforts “prepared the table” for negotiations and 
reconciliation, but gives little credit to AFSC and the international antiapartheid 
movement’s contribution to the construction of the table he helped to set.91 
     Bill Sutherland resigned from AFSC in 1982.  Subsequent appointees continued his 
efforts in the region.  In his memoir Sutherland expresses a much different view from van 
der Merwe.  Sutherland summarized the conflict this way:  
One issue that came up during my time with AFSC was the concern by 
some on the AFSC Board that I was making use of the organization to 
support armed struggle.  It seemed that if I said it looks like violence is 
inevitable in a particular situation in South Africa, I would be accused of 
advocating violence…There was an influential and affluent group within 
the AFSC with the conscious or unconscious feeling that they could 
maintain the status quo in South Africa and give it a human face, or make 
it less violent.  It was my conviction that the people must overthrow a 
system based on greed and racism.  Revolutionary nonviolence, as I 
understand it, takes into account the fact that true liberation must beware 
of methods that could end up replacing one tyranny with another.  But I 
identify with any people’s struggle to get a boot off their necks and it’s up 
to them to decide their methods.  I couldn’t tell the ANC or PAC to wait 
until my nonviolent experiment works.92 
 
Bill Sutherland’s efforts represented the best tradition of Quaker diplomacy – patient 
listening, behind-the-scenes contacts, and availability to the powers that be as well as the 
aggrieved parties.  But his outsider status – not a Quaker, black, and unwilling to enter 
South Africa as an “honorary” white - put him at odds with vocal opponents in AFSC’s 
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constituency.  Many white South African Friends and doctrinaire American Quakers who 
criticized Sutherland disagreed with the logic propounded in Jim Bristol’s, “Nonviolence: 
Not for Export” and the analyses of the Third World Coalition.  Moreover, Sutherland’s 
presence in Africa challenged the Southern African Friends self-image as neutral brokers; 
his refusal to enter South Africa reminded them of their white privilege, implicating them 
as beneficiaries of apartheid. 
     The struggle that took place among William Penn’s political heirs within AFSC 
involved members of the international Quaker network and people who saw themselves 
as part of the African diaspora; only a few individuals, such as Jim Fletcher and Jerry 
Herman, seemed able to easily identify with both groups.  The idea of liberation pacifism, 
articulated by Jim Bristol, Margaret Hope Bacon, and others who saw themselves as 
pacifists and revolutionaries, proved most challenging to those Quakers who emphasized 
diplomacy and active reconciliation.  AFSC, by elevating Desmond Tutu’s work and 
witness made a significant contribution to the transnational application of nonviolence 
that helped end apartheid.  The sanctions that Tutu had urged gained international 
grassroots support from groups like AFSC and proved to be one important nonviolent 
tool for encouraging change.93  The post-apartheid evaluations of former government 
officials and antiapartheid leaders alike confirm the important role of international 
sanctions and divestment in forcing the apartheid regime to negotiate.94  
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     The ANC and Nelson Mandela also affirmed Hendrik van der Merwe for his 
mediation efforts.95  Van der Merwe’s arbitration succeeded in the context of the creative 
tension heightened by the international economic pressure that AFSC had encouraged.  
The conflict between AFSC’s South Africa Program and South African Quakers over 
sanctions exemplified the difficulty of balancing popular education and mobilization 
based on liberation pacifism with active reconciliation.  AFSC’s antiapartheid activism 
created a different understanding of how nonviolent activists can support the aims of 
armed liberation struggles without endorsing violence.  It also exposed the difficulties of 
overcoming the historical and cultural legacies of racism when pursuing liberation, even 
in a single organization.  AFSC’s South Africa Program’s melding of traditional Quaker 
diplomacy with popular mobilization broadened decision-making about nonviolent action 
beyond the old AFSC elite.  The evolution of AFSC’s antiapartheid activism shows the 
dynamic nature of nonviolence in contrast to the static nonresistance prescribed for 
pacifists by critics like Stephen Chapman and Guenter Lewy. 
     AFSC’s work against apartheid extended Martin Luther King’s conception of creative 
tension across physical and psychological borders.  In his “Letter From a Birmingham 
Jail” King asserted that “nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and 
establish such creative tension that a community that has constantly refused to negotiate 
is forced to confront the issue.”96  King sought to combine confrontational direct action 
with constructive negotiation.  In its antiapartheid work AFSC used a similar strategy 
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when it confronted the issue of racism in South Africa and in its own ranks.  Ultimately, 
active reconciliation and liberation pacifism proved to be synergistic, not contradictory.  
AFSC grew beyond the patronizing missionary assumptions of some of its internal critics 
and began to live out Jim Bristol’s assertion that “nonviolence begins at home.” 97  The 
new synthesis of liberation pacifism represented the achievement of all those in the 









                                                






Black Power on Embassy Row: TransAfrica 
 
"When black people in Africa begin to storm Johannesburg,  
what will be the role of this nation - and of black people here?" 
 
Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton in 
Black Power: The Politics of Liberation1 
 
 
     “Mr. Ambassador, please convey for us to your government our basic demand” stated 
Randall Robinson to Bernardus G. Fourie, South Africa’s Ambassador to the US.  As 
Fourie grew increasingly uncomfortable, Robinson, the executive director of the African-
American foreign policy organization TransAfrica, continued to confront the ambassador 
with the terms and conditions that he and his companions had come to the embassy to 
express. In the presence of fellow protesters Mary Frances Berry, civil rights 
commissioner, Walter Fauntroy, Washington, DC’s Congressional Delegate, and Eleanor 
Holmes Norton, activist law professor, Robinson continued: 
All of your government’s political prisoners must be released 
immediately.  These would include, among others, Nelson Mandela, 
Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, the thirteen labor leaders arrested recently 
without charge, and the three black leaders who have taken refuge in the 
British consulate in Durban.  We are further demanding that your 
government commit itself immediately and publicly to the speedy 
dismantlement of the apartheid system with a timetable for this task2 
 
Ambassador Foury was at a loss.  He pleaded with Delegate Fauntroy, “You are a 
member of the United States Congress.”  Fauntroy replied, “I am indeed a member of the 
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United States Congress and I am there because I have devoted my life to civil rights and 
the pursuit of racial justice.  I am here for the same reason.”3 
     The day before Thanksgiving is often a slow day for political news.  On Wednesday, 
November 21, 1984, a unique act of civil disobedience filled the pre-holiday news 
vacuum.  Four African Americans, all of them prominent in their fields, had arranged to 
meet with South Africa’s ambassador to the US, Bernardus G. Fourie, in order to 
communicate their outrage over the recent government crackdown and consequent jailing 
of 14 antiapartheid labor activists in South Africa.  The delegation of black American 
leaders arrived at the South African embassy on Massachusetts Avenue, NW, which in 
legal terms was South African soil, in the nation’s capital, for a 3:30 pm appointment.  
Eleanor Holmes Norton, formerly the head of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, described the plan simply: “What we really wanted was to get in there.”4  
After listening to the Ambassador for about an hour, Professor Norton excused herself 
from the meeting.  She left the embassy to alert the media and signal supporters that the 
three remaining members of the party planned to sit-in at the embassy until their demands 
were met or they were arrested.  The ambassador obliged and called the police, which 
landed Robinson, Berry, and Fauntroy in jail and the embassy confrontation on the front 
page of the Thanksgiving Day newspapers.  Justifying the action of this elite group of 
protesters, media spokesperson Norton declared, “What can we do except draw the 
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attention of the world to black South Africans who cannot speak for themselves?  Our 
own government is no recourse for us at this point.”5 
     Robinson and his allies used the unusual civil disobedience action to bring attention to 
long-standing concerns about apartheid in South Africa.  The 1984 embassy action served 
as the initiation of the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM), in which TransAfrica 
played the leading role.  The FSAM’s initial action launched a solid year of picketing and 
civil disobedience at the South African embassy.  TransAfrica’s initiative galvanized the 
US antiapartheid movement at the outset of the second Reagan administration in a way 
that linked protest to legislative action to impose economic sanctions on South Africa.  
The prominence of an African-American foreign policy lobby at the center of the national 
antiapartheid coalition made clear the identification of black Americans with the struggle 
against South African racism and helped to illuminate a wide range of antiapartheid 
activities. 
     Based in Washington, D.C., TransAfrica grew from a mandate established by the 
Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), as the African-American lobby group for African 
and Caribbean concerns.  Led by activist lawyer Randall Robinson, TransAfrica 
represented a coming of age for African-American involvement in foreign policy.  
Utilizing a network of black elected officials to mobilize opposition to policies favorable 
to apartheid, TransAfrica combined a high profile direct action in Washington, DC, with 
grassroots lobbying and support from prominent African-Americans.  TransAfrica 
conveyed Pan-Africanist concerns with a politically viable voice, situating itself to take 
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advantage of the political space created by the legacy of the civil rights movement and 
the 1984 presidential campaign of Jesse Jackson.6 
     TransAfrica’s role in creating and leading the Free South Africa Movement marked 
the culmination of a long struggle to assert an effective African-American voice in the 
realm of US foreign policy debate.  TransAfrica drew upon the many preceding efforts to 
galvanize concern about Africa in the black community, capitalizing on the new access to 
power achieved by African-Americans in the post-civil rights movement era.  The 
precedents set and problems encountered by organizational predecessors such as the 
Council on African Affairs (CAA), The Liberation Support Committee (LSC), the 
American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa (ANLCA), the Organization of 
African American Unity (OAAU), and the African Liberation Support Committee 
(ALSC), loomed large in the mind of TransAfrica’s founders as they tried to construct an 
organization that connected African-American concern and identification with Africa, 
particularly South Africa.  TransAfrica’s assertion of a new variant of Pan-Africanism 
exposed the possibilities as well as the limits of what Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has 
termed “strategic essentialism,”7 a political strategy that emphasized the special bond 
between black Africans under apartheid and the historic discrimination against African 
Americans. 
     The individual most central to TransAfrica’s success was Harvard-trained lawyer 
Randall Robinson.  Robinson’s personal story is interwoven with that of the organization 
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he led from its inception in the 1970s through the height of the antiapartheid movement 
in the 1980s and into the post-apartheid 1990s.  His post-apartheid memoir, as well as a 
novel written prior to the launch of TransAfrica, provide historical background as well 
personal insight to the visceral connection to Africa that motivated Robinson and inspired 
many African-Americans to commit themselves to the antiapartheid struggle. 
     TransAfrica’s organizational history illuminates several questions regarding the 
group’s role in the broader antiapartheid movement: What distinguished TransAfrica 
from previous efforts to mobilize the African-American community against South 
African apartheid?  What forces converged to make the inception of TransAfrica 
possible?  How did TransAfrica employ the nonviolent direct action model of the civil 
rights movement while advocating solidarity with those waging armed struggle against 
the apartheid regime?  How did TransAfrica achieve the combination of public 
prominence and political power to gain the ear of the political establishment?  These 
questions can be addressed by examining the organizing that preceded the emergence of 
TransAfrica, analyzing the original goals and objectives of TransAfrica, and evaluating 
the degree to which these goals were achieved in the context of the broader antiapartheid 
movement of the 1980s and early 1990s. 
     At the time of TransAfrica’s founding the McCarthy era polarization that contributed 
to the destruction of the Council on African Affairs had ebbed.  No longer did 
identification with anti-colonial movements automatically put an organization beyond the 
political pale in the eyes of the US government.  The wave of independence that had 
swept Africa in the sixties and seventies had helped to legitimize the kind of Pan-
Africanism that had made W.E.B. Du Bois and Paul Robeson targets of political 
harassment and repression.  The end of Portuguese colonialism in Africa in 1976 led to 
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increasing international pressure to end white rule in Rhodesia and South Africa.  
Meanwhile, the contribution of African-Americans to the election of Jimmy Carter in the 
1976 presidential election showed that a modicum of recognition would be granted to the 
black constituency of the Democratic Party.  Carter’s selection of African-American civil 
rights activist Andrew Young as his United Nations ambassador marked a new phase of 
engagement by blacks with the formulation and execution of US foreign policy. 
     Along with increased political clout, African-Americans were enjoying increased 
economic power and academic prestige as well as prominence in the realm of the arts and 
media.  The marginal political position that had made Robeson and Du Bois particularly 
vulnerable to McCarthyism and blacklisting had changed sufficiently to allow a new 
generation of activists, schooled in the lessons of the civil rights movement, to employ 
their wealth and talent in service of the antiapartheid cause.  Growing political power 
helped resolve the tension between radical Pan-Africanists who identified with the armed 
liberation movements in Africa and more moderate activists who supported liberation but 
also sought integration into the foreign policy establishment.  Thus the journey to 
Ambassador Fourie’s office did not start at Robinson’s Capitol Hill workplace.  It had it 
origins in the legacy of the CAA and had grown until enough political capital had been 
accrued that Randall Robinson and his allies could insist that the check be cashed and 
black leadership of the antiapartheid movement be acknowledged.  The organizations and 
alliances that preceded TransAfrica tested the tactics, developed the analyses, and trained 
many of the activists who contributed to TransAfrica’s development.  To understand the 
conditions that made TransAfrica possible it is necessary to review the primary Pan-
African and civil rights organizing activities of the sixties and early seventies. 
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     The formal disbanding of CAA and the public castigation of its leading figures, 
Alphaeus Hunton, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Paul Robeson,8 had cast a pall over the prospects 
for Pan-Africanist organizing in the late fifties.  When the formerly colonized nations of 
Africa began to gain their independence a new cohort of Pan-Africanist groups that 
strove to support independent Africa began to appear.  An early watershed moment for 
this emerging movement came during the global surge of protest that followed the 
assassination of Patrice Lumumba, Prime Minister of the Republic of Congo, in January 
1961.  An ad hoc array of individuals, many associated with Pan-Africanist groups in 
New York City, entered the visitor’s gallery of the United Nations Security Council 
intending to rise in silent protest during US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson’s presentation.  
UN security guards intervened with the protesters and a fracas ensued during which 
eighteen people sustained injuries during their ejection from the gallery.  Upon their 
removal the activists commenced a street demonstration that attracted several hundred 
protesters.  As a result of the protest the UN was closed for two days.  Although press 
reports and political commentators accused the protesters of being Communists, the Pan-
African demonstrators had actually barred black Communist leader Benjamin Davis, a 
long time ally of Paul Robeson, from participating.  In addition, this early clash signaled 
a new militancy among African-Americans advocating Pan-African solidarity.  No longer 
would the pillorying of their CAA predecessors prevent them from protesting American 
complicity with apartheid.9 
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     Among the protesters at the UN was Daniel Watts of the Liberation Support 
Committee (LSC), which produced Liberator magazine.  Beginning in 1961, Liberator 
served as an important monthly forum for discussion of Pan-Africanism and cultural 
nationalism.  Watts’ magazine also covered protests it deemed noteworthy in the cause of 
the struggle for black liberation.  Among the network of activist-journalists who wrote for 
Liberator was William Worthy.  Worthy was a 1942 graduate of Bates College where he 
had been a classmate and ally of fellow anti-apartheid activist Bill Sutherland.10  He had 
been a member of the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE) and participated in the 1947 
Journey of Reconciliation that had challenged segregation of public transportation in the 
upper South. Worthy gained prominence as one of the first African-American journalists 
in Moscow during the mid-fifties, and earned notoriety when he entered China and Cuba.  
Like other Americans who traveled to places deemed off-limits by the US State 
Department in the 1950s and early 60s Worthy had his passport revoked after making a 
documentary film in Cuba.11  Worthy’s Cuba controversy even became the subject of a 
song, “The Ballad of William Worthy,” by folk singer Phil Ochs.  The refrain of the 
ballad pokes fun at the State Department’s policy on travel to Cuba: “But somehow it is 
strange to hear the State Department say ‘You are living in the free world, in the free 
world you must stay.’”12 
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     Worthy also challenged the US foreign policy establishment’s position on South 
Africa.  Two decades before the 1984 sit-in at the South African embassy, Worthy and a 
group of allies paid a protest visit to US Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson.  On 
July 28, 1963, Worthy and six companions arrived at Stevenson’s US Mission to the UN 
office.  The men wore dress suits and the women donned hats and their best dresses to 
underscore the seriousness of their deputation.  Stowed in the purse of one of the women 
was a banner that read “EXPEL SOUTH AFRICA FROM THE UNITED NATIONS.”13  
Word of the action reached the Ambassador’s office before the protesters.  Upon arrival 
an assistant asked, “Is this the group that is planning a sit-in?”14  Still smarting from the 
memory of the 1961 Lumumba demonstration, UN and US security services had arranged 
for an increased presence in preparation for the nonviolent confrontation, even sending 
James H. McShane to observe the protest.  McShane had commanded the federal 
marshals who had accompanied James Meredith during his integration of the University 
of Mississippi.15 
     Worthy’s group arrived without an appointment.  After a half hour wait, Ambassador 
Stevenson received the delegation and then proceeded to defend the Kennedy 
administration’s policy toward South Africa.  The “heated conference” did not persuade 
the Ambassador; according to Worthy “We spoke with Mr. Stevenson but did not 
communicate.”  The delegation did manage to alarm Stevenson when they warned him 
that the sit-in represented just the first wave of black demonstrators who would come to 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
13 William Worthy, “Anatomy of a Sit-in,” Liberator, vol. III, no. 9, September 1963, 6-7. 
 
14 Worthy, “Sit-in,” 6. 
 
15 Worthy, “Sit-in,” 6. 
 
128 
the UN on behalf of African independence.  The direct action at the Ambassador’s office 
garnered television and newspaper coverage.  Worthy was hopeful that the next time 
Stevenson enunciated American policy toward Africa to the Security Council the 
ambassador would “have to look over his shoulder to see if dissenters from Harlem, 
poised to demonstrate, are sitting in the gallery.”16 
     Actions such as those covered in Liberator magazine brought increased attention to 
growing concern about Africa in the black community.  African-American civil rights 
leaders tried to represent that concern in with a more moderate profile by forming The 
American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa (ANLCA).  Initiated in 1962, the 
organization included black civil rights leaders Dorothy Height, James Farmer, Martin 
Luther King, Jr., A. Philip Randolph, Roy Wilkins, and Whitney Young.  Opposition to 
apartheid was salient among ANLCA’s concerns.  The ANLCA leadership urged 
President Kennedy to consider imposing economic sanctions on South Africa when they 
met with him in December of 1962.17  ANLCA’s style paralleled that of the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) by providing elite black leadership to a broader 
civil rights movement.  In its short existence ANCLA fostered the appointment of 
African-Americans to ambassadorial posts in Africa and helped bring an end to the 
practice of refueling US Navy ships at Cape Town.  ANCLA held its final meeting in 
1967 and eventually dissolved for lack of funding.  Historian Milfred C. Fierce traces the 
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inception of TransAfrica to the intent of ANCLA to found “a permanent organization to 
carry out the objectives of the conference.”18 
     Similarly fated to fade from the scene while establishing an important precedent was 
the Organization of Afro-American Unity (OAAU) founded by Malcolm X in 1964.  
Presaging the formula for political efficacy proposed by Carmichael and Hamilton in 
Black Power, wherein they posit that “Before a group can enter the open society, it must 
first close ranks,”19 the OAAU was Malcolm X’s post-Nation of Islam effort to link 
domestic efforts to end the oppression of blacks with the international vantage point he 
had developed in his travels to Africa and the Middle East.  OAAU dissolved shortly 
after Malcolm’s assassination in 1965, but his plan to testify before the United Nations in 
order to call for an international investigation into crimes against black Americans was 
emulated by James Forman in his capacity as International Affairs Director of the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).  Forman argued to the Fourth Committee 
of the UN General Assembly, the body responsible for decolonization issues, in 
November 1967 that, “any examination of the forces of apartheid, racism and colonialism 
had not only to observe the effect of those forces in one area or country but to consider 
their entire interrelations and manifestations elsewhere.”20   
     Forman also gained renown for his authorship of and agitation for “The Black 
Manifesto” in 1969.  The Manifesto, first announced by Forman when he interrupted a 
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service at New York’s Riverside Church, demanded $500,000,000 in reparations from 
Christian and Jewish organizations to organizations working for the liberation of black 
Americans.21  The Manifesto, like Forman’s testimony to the UN, established a precedent 
for more militant action on the part of African-Americans in the name of the African 
diaspora.  Forman’s ten point platform, which followed the model of the Black Panthers’ 
1966 Ten Point Program22, spoke to both the whites in the pews and the blacks he hoped 
to mobilize, asserting, “We must boldly go out and attack the white Western world at its 
power centers.  The white Christian churches are another form of government in this 
country and they are used by the government of this country to exploit the people of Latin 
America, Asia and Africa.”23  The Manifesto, with its strident tone and call for 
“revolution which will be an armed confrontation and long years of sustained guerilla 
warfare inside this country,”24 presaged Black Panther leader Huey Newton’s call for 
“Revolutionary Suicide.”25  While the Manifesto never reaped the reparation sum initially 
sought, it did stimulate internal giving, as well as much soul searching among the faithful 
and their religious organizations. 
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     The tumultuous period between the announcement of the Black Manifesto and the 
founding of TransAfrica saw many important developments that shaped the conditions in 
which the group would be conceived.  The 1969 African Studies Association (ASA) 
conference in Montreal was riven with conflict between the established white scholars of 
Africa and a coalition of Africans and African-Americans who demanded racial parity on 
the organization’s governing board.  A parallel African Heritage Studies Association 
(AHSA) arose to provide a forum for scholarship from an African perspective.  The 
participation of activist scholars such as Ronald Walters in AHSA helped to connect the 
organization to the realm of Pan-Africanist organizing.26 
    The willingness to confront the status quo arrangements regarding South Africa was 
not limited to academe.  Beginning in 1970 one of the first and most successful efforts to 
pressure an American corporation to stop doing business with South Africa arose from 
black employees at the Polaroid Corporation.  Upon discovering that Polaroid equipment 
was being used to produce South Africa’s passbooks, the onerous internal passport that 
black South Africans were required to carry, Polaroid employees Ken Williams and 
Caroline Hunter initiated the Polaroid Revolutionary Workers Movement (PRWM) with 
the aim of publicizing Polaroid’s complicity with the apartheid regime and organizing a 
boycott of Polaroid products.  As a result of her activism Hunter lost her job; Willims, her 
husband, had already resigned.27  Polaroid responded by advertising their intention to stay 
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in South Africa in order to encourage change and embarked on an effort to improve 
conditions for its black employees in South Africa.28  Supporters of the PRWM, including 
the American Committee on Africa (ACOA), criticized Polaroid’s gradualist approach.  
In 1977 ACOA contacts in South Africa helped to prove that the government was still 
obtaining Polaroid film through a third party distributor.  As a result of this revelation 
Polaroid abruptly ended all sales and involvement in South Africa, becoming the first 
major corporation to disinvest.29 
     In 1971 the Democratic Select Committee, led by Congressman Charles Diggs, 
became the Congressional Black Caucus.  As the Caucus gained new members African 
concerns were high on its agenda.  The high water mark of cooperation between black 
activists who had become politicians in the Democratic Party and more radical black 
nationalists and Pan-Africanists came in 1972 with the organizing of African Liberation 
Day.  Demonstrations in Washington, DC, and San Francisco involved thousands of 
blacks from around the country and the world.  In DC the march leading up to a rally at 
the Washington Monument passed by the South African Embassy.  Speakers at the 
Liberation Day rally included Congressman Diggs and DC Delegate Walter Fauntroy.30  
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Coinciding with the Liberation Day events was the African-American National 
Conference on Africa held at Howard University.  Sponsored by the Congressional Black 
Caucus, speakers from the US and Africa stressed the need for black Americans to unite 
with the liberation struggles in Africa in recognition of their common struggle against 
white colonialism. 
     The events in DC lived on in the form of the African Liberation Support Committee 
(ALSC).  Leading figures such as Owusu Sadaukai (Howard Fuller)31 and Black Arts 
Movement creator Amiri Baraka (Leroi Jones), as well as a number of younger activists, 
participated in activism around the country that was grounded in a Pan-Africanist 
approach to the wars of liberation occurring in Africa.  ALSC was well represented at the 
1974 Sixth Pan Africanist Congress held in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania.32  By 1976 
ideological transition from Black Nationalism to variants of Marxism on the part of 
leaders such Sadaukai and Baraka, along with FBI infiltration, led to sectarian division 
and the demise of the ALSC.33  Despite the brief existence of ALSC, it had set an 
important precedent by joining radical solidarity with African liberation movements to 
the politics of the Black Convention Movement and the accession to power of an 
increasing number of black elected officials at all levels. 
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     In America’s bicentennial year, the focus of the Congressional Black Caucus on 
apartheid and other struggles in Africa intensified.  A discussion about mobilizing black-
led political action for Africa that began in 1975 among the members of the CBC and its 
allies had come together as the Black Forum on Foreign Policy.34  At its annual fall 
weekend conference September 25-26, 1976, Congressmen Andrew Young and Charles 
Diggs assembled representatives of national black organizations in order to craft a 
response to the policies of the Ford administration.  Along with the CBC those included 
were the NAACP, PUSH, AFRICARE, the Black Economic Research Council, and the 
National Council of Negro Women (NCNW).  The meeting ratified a proposal titled “The 
African-American Manifesto on Southern Africa”35 written by Randall Robinson, 
Herschelle Challenor, and Charles Cobb, who had all worked with Diggs’ House 
Subcommittee on Africa.  Drawn up at a time when the Soweto Uprising in South Africa 
had been raging for three months, the Manifesto combined criticism of the pro-Rhodesia 
actions of Ford’s Secretary of State Henry Kissinger with a vision for changing 
America’s role in the region. 
     “There comes a moment in the affairs of humankind when honor requires unequivocal 
affirmation of a people’s right to freedom with dignity and peace with justice” began the 
Manifesto.  Pledging solidarity with those protesting apartheid in South Africa as well as 
in Namibia and Zimbabwe, the Manifesto argued “the specter of internationalized, anti-
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colonial war… could have an ominous impact on race relations in America and abroad.”  
Building on the bicentennial theme of 1976 the document connected “the first modern 
war for independence” to the signers’ “unswerving commitment to immediate self-
determination and majority rule in Southern Africa.”  The authors bolstered their case 
with the assertion that “the destiny of Blacks in America and Blacks in Africa is 
inextricably intertwined, since racism and other forms of oppression respect no territories 
or boundaries.”36 
     The Manifesto laid claim to a mandate from a roster of “revolutionary predecessors” 
from Africa and the diaspora:  
From Crispus Attucks to W.E.B. Du Bois, from Dinizulu to Amilcar 
Cabral, from Martin Luther King to Malcolm X, from Nkrumah to 
Lumumba, from Nat Turner to Whitney Young, from Sojourner Truth to 
Mary McLeod Bethune, to proclaim the truth of the Revolution of 1776, 
which is also the truth of the Revolution of 1976 in Southern Africa. 
 
Like James Forman’s Black Manifesto, the African-American Manifesto articulated ten 
points based on an analysis of the root causes of the conflicts in the region: “Despotism 
and racism that serve to polarize the white government and the African majority; the 
continuing violence by the Europeans to sustain institutions of racism and exploitation; 
economic exploitation.”  The document affirmed the legitimacy of “the liberation of 
Southern Africa from white minority rule by means of armed struggle, where necessary” 
and supported “the right of the liberation movements to seek necessary assistance from 
whatever sources available,” implicitly justifying the acceptance of military aid by groups 
such as the African National Congress (ANC) from the Soviet Union and Cuba, while 
emphasizing that they rejected the supposition that “such assistance implies external 
                                                
36 Manifesto, Freedomways, 216. 
 
136 
domination within Cold War context.” After laying out the particulars that included 
condemnation for South Africa and Rhodesia, support for Angola and Mozambique, and 
opposition to US corporations in South Africa, the Manifesto concludes with a 
restatement of “Our Commitment:” 
We challenge the Judeo-Christian community, the labor movement, the 
media and political, business, and civic leadership in this country to see 
that our government upholds its values and its historical commitment to 
self-determination, freedom and justice, and to understand that the 
appeasement of South Africa can only invite an escalated war that will 
exacerbate racial tensions in the United States. 
 
     To back up their challenge, the signers pledged themselves to “mobilizing Black 
America and others of good will to formulate and support a progressive US policy toward 
Africa.”  Further, the Manifesto underscored the signers’ vision of a united front effort, 
promising resistance “to those Blacks who work directly or indirectly to support white 
minority regimes in Southern Africa.”37 
     The African-American Manifesto, adopted unanimously, represented a radicalization 
of the black establishment’s position on Southern Africa.  While endorsing armed 
struggle and promising to enforce racial cohesion on Southern Africa related policy 
issues, the Manifesto couched its radical opposition to the course of US foreign policy in 
terms redolent of the Declaration of Independence and the rhetoric of American civil 
religion.  Thus the radical demands of the Pan-Africanist movement were melded to the 
pragmatic agenda of black elected officials, an established vanguard in a unique position 
to lead the fight for radical reform.  In its most significant action the Black Leadership 
Conference connected the demands of the Manifesto to the initiation of an African-
American foreign policy lobby group.  Randall Robison, who had worked as an assistant 
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to Congressman Diggs, was asked to chair the planning group that laid the groundwork 
for the establishment of TransAfrica.38 
     Placing this responsibility on Robinson proved to be an inspired decision.  Robinson’s 
background served to make him a doggedly determined advocate for the cause that 
blended his concerns about Africa with personal experience of racism in America.  Born 
in Richmond, Virginia, in 1941, Robinson grew up in circumstances so segregated that he 
never sat next to a white person in a classroom until entering Harvard Law School in 
1967.39  Robinson came from a prominent family in Richmond’s black community.  His 
siblings were often in the vanguard of integrating the educational institutions they 
attended and the professions they pursued.  Robinson served in the Army before 
graduating from historically black Virginia Union University in Richmond.  In his 
memoir Robinson recounts the most egregious of the slights and slanders he suffered at 
the hands of blatant segregationists in the south and supposedly enlightened liberals in 
the north.  As he became more politicized he came to a position where he “could see no 
real substantive distinction between my American experience and the painful lot the 
Haitians, South Africans, Mozambicans, Angolans, Zairians, Afro-Brazilians, and other 
blacks in other places about whom I was reading.”40 Robinson’s experience during his 
youth of an American version of apartheid made him eager to travel to Africa.  A Ford 
Foundation research fellowship facilitated a six-month sojourn to Tanzania following his 
graduation from Harvard Law School in 1970. 
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     Robinson’s time in Tanzania deepened his commitment to the cause of Africa.  Upon 
his return to Boston he devoted himself to organizing the Pan African Liberation 
Committee (PALC) while earning a living as a community organizer at the Roxbury 
Multi-Service Center.  PALC took up the cause of solidarity with those resisting 
Portuguese colonialism in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique.  The Committee 
facilitated the production of 50,000 posters of a picture of grinning Portuguese soldiers 
holding aloft the severed heads of several Africans; each poster bore the logo of Gulf Oil, 
the major corporation involved in Angola, and carried the message “Boycott Gulf.”41  
Harvard became a target for PALC organizing when it refused to divest its Gulf Oil 
stock.  Robinson and other PALC members planted over a thousand black crosses in 
snow covered Harvard Yard to publicize the university’s complicity with the forces of 
oppression in Southern Africa.  In 1972 PALC also executed a six-day occupation of 
Harvard President Derek Bok’s office.  The sit-in ended when the University promised to 
send an official to investigate conditions in the Portuguese colonies.  Bok’s special 
assistant, Stephen Farber, traveled to Africa as agreed; upon his return he had found no 
reason for Harvard to divest from Gulf Oil.42  Robinson and PALC had gained national 
attention and a minor concession from Harvard, but had not brought any substantive 
change in the University’s investment policy. 
     During his days as an organizer with PALC, Robinson composed a short novel that 
distilled his relationship to the struggle against apartheid.  Drawing on his experiences as 
a soldier as well as the knowledge he had gained as a Pan-African activist, in The 
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Emancipation of Wakefield Clay, published in 1978, he places his protagonist in a 
predicament where his loyalties to his country of birth and his ancestral homeland and its 
peoples come into conflict. 43  The main character is a young African-American soldier 
from the south, Wakefield Clay, who is mobilized to Africa as part of an Army unit 
deployed to protect a US owned gold mine from antiapartheid insurgents.  The “African 
Liberation Front,” captures Clay, along with two white soldiers, a Boston liberal and a 
redneck southern Captain. 
     While captive, Clay reads antiapartheid literature provided by his jailers, much as 
Robinson had first developed an interest in Africa while reading at the base library when 
he was in the Army.  Through reading and conversation with one of the guards, Clay 
gains a new awareness about the politics of the struggle and develops sympathy for the 
cause.  When his fellow prisoners attempt an escape, he finds himself torn between the 
mandate to elude capture and his support for the Front.  When the Captain stealthily 
pounces on a sentry who obstructs the Americans’ escape, Clay cries out to alert the 
guard and then interposes himself between the knife-wielding Captain and the South 
African.  In the ensuing struggle the Captain stabs Clay several time while shouting, “Die 
you nigger!” before the guard manages to shoot him.  While his life slips away Wakefield 
is condemned by the surviving captive American who says “Goddam you, Clay, goddam 
you.”  With “his eyes open and shining, at peace” as he dies, Clay is thanked by the guard 
whose life he saved and cradled in the arms of one of the female Front soldiers.44 
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     The portrayal in Wakefield Clay of an average black soldier receiving a political 
education against the backdrop of the antiapartheid struggle reflects the position 
Robinson had developed as he began his work with TransAfrica.  Like Clay, he had been 
a naïve southern soldier who had his eyes opened while serving in the Army during the 
Vietnam era.  He developed a bond with Africa as a result of his reading and his time in 
Tanzania.  Finally, he did not know whether to be more wary of the open racism of the 
southern whites with whom he had grown up or the veiled disdain of northern whites like 
those he had encountered in the classrooms at Harvard.  The climax of Wakefield Clay 
resolves this tension by having the protagonist commit revolutionary suicide to show his 
solidarity with the transnational fight against colonialism and apartheid.  In the book’s 
closing scene, Clay’s father and brother decide not to share the sympathy message sent 
by the African Liberation Front with Wakefield’s mourning mother.  Unsure what to 
believe about Clay’s death, they cannot square the official US explanation with the note 
that states that Wakefield Clay “courageously gave his life for the cause of African 
freedom.”45 
     Robinson personally experienced the indignity of apartheid in 1976 when he 
accompanied a Congressional delegation to South Africa.  Upon arrival he realized that 
he had stepped into a situation much like the one he knew in the segregated Richmond of 
his youth.  In an interview Robinson recounted his sense that the atmosphere in South 
Africa “…smells of tension.  Everyone is watching everyone.  It’s a situation that feels 
like it might explode at any moment.  It’s almost surreal.”46  At the time of his visit, 
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conditions were so tense that the American Foreign Service officials who met the plane 
accompanied Robinson and other black members of the delegation to the whites only 
men’s room in order to avert an incident with the South Africans. 
     By the summer of 1977 Randall Robinson had emerged as the choice to become 
executive director of the new TransAfrica, a name coined by fellow exploratory 
committee member Herschelle Challenor.  Incorporating the organization on July 1, 
1977, Robinson raised money and helped assemble the board so that the organization 
could begin its work as “The Black American Lobby for Africa and The Caribbean” in 
June 1978.  Political Scientist Ronald Walters contacted Richard Hatcher, mayor of Gary, 
Indiana, to head the board of directors.  Hatcher had been prominent in the Black 
Convention movement and had strong connections with black elected officials.  The 
inclusion of Dr. Dorothy Height of the National Council of Negro Women provided a 
connection to the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa, with which Height 
was also involved.  Start up funding came through the Africa Committee of the National 
Council of Churches.47 
     TransAfrica faced challenges on two fronts.  Trying to address all of Africa’s issues 
put the two person staff in a position comparable to that of the Israeli lobby multiplied by 
nearly sixty nations, clearly an impossible task.  At the same time TransAfrica took on 
the role of speaking for black America on foreign policy issues, which made it vulnerable 
to charges of arrogance and over-reaching.  The fledgling lobby launched activities such 
as monitoring key legislation pertaining to Africa, providing testimony at Congressional 
hearings, publishing a newsletter and building its membership.  As TransAfrica got 
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underway, Randall Robinson and his associates searched for ways to break out of the 
righteous but irrelevant category to which African issues, often represented by the 
“amiable but fangless liberal church establishment,” 48were often relegated.  
     An opportunity to join the struggle over the Carter administration’s policy on 
Rhodesia came when the leader of the white minority regime in Rhodesia, Ian Smith, 
accepted the invitation of twenty-seven conservative members of the Senate to visit the 
US.  Confronting Smith provided TransAfrica with a target for protest as well as a chance 
to raise its own public profile.  TransAfrica organized a letter, signed by more than forty 
black leaders, to President Carter that objected to granting Smith a visa to the US.  
TransAfrica lawyers Curtis White, John Garland and Victor Goode unsuccessfully 
attempted to obtain an injunction from the US District Court to prevent Smith’s plane 
from landing at JFK Airport, arguing that granting Smith’s visa violated UN sanctions 
against Rhodesia.  As Smith traveled across the country protesters in several cities 
greeted him; in Washington, TransAfrica rallied hundreds outside the White House to 
make clear the widespread opposition to the continuation of Smith’s rule.49  The 
Washington Post ran an opinion piece by Randall Robinson titled “A Visa for ‘Tyranny’” 
in which Robinson called Smith’s proposal for “internal settlement” a plan for continuing 
“white minority rule in blackface.”50  The precedent for action set during the Smith visit, 
which combined direct action protest with pressure from African-Americans in positions 
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of power, became a distinctive synthesis that TransAfrica applied again at key moments 
of political opportunity. 
     That same summer the founder of the CBC and chair of the House Subcommittee on 
Africa, Charles Diggs, Jr., faced charges of mail fraud and lying in connection with the 
misuse of his Congressional payroll monies.  Despite being found guilty in October, in 
November Diggs won re-election to his House seat for a thirteenth term by better than 
eighty percent of the vote.  By June of 1980 his appeals had been turned down and he 
began a seven-month prison sentence.  With the end of Diggs’ political career 
TransAfrica and the antiapartheid movement lost an important ally in Congress.51 
     President Carter’s 1977 appointment of Congressman Andrew Young as the US 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations presented opportunities and frustrations 
for TransAfrica.  Young had been among the initiators of the Black Foreign Policy 
Forum that helped to found TransAfrica, and shared the group’s goals.  Young, however, 
saw economic involvement in southern Africa as the best way for the US to facilitate 
change, a position that put him at odds with TransAfrica activists who had accepted the 
necessity of boycott and armed struggle.  During his visit to southern Africa in 1977, 
Young made waves among blacks and whites when he met with representatives of the 
black community in South Africa and suggested that they mobilize nonviolent economic 
boycotts as he had done as a civil rights activist in the US.52 
     Despite disagreements over the Carter administration’s policies toward Africa, 
Young’s turbulent tenure at the UN marked a period when TransAfrica had the greatest 
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degree of access to the executive branch.  Young’s off the cuff remarks and 
individualistic style, often at odds with the objectives of the Carter State Department, 
drew down his currency with Carter and ultimately made him a liability in the eyes of the 
administration.  In July of 1979, without clearing the conference with the State 
Department, Young met with the Palestine Liberation Organization’s UN representative 
Zehdi Terzi.  Young requested that Terzi try to delay the release of a report by the UN 
Committee on Palestinian Rights.  A reporter for Newsweek found out about the meeting, 
queried the State Department, and set off the process that led to Young’ resignation at the 
request of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.53 
     Young’s forced departure from the administration drew protest from the black 
constituency that had supported Carter’s election in 1976.  Many black leaders saw 
Young’s resignation as evidence that the Carter camp valued the political support of 
American Jews, who had protested Young’s conference with Terzi, more than the loyalty 
of the black community.  TransAfrica weighed in on the controversy with a “Message to 
the President on the Resignation of Ambassador Andrew Young and on United States 
Relations with the Middle East and Africa.”54 
     The “Message” from TransAfrica reiterated the disappointment and regret of the black 
community regarding Young’s resignation.  Declaring that “Black Americans and Jewish 
Americans are peoples whose history have made them ready champions of the 
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oppressed,” the “Message” bemoaned the damage that the circumstances of Young’s 
resignation to “the socially conscious and beneficial cooperation that has existed between 
our two communities” as well as to “the prospects for a general, peaceful resolution of 
conflict in the Middle East.”  Stating that TransAfrica’s goal was “foreign relations that 
are more mutually beneficial to this country and to the substantial populations of African 
descent in the countries of Africa and the Caribbean,” the missive went on to address the 
parallel between TransAfrica and American allies of Israel:  
We are styled “the black lobby for Africa,” and sometimes compared with 
“the Israeli lobby” by people who wonder if we can “do for Africa what 
the Jews have done for Israel.  We do not seek to do what they have done.  
We do not seek to hold American policy or action to ransom in the interest 
of this or that policy or ambition of any foreign country. 
 
The message detailed TransAfrica’s disagreements with Young over the best course for 
fostering change in South Africa while affirming Young’s role in the Carter 
administration as the most effective advocate for “improving the relations between the 
United States and the emergent and impoverished nations of the world.”55  TransAfrica 
made clear its distress over Young’s resignation: “The blame for Young’s removal must 
fall principally on you Mr. President.”56  The discontent with Carter administration’s 
diminished commitment to the human rights agenda it had emphasized at the outset of its 
tenure would grow into outrage over the change in policy that transpired when Carter lost 
the White House to Ronald Reagan. 
     As the November 1980 election approached, TransAfrica strengthened and diversified 
its activism.  An “Action-Alert System” aimed at bringing black public opinion to bear 
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on Congressional and Executive branch decision-making was organized.  Implementation 
of the call and letter-generating system involved targeting the 153 congressional districts 
with a black constituency of ten percent or more.  Initially thirty “Action Alert 
Coordinators” took on the task of generating responses in their districts.57  Another 
project was a national campaign to provide scores of permanent signs proclaiming 
“LET’S END U.S. SUPPORT FOR SOUTH AFRICA” and other antiapartheid messages 
to black churches and community institutions.  The signs served as a visible link between 
the African-American community and the struggle of the black majority in South Africa.  
An expanded staff included Salih Abdul-Rahim (Salih Booker) who served as legislative 
assistant. 58 
     From TransAfrica’s perspective the portents of Reagan’s policy toward southern 
Africa were grim.  “All Reagan knows about southern Africa is that he’s on the side of 
the whites,”59 avowed the man who became Ronald Reagan’s Assistant Secretary of State 
for South Africa, Chester Crocker.  Reagan affirmed Crocker’s appraisal in March of 
1981 when he stated to a reporter that, because of the primacy of cold war considerations, 
he could not foresee forsaking “a country that has stood by us in every war we have 
fought…” even though the Afrikaner leaders of the National Party were the political heirs 
of the Afrikaner architects of apartheid who had favored the Nazis in World War II.  
Crocker concocted the policy of “constructive engagement,” as opposed to confrontation, 
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by which he hoped to nudge South Africa toward change through continued US 
economic involvement rather than sanctions and divestment.  His compatriots in the 
Reagan administration seemed more interested in engagement with the apartheid regime, 
constructive or not. 
     TransAfrica quickly moved into a confrontational position with the Reagan 
administration.  In May of 1981 Randall Robinson received classified State Department 
documents that revealed the warmer relationship the Reagan foreign policy team was 
initiating with South Africa.60  The person who passed the memoranda to Robinson did so 
out of disagreement with the new policy direction.  Robinson turned the documents over 
to Washington Post journalist Joe Ritchie, who published an article based on the leaked 
information.61  The papers revealed that Assistant Secretary-designate Chester Crocker, 
along with his assistant Alan Keyes, had met with South Africa’s Defense Minister and 
Foreign Minister in Pretoria to discuss relations with the new administration.  Central to 
the logic of the papers were administration concerns about Soviet involvement in Angola, 
access to South Africa’s mineral wealth, and protection of sea transportation around the 
Cape of Good Hope.  The papers also made clear that Reagan’s policy regarding South 
Africa’s illegal occupation of Namibia would not continue the multilateral approach that 
had been crafted under Carter.  Overall, the message to Pretoria was that the Reagan 
White House would “work to end South Africa’s polecat status in the world and seek to 
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restore its place as a legitimate and important regional actor with whom we can cooperate 
pragmatically.”62 
     TransAfrica published the purloined papers in its August 1981 News Report with the 
hope that wide dissemination of the moves toward the “developing alliance” with South 
Africa would help build opposition to apartheid in the US.63  Robinson’s action caused 
concern among TransAfrica’s board members because release of the State Department 
memoranda put the organization in a position akin to that of Daniel Ellsberg, the Rand 
Corporation employee who leaked the “Pentagon Papers” to the New York Times.  The 
TransAfrica Board held a special discussion to deal with whether Robinson had followed 
proper organizational protocol by releasing the documents without prior consultation; it 
was decided that the board did not want to be embroiled in such decisions in the future.64  
No legal action followed the incident, but the lines between the White House and 
TransAfrica had now been clearly drawn and the black lobby had made clear that it 
planned to use all tools at its disposal to challenge constructive engagement. 
     While the early 1980s proved to be a period of frustration for TransAfrica’s attempts 
to influence White House policy toward southern Africa, as an organization the black 
lobby was growing.  New chapters were established and individual membership grew.  
An annual dinner served as a fundraising event as well as a venue for prominent speakers 
such as Sam Nujoma of the Namibian liberation movement SWAPO and Maurice 
Bishop, Prime Minister of Grenada.  In 1982, TransAfrica launched a non-profit 
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educational branch, TransAfrica Forum.  The forum produced two publications: “Issue 
Brief” and a quarterly called TransAfrica Forum Journal.65  The Forum aimed to amplify 
the work of TransAfrica by providing venues for a variety of scholars and commentators 
to raise the profile of issues related to Africa.66  
     The Reagan administration’s policies toward South Africa and the increasingly 
repressive actions of the South African government continued to prod TransAfrica to 
seek new methods by which to convey its antiapartheid message.  All over the country 
divestment debates roiled university trustees and municipal bodies, while Presidential 
Candidate Jesse Jackson made opposition to apartheid a campaign theme, and South 
African apartheid opponent Bishop Desmond Tutu received the 1984 Nobel Peace Prize.  
At the same time the aggressive anticommunism of Reagan’s foreign policy left its 
opponents scrambling to respond to cold war confrontations with the Soviet Union and 
repression of revolutionary movements in Central America.  The Republican landslide re-
election in 1984 added to the anxiety of those seeking some way to resist Reagan’s 
foreign policy. 
     The Wednesday, November 21, 1984, sit-in at the South African Embassy right after 
the election acted like a flare in the night sky, illuminating the breadth of existing 
grassroots antiapartheid activism while igniting a new wave of antiapartheid organizing.  
Building on the extensive Thanksgiving Day media coverage, the day after Thanksgiving 
the launch of the Free South Africa Movement  (FSAM) was announced in a meeting 
room in the Rayburn House office building.  A steering committee made up of prominent 
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African Americans who had been outspoken in their opposition to apartheid – Eleanor 
Holmes Norton, Roger Wilkins, historian and fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies, 
William Lucy of the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists, and Dr. Sylvia Hill, professor at 
the University of the District of Columbia and leader in the DC based South Africa 
Support Project (SASP) – connected FSAM with a range of constituencies.  TransAfrica 
played the central role in the coalition, with Legislative director Cecelie Counts 
coordinated the day-to-day operation of the demonstration.  FSAM, which initially 
intended to mount a week of picketing at the embassy, grew into a year of protests in 
which over 4000 people were arrested during protests at the embassy.67 
     In the days immediately following the embassy sit-in, protests happened in twenty-six 
cities across the country.  Demonstrators targeted South African consulates and 
businesses that sold gold Kruggerand coins from South Africa.  The number of arrestees 
grew so large that on November 30, 1984, the US Attorney for Washington, DC, Joseph 
diGenova, began dismissing charges because of the fear that they would clog the courts.68  
Subsequently, a range of celebrities including Arthur Ashe, Stevie Wonder, and Amy 
Carter, along with twenty-three members of Congress, submitted to arrest during the 
daily picket line that started each day at 3:30 pm, the time of the original appointment 
with Ambassador Fourie.  Several rallies involving the visiting Archbishop Tutu served 
to connect the embassy actions to the global movement against apartheid. 
     Organizer Cecelie Counts, like Robinson a graduate of Harvard Law School, 
attributed the successful mobilization by the FSAM to the way it was originally 
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imagined.  According to Counts, “the format of the demonstrations allowed people to use 
their organizational identities as a way to come to the movement.”69  The daily ritual of 
volunteer “messengers” stepping forward from the picket line to risk arrest by refusing to 
leave until they were arrested for demonstrating within five hundred feet of an embassy 
provided an entry level, low risk activity though which people could show their 
commitment to the cause.  The dignified, nonviolent nature of the protest helped garner 
sympathetic media attention while expanding participation beyond the cadre of activists 
for whom apartheid had been a long-held concern.  Steering committee member Sylvia 
Hill emphasized the significance of the co-operation of the Washington, DC city 
government, which under Mayor Marion Barry, who had once been president of the 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, “helped to legitimize protest and arrest for 
many people who would otherwise have been apprehensive.”70 
     The FSAM coalition provided leadership to a symbolic revival of an alliance akin to 
the civil rights coalition of the sixties that included blacks, labor, Christian and Jewish 
groups, women, and students.  FSAM made American opposition to apartheid visible in a 
way that had not previously occurred and linked that sentiment to the demand for 
sanctions legislation.  Without fully expecting it, TransAfrica had managed to bridge 
divides that had previously separated segments of the antiapartheid constituency.  By 
fulfilling the long sought strategic objective of an antiapartheid network led by African 
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Americans, FSAM served to publicize the struggle for federal legislation to impose 
economic sanctions on South Africa. 
     Linking grassroots demonstrations to foreign policy legislation is a difficult and 
delicate business.  TransAfrica’s links to the Congressional Black Caucus made that 
connection more direct than had been the case with comparable legislation in the 1980s 
regarding nuclear arms control and aid to Central American counter-revolutionaries.  As 
conditions worsened in South Africa and the government there declared a state of 
emergency, frustration grew in the US and the possibility for garnering support for 
substantive sanctions legislation increased.  FSAM helped give impetus to increased 
activity in Congress to enact economic sanctions against South Africa.  In 1985, 
Congress, after much debate and bargaining, passed a limited sanctions bill that served 
notice to the White House that opinion in the legislative branch was turning against 
constructive engagement.  Even a group of Republican legislators, led by Georgia 
Republican Newt Gingrich, wrote a letter to Reagan warning of the domestic political 
cost of maintaining constructive engagement.71  In response, Reagan’s allies began to 
probe and criticize the leadership of the antiapartheid movement for being too far to the 
left politically.  One of TransAfrica’s critics was The Lincoln Institute for Research and 
Education, a conservative think tank that articulated a right wing critique of civil rights 
issues. 
     In 1985 the Lincoln Institute published a booklet titled TransAfrica: A Lobby of the 
Left.72  Concerned that some of the junior Republicans in Congress had become critical of 
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constructive engagement as a result of the publicity generated by the Free South Africa 
Movement, the authors of Lobby of the Left strove to show that TransAfrica as well as its 
supporters in the CBC were in league with pro-Soviet, anti-American forces in southern 
Africa and elsewhere.  The first target of Lobby was the African Nation Congress.  
Asserting that the ANC could not conduct the campaign of sabotage and guerilla strikes it 
had been executing since the late seventies without Soviet training and support, Lobby 
cited statements by ANC President Oliver Tambo and other ANC representatives in 
which they express gratitude to the USSR for its aid to and support of the antiapartheid 
struggle.  TransAfrica’s defense of the role of Cuban combat troops in Angola along with 
support for statements critical of Israel provided proof to the authors of Lobby that 
TransAfrica’s advocated a radical agenda. 
     In Lobby of the Left the Lincoln Institute reached back to the Rhodesia crisis of the 
Carter years in an effort to tar Randall Robinson as disloyal to the US.  Citing a quote in 
the Philadelphia Bulletin in which Robinson stated: 
The 82nd Airborne is 40 percent black.  The (Carter) administration would be 
absolutely foolish to expect these troops to be sympathetic to an order to help 
racist governments in South Africa, Zimbabwe or anywhere else.  It would create 
all kinds of turmoil.  We would expect the black leadership to provide this 
information to black troops to help them make up their minds.  I would be the first 
to do so.73 
 
By intimating that Robinson had counseled treason to African-American troops, the 
Lincoln Institute attempted to discredit him the same way that Paul Robeson had been 
smeared in 1949 for speaking out against the possibility of war with the Soviet Union.  
Robeson too had been lambasted for purportedly treasonous speech that might have 
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persuaded black troops not to fight.  For Robeson, this charge began the effective 
containment of his political activism.74  For Robinson and TransAfrica, the times had 
changed enough so that such charges had little impact. 
     Lobby of the Left accused TransAfrica of abusing the moral mantle of the civil rights 
movement in order to support Marxist terrorism in southern Africa for the purpose of 
undermining the geopolitical objectives of the US.  The pamphlet charged TransAfrica 
with selectively criticizing South Africa while failing to hold other African states to the 
same standard.  Lobby alleged that TransAfrica focused not on “‘racism’ but the 
promotion of radical revolution.”75  By utilizing the kind of anticommunist rhetoric 
reminiscent of publications such as Red Channels76 that had been used against the 
Council on African Affairs in the 1950s, The Lincoln Institute’s broadside tried to 
delegitimize TransAfrica’s work by casting it as anti-American.  While Lobby of the Left 
did not directly hinder TransAfrica’s efforts, it did contribute to an atmosphere in which 
the black lobby’s opponents tried to undermine its credibility with charges of anti-
Americanism.  
     The fears of the rightwing were justified insofar as the increasing momentum of the 
pro-sanctions forces in Congress heralded the growing consensus against constructive 
engagement.  In 1986 a bill authored by the Democratic Congressman from Berkeley, 
Ronald Dellums, one of the CBC members who had been arrested at the South African 
Embassy, passed the House on June 12.  The bill called for comprehensive sanctions 
                                                
74 Martin Bauml Duberman, Paul Robeson (New York: Pan Books, 1989), 342. 
 
75 Lincoln Institute, Lobby, 34. 
 
76 Counterattack (Organization), Red Channels: The Report of Communist Influence in 
Radio and Television (New York: American Business Consultants, 1950). 
 
155 
including a trade embargo and divestment.  In August the Senate passed a slightly weaker 
version of sanctions.  In the House-Senate Conference Committee the Senate bill was 
accepted as the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986.  President Reagan vetoed 
the measure, but was overridden by both chambers of Congress.77  The override of 
Reagan’s veto marked the end of constructive engagement and the first major foreign 
policy defeat for the administration.  Congressman Dellums evaluated the victory this 
way:  
In the end, Reagan’s veto made a Senate bill that I and other activists felt 
was weak far more significant than it would otherwise have been.  When 
the Republican Senate and the Democratic house both overrode the veto, a 
clear message was sent to South Africa – the people’s representatives 
within the government of the United States had trumped the executive 
branch, and had taken control of the character of the sanctions that would 
be imposed.78 
 
    The politics of the civil rights movement and the Cold War were intertwined in the 
lead-up to the sanction.  Conservative Republican Senator Jesse Helms, who had often 
been at odds with the civil rights movement in the US, had mounted an unsuccessful 
filibuster of the 1985 sanctions package.  During the 1986 debate Helms helped arrange 
phone calls between South African Foreign Minister Roelof (Pik) Botha and farm state 
senators sensitive to South African grain purchases.  Helms asserted that sanctions would 
lead to “violent, fundamental change” in southern Africa that would foster “lasting 
tyranny” and benefit the Soviet Union’s regional aims.  Fellow Republican Richard 
Lugar from Indiana, who supported sanctions, countered Helms charge by positing that 
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“We are against tyranny, and tyranny is in South African, and we must be vigorous in 
that fight.  We are not destroying the [South African] government.  That government is 
self-destructive.”79 
     TransAfrica celebrated the enactment of the Anti-Apartheid act as the culmination of 
many years of struggle and the fruit of the FSAM.  Emphasizing the role that TransAfrica 
had played in building the momentum for sanctions, Senator Edward Kennedy referred to 
Randall Robinson as the “101st Senator” for the role he played in representing FSAM in 
the process of obtaining the sanctions bill.  “We could not have overridden Ronald 
Reagan’s veto without Randall Robinson’s leadership.”80  TransAfrica increased its 
prestige and profile by using increased funds to hire more staff.  The Congressional 
imposition of sanctions would be TransAfrica’s brightest moment, one that illuminated 
the strengths and weaknesses of strategic essentialism that had inspired the black-led 
FSAM.  While the Congress passed sanctions in response to public pressure in the 
context of escalating violence in South Africa, the Reagan administration showed its 
determination to continue its engagement with South Africa.  In February 1987 the US 
vetoed a UN Security Council resolution modeled on the 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act that 
would have imposed stricter international sanctions on South Africa.  This vote 
contravened the stipulation of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act that the US 
government should pursue broader international sanctions, thus disregarding the intent of 
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the law.81  Thus the expansion of the legacy of the civil rights movement, as represented 
by the FSAM, into Congressional decision-making on US foreign policy did not extend 
to an international venue such as the UN. 
     With overt constructive engagement undone by sanctions, the Reagan administration 
did its utmost to maintain its cold war-driven agenda in southern Africa, particularly its 
support for the antigovernment National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA) guerrillas in Angola led by Jonas Savimbi, who also had the support of South 
Africa.  In 1985, Congress had repealed the Clark Amendment, originally passed in 1976, 
which had prevented the US from providing covert assistance to UNITA.  Antiapartheid 
activists saw the support for UNITA as “a strategy to lift the financial weight from South 
Africa by paying for Savimbi.”82  Savimbi’s supporters in Congress and the Reagan 
administration supported his forces as a counterweight to the Cuban forces that supported 
the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Worker’s Party (MPLA) government 
in Luanda.  In June of 1988 Savimbi was brought to the US to meet with President 
Reagan as well as to conduct a speaking tour of southern cities.  Reagan refused to meet 
with Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos during this period.  Savimbi’s tour 
culminated with the Medgar Evers Humanitarian award being presented to him in 
Jackson, Mississippi.  With more protesters outside the event than in attendance, Savimbi 
accepted the award from Jackson Mayor Charles Evers, the brother of slain NAACP 
leader Medgar Evers, and then joined hands with the mayor to sing “We Shall 
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Overcome.”83  TransAfrica, along with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
(SCLC) and the NAACP, organized protests to greet Savimbi at each of his speaking 
engagements.84 
     In July of 1988 an agreement was reached that would lead to the independence of 
Namibia and the eventual unraveling of apartheid.  Assistant Secretary of State Chester 
Crocker managed to mediate the July 20 accord between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa 
that, when formalized as the Angola Accord and the Namibia Accord on December 22, 
1988, would lead to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and the independence 
of Namibia from South Africa in March of 1990.85  The success of Crocker’s diplomacy 
served to prevent further tightening of the loosely enforced sanctions on South Africa, 
and thus the possibility for mobilizing greater public pressure on Congress diminished 
even as the administration continued to lobby for aid to Savimbi 
     Randall Robinson and TransAfrica worked hard to prevent more aid going to UNITA.  
This effort was rewarded by further enmity from conservative supporters of Savimbi who 
searched for ways to diminish TransAfrica’s credibility.  During the summer of 1988 it 
was made known via TransAfrica’s financial report to the House of Representatives, a 
requirement for registered lobby groups, that the Cuban interest Section had purchased 
tables at several of TransAfrica’s annual fundraising dinners.  The total amount given to 
TransAfrica by the Cubans was $4000.  News of the donations elicited condemnation 
from spokespeople for the administration as well as the Washington Times and the Wall 
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Street Journal.  TransAfrica responded to the charges that the organization was taking 
money from Communist Cuba by explaining that all of the African and Caribbean 
embassies and interest sections had been invited to the functions and thus the funds had 
not been considered a donation.  What the Wall Street Journal dubbed a “miniflap” did 
not result in legal problems for TransAfrica but it once again indicated that the 
organization’s opponents wanted to obstruct TransAfrica’s agenda by casting it in Cold 
War terms.86 
     As the debate over aid to Savimbi continued, the charges that TransAfrica had taken a 
pro-Communist stance emerged again in 1989.  On October 2, Republican Senator Orrin 
Hatch of Utah called for an investigation by the Attorney General into whether Randall 
Robinson had received payment from the MPLA government in Angola.  Robinson, with 
funding from the United Church of Christ, had traveled to Luanda the previous week 
where he met with President dos Santos and other Angolan officials.  He presented dos 
Santos with an invitation from thirty-six members of Congress, including eight 
Republicans, to visit the US.  Hatch charged that, “Mr. Robinson should not be permitted 
to propagate Marxist propaganda under the cover of academic independence,” and that “it 
is known that the Marxist regime financed Mr. Robinson’s trip to Luanda.”87 
     Liberal columnists Anthony Lewis of the New York Times and Courtland Milloy of 
the Washington Post came to Robinson’s defense.  Lewis suggested that allies of Savimbi 
such as Hatch were becoming desperate as even conservative opinion was turning against 
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the brutal anti-Communist guerilla.  Milloy attributed the smear to “a regressive political 
atmosphere in which blacks are considered fair game for unjustified attacks.”88  In 
response to rebukes in the press as well as letters from the CBC and Robinson, Hatch 
apologized for the letter.  The Senator claimed the letter had been written and sent by a 
pro-Savimbi aide without his knowledge or approval.  Hatch said, “It got out of hand.  
It’s a stupid letter.  I’m a little offended that people would think I’m dumb enough to 
write that letter.”89  The CBC accepted Hatch’s apology and the controversy receded.  
TransAfrica had enough allies and sufficient reputation to easily survive one of the last 
red baiting episodes of the cold war era. 
     In the fall of 1989 the transformation of South Africa and the end of apartheid began 
to accelerate.  The aging president P.W. Botha was made to resign by his cabinet.  Botha 
was replaced by F.W. deKlerk, who represented a younger faction of the National Party 
that realized apartheid was no longer economically tenable.  In February 1990, de Klerk 
lifted restrictions on the political organizations that had been banned in the wake of the 
Sharpeville Massacre.  The ANC, PAC and South African Communist Party could now 
come above ground to be rejoined with long imprisoned leaders whom de Klerk released.  
On February 11, 1990, Nelson Mandela was released from prison after more than twenty-
seven years behind bars.90  The tectonic shift in the South African political situation 
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reverberated in the US.  Suddenly, the years of organizing and picketing and letter 
writing and lobbying seemed to have come to fruition. 
     The abrupt change in South Africa created new opportunities and complications for 
TransAfrica.  In March a high-level delegation from TransAfrica, including Jesse 
Jackson, Richard Hatcher, Dorothy Height, and Randall Robinson met with Secretary of 
State James Baker III.  They urged him to maintain sanctions on South Africa, arguing 
that pressure needed to be maintained to insure that the government continued to 
dismantle apartheid.91  The transformation of South Africa was in a tentative phase, 
temporarily elevating TransAfrica from the position of petitioner to the role of 
intermediary between the liberation movement and the US government.  This was the 
role TransAfrica played during the American phase of Mandela’s 1990 world tour. 
     In June of 1990 Nelson Mandela and his wife Winnie made a whirlwind national tour 
of the US, covering eight cities in eleven days.  Except for a small demonstration in 
Miami where anti-Castro Cubans expressed unhappiness about Mandela’s friendship with 
Fidel Castro, the tour was welcomed by tens of thousands of people who expressed 
admiration for Mandela and support for the antiapartheid struggle.  Mandela spoke to 
huge crowds, enjoyed a parade in Manhattan, and addressed a joint session of Congress, 
the first African to do so.  Randall Robinson and board members of TransAfrica joined in 
the greeting of Mandela upon his arrival in New York and helped to arrange his many 
engagements in the black community.  Black mayors governed most of the cities 
Mandela visited; over seven million dollars was raised for the ANC during the tour.92 In 
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his address to Congress on June 26, Mandela expressed his appreciation to the 
antiapartheid movement: 
And here I speak not only about you, members of the United States 
Congress, but also of the millions of people throughout this great land who 
stood up and engaged the apartheid system in struggle.  The masses who 
have given us such strength and joy by the manner in which they have 
received us since we arrived in this country.93 
 
     The quickly shifting political circumstances made for disparate aftereffects from the 
Mandela tour.  While the tour created lots of media coverage and involved thousands of 
people who felt included in the moment, the effect on the antiapartheid movement was 
decidedly mixed.  Longtime grassroots activists often felt shoved aside as the ANC 
showed “more interest in developing ties with sources of political power and money than 
with activist organizations.”94  As the role of the ANC changed from that of an activist 
movement to a political party vying for power and elected office, its relationships with 
solidarity activists and allies changed, much to the disappointment of those at the 
grassroots.  Local activists also voiced frustration with TransAfrica.  According to Prexy 
Nesbitt, an African-American organizer who had been central to antiapartheid activities 
in Chicago and had worked with ACOA, TransAfrica did not relate well to grassroots 
groups because it saw itself “as being exclusively in control of all work on Africa in the 
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US.  Just because African-Americans were the moving force behind the movement 
doesn’t mean we should reject allies in the struggle.”95 
     In the wake of the Mandela visit the role of TransAfrica began to change.  The 
organization responded with outrage to the Bush administration’s May 1990 invitation to 
South African President F.W. de Klerk to visit the US.  Randall Robinson spoke out 
forcefully in opposition, stating:  
No American president has ever invited a South African president 
presiding over an apartheid state to visit the United States.  Not even 
Ronald Reagan.  Then to do it in the face of objections and the week 
before Nelson Mandela comes to the United States is a demonstration of 
insensitivity of which I did not know George to be capable. 
 
As a result of the uproar from TransAfrica and other critics of the Bush administration de 
Klerk postponed his trip.  One group that did not oppose de Klerk’s visit was the ANC.  
When asked by a reporter whether de Klerk’s meeting with Bush concerned him, 
Mandela replied “Whether I go to the States before or after Mr. de Klerk makes no 
difference whatsoever to me.”96  This small rift between the ANC and TransAfrica 
continued to grow as the events of the early nineties unfolded. 
     In October of 1991 Nelson Mandela and the ANC hosted the “Democracy Now Tour” 
organized by TransAfrica.  A delegation of twenty-three African Americans spent six 
days learning about and investigating conditions in South Africa.  Among the delegates 
were producer Quincy Jones, NCNW president Dorothy Height, Representative Maxine 
Waters, publisher Earl Graves, tennis star Arthur Ashe, Mayor Richard Hatcher, Gay 
McDougall of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, along with labor 
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leaders, business people, and clergy.97  Lindiwe Mabuza of the ANC welcomed the group, 
stating: 
Here are the sons and daughters of Africa whose ancestors left the 
continent as slaves coming back to say to their brothers and sisters in 
South Africa who are under going another form of slavery, ‘We are 
coming back not shackled, not weak, but strong because we have learned 
over the centuries that in order to make it we must stand together.98 
 
The delegation pledged its continued support to the South African freedom struggle.  
Upon departure Randall Robinson spoke for the group, telling Nelson Mandela, “The 
blood that unites us is thicker than the water that divides us.”99 
     TransAfrica’s sixteen years of struggle and growth had brought it to a place where 
Robinson and the board believed it needed to expand from an activist lobby group to an 
institution akin to other Washington think tanks.  With that goal in mind, a building at 
1744 R Street NW in DC was purchased in 1993.  TransAfrica raised over 2.4 million 
dollars for the purchase and renovations of its new headquarters.  The building, which 
had once been the German Embassy, was meant to house offices, meeting space and a 
specialty library devoted to works on Africa and the Caribbean.  The library was named 
in honor of Arthur Ashe, who had died in February 1993.  The collection included books 
from the shelves of the Council on African Affairs, donated to TransAfrica by Dorothy 
Hunton, the widow of CAA director Alpheus Hunton.100  The conference room in the new 
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headquarters was named in honor of W.E.B Du Bois while a large portrait of Paul 
Robeson adorned the front hall.  The new TransAfrica headquarters was officially 
dedicated on June 4, 1993.  The group that had held vigil outside of the South African 
embassy through heat and cold, rain and snow, had now taken residence among the 
legations of the world on Embassy Row.101 
     One of the first major events at the new center was a reception for Nelson Mandela.  
An elite group of TransAfrica supporters shared a luncheon with the South African leader 
and his entourage.  Mandela informed the gathering of the plans being made for the first 
all race elections of 1994 that would make him president, as well as describing the dire 
need for international aid to address the poverty of the black masses.  According to 
Robinson’s memoir, toward the end of the meeting Mandela aide Barbara Masakela 
informed the group that the ANC had approached American corporations for support of 
their election efforts.  Among those contacted had been J. Wayne Fredericks, who, as a 
spokesperson for Ford Motor Company had long resisted disinvestment and sanctions.  
Randall Robinson took offense at this, and told Masekela “To seek their support is 
prudent and desirable.  But for us who have heard nothing about this initiative from the 
ANC is an affront.”  When asked, “After all of our efforts, how could you do this?”  
Masakela replied, “That was then, this is now and we must move on.”102 
     Randall Robinson’s disappointment with the ANC grew in 1994 when another 
planned fundraiser featuring Mandela was cancelled with little notice.  After returning the 
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donations solicited for the affair TransAfrica landed in financial difficulty.  Frustrated 
with this kind of treatment from those on whose behalf he had labored so long, Robinson 
pessimistically contended “once there was an army of Americans eager to push our 
government in a helpful direction.  Now, that well-meaning force has been all but 
dissolved--puzzlingly, by the hand of the ANC itself.”103 
     TransAfrica’s leadership of the Free South Africa Movement culminated a long 
struggle to assert an effective African-American voice in the realm of US foreign policy 
debate.  The same strategic essentialism, built on the special bond between black 
Africans under apartheid and African Americans, which helped make TransAfrica 
effective in the fight for economic sanctions on South Africa, hindered the efficacy of the 
same tactics when applied to other issues regarding Africa.  Like his character Wakefield 
Clay, Randall Robinson tried to interpose himself and his organization between those 
suffering from apartheid and the support of the apartheid regime by the US.  Akin to A. 
Philip Randolph’s role in the March on Washington Movement, TransAfrica benefited 
from Randall Robinson’s “situational charisma,” described by Randolph’s biographer 
Paula Pfeffer as 
A term applicable to a leader of normally nonmessianic tendency who 
invokes a strong response because he offers, in a time of acute adversity, 
leadership that is perceived as a means of salvation from distress.  
Situational charisma may bring a leader such as Randolph to power; it 
cannot keep him there.104 
 
Like its leader, TransAfrica was delimited by situational appeal that could not be easily 
stretched to fit the post apartheid circumstances.  Like a flare that lights up the night, the 
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TransAfrica’s FSAM tactic proved to be a one-use-only political tool based on strategic 
essentialism. 
     TransAfrica represented the de facto merger of Pan-Africanist and integrationist 
trends among African Americans concerned about South Africa.  It was most successful 
when it leaned toward the integrationist side and cast the antiapartheid struggle in terms 
of the American civil religion.  It was less successful when it leaned toward the more 
radical Pan-Africanist side because that message did not reach the broader public.  
Without the mirror of the struggle to end apartheid in South Africa to reflect its light and 
heat on TransAfrica’s rejuvenation of the American civil rights coalition, the group was 
limited in its appeal and could not rebuild the public base that had been crucial to the 
passage of the 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. 
     TransAfrica successfully invoked the spirit of the movement for African-American 
civil rights and applied it to influencing US policy toward South Africa.  Utilizing its 
connections in the CBC in combination with symbolic civil disobedience at the South 
African Embassy, TransAfrica clarified the preceding three decades of patient 
antiapartheid organizing while bringing pressure to bear on Congress as well as 
Presidents Reagan and Bush.  During the decisive years of the antiapartheid struggle 







Lost in the Stars: Apartheid and American Popular Culture 
 
Not miles, or walls, or length of days 
Nor the cold doubt of midnight can hold us apart, 
For swifter than wings of the morning 
The pathways of the heart! 
Over tens of thousands of miles.” 
 
Lost in the Stars 
By Maxwell Anderson and  
Kurt Weill  
19491 
 
It’s time to accept our responsibility 
Freedom is a privilege nobody rides for free 
Look around the world baby it can’t be denied 
Why are we always on the wrong side? 
 
Sun City  
By Little Steven 
19852 
 
     When both apartheid and the cold war were new, Americans learned of South Africa’s 
racial conflict through Alan Paton’s novel Cry, The Beloved Country.  First published in 
early 1948, just prior to the election that swept the Nationalist Party into power in South 
Africa, Cry was made into a Broadway musical in 1949, titled Lost in the Stars, and 
produced as a film in 1951.  The international bestseller alerted the world to South 
Africa’s crisis in a way similar to Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin3 (also an 
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international success adapted to the stage) informed the debate over slavery in antebellum 
America.  Like Stowe, Paton observed apartheid from the position of a white Protestant 
seeking reconciliation with oppressed blacks.  The career of Cry on page, stage, and 
screen provides a starting point for understanding the way that Americans perceived 
apartheid through popular culture. 
     Casting of the dramatizations of Cry offered opportunities for African-American 
performers to learn about conditions in South Africa while gaining prominence in 
productions that earned international renown.  The transnational involvement of writers, 
directors, and actors in producing Cry and Lost in the Stars exemplified the power 
relationships at the outset of major cultural productions about apartheid: white American 
and European, writers, directors and lyricists framed dramatic presentations that featured 
African-American and black South African performers. 
     Over the four decades that books, movies, and music conveyed the oppression and 
pain of South Africa’s struggle to American audiences, a simultaneous struggle for 
control of the means of creative production and transmission by Africans and African-
Americans ensued.  The way in which the stories were told and the productions were sold 
reflected changing racial power dynamics in South Africa and the US.  The gradual 
assertion of black authorship and control is parallel to the process by which the 
emergence of the black-led Free South Africa Movement marked a shift in the power 
relationships within the American antiapartheid movement.  By translating the issue of 
apartheid into the terms of American civil religion influenced by the civil rights 
movement, representations of apartheid in popular culture shaped the cultural context in 
which Americans understood the South African crisis. 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
172 
     Cultural critic Melani McCalister has noted that cultural representations “do not inject 
ideologies into their audiences, but they do figure in the process of constructing 
frameworks that help policy make sense in a given moment.”4  Americans learned about 
and understood the situation in South Africa in ways that jibed with their own experience.  
The oppression of apartheid resonated with many Americans because it looked familiar.  
Images of white police and soldiers beating, shooting, and gassing black protesters 
created a context in which the term “apartheid” came to symbolize the kind of racial 
Armageddon that Americans, after the riots and strife of the 1960s, hoped to avert at 
home.5 
     The similarity of apartheid to American racial segregation provided activists with 
messages and metaphors to mobilize constituencies that opposed American racism.  
Sociologist Robert Bellah’s definition of civil religion, which emphasizes rituals such as 
Presidential inaugurations, Memorial Day, and the Fourth of July6 does not account for 
the role of popular culture in recasting the symbols and terms of the creed.  In the era 
where television and movies came to be the dominant medium, popular culture is the 
realm in which civil religion is reinterpreted and understood in light of new 
circumstances.  The representation of the antiapartheid struggle in South Africa in 
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popular culture is the venue by which many Americans became aware of the issue, and 
thus it is important to contextualize the key examples that conveyed the message. 
     This chapter explores the changes in the way apartheid was presented to Americans 
using an eclectic approach that concentrates on salient examples in key cultural 
categories.  Covered here are the precedents established when Cry, the Beloved Country 
first introduced South Africa’s problems to the world.  The role of music, particularly the 
career of Miriam Makeba, the production of the album Sun City, and the controversy 
around Paul Simon’s Graceland album, are explored.  The realm of athletics is examined 
by looking at the personal activism of African-American tennis star Arthur Ashe.  
Finally, an analysis of the most prominent films about apartheid will show the evolution 
of the genre. 
     Alan Paton’s novel grew from the epiphany of a middle-aged teacher turned juvenile 
prison warden who, during travels abroad, gained the necessary perspective to distill and 
record his personal feelings about his country’s racial divide.  Paton, born in 1903, was 
descended from British settlers; his upbringing as a devout Anglican Christian is evident 
in his writings.  Beginning in 1935, he served as Principal of the Diepkloof Reformatory 
for young offenders, where he earned a reputation as a progressive reformer in his work 
with the young black African wards.  In 1946 Paton toured prison facilities in Sweden, 
Norway, and the US.  During his trip he wrote Cry, finishing the novel in San Francisco 
on Christmas Eve.  American friends convinced him to submit it to several publishers.7  
Accepted by Scribners without modification, Cry drew praise from many quarters.  
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Theologian Reinhold Niebuhr told the New York Times Book Review he thought Cry to 
be “about the only recent religious novel that succeeds.”8 
     The full title of Paton’s first book is Cry, the Beloved Country: a Story of Comfort in 
Desolation.  Cry tells the story of reconciliation between a black priest and a white farmer 
brought together by a shared crisis.  The son of the priest murders the reformer son of the 
farmer; the priest’s son is tried and executed for the crime.  The personal rapprochement 
that the two fathers achieve after losing their sons is symbolized by the agreement of the 
farmer to help repair the leaky roof of the priest’s church.  In order to overcome the 
sadness and loss brought on by the deaths of their sons, the two men find common 
ground in the practical act of resurrecting a place of worship. 
     Patons’s stark tale makes human and personal the difficulties that the peoples of South 
Africa had in emulating the balance and harmony of nature found in the bountiful land 
where they lived.  It also simplifies the complexities of South African life, avoiding the 
issues of ethnic division in both the white and black communities.  In so doing it poses 
the political against the spiritual; the harmonious ideal that Paton imagines in Cry is not 
achieved through political redress of black demands, but through the practical 
resurrection found in personal confession and forgiveness.  As a morality tale it succeeds 
wonderfully, but as an explanation of the political and racial conflict it only touches the 
surface of problems that soon engulfed the country.  In this sense it falls short of the more 
systematic critique of American slavery Stowe laid out in Uncle Tom’s Cabin. 
     The immediate success of Cry attracted proposals for turning the story into a musical 
and a movie.  Playwright Maxwell Anderson learned of the novel before its publication 
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via a conversation with Dorothy Hammerstein, the wife of Oscar Hammerstein, who 
knew of its pending debut.  Anderson sought out composer Kurt Weill to collaborate on 
creating a musical adaptation of Paton’s work.  Weill, who had fled Nazi Germany, 
collaborated with Bertolt Brecht, and composed numerous operas and musicals in 
German and English, provided a soaring score for the production.  Stars was Weill’s last 
composition; he died in 1950.  Rouben Momoulian, who had directed the original version 
of George Gershwin’s Porgy and Bess,9 directed the resulting show titled Lost in the 
Stars.  Momoulian recruited Todd Duncan, a professor of voice at Howard University, to 
play the lead role of Stephen Kumalo.  Duncan had earlier played Porgy in Gershwin’s 
folk opera of black life in the American south.10 
     The linkages between Cry and Porgy and Bess are significant because they show 
connections between the emergence of African-American performers on Broadway and 
the issue of apartheid.  Though criticized for characterizing black life from the point of 
view of outsider whites, productions of Porgy and Bess provided an important entry point 
for blacks breaking into the performing arts.  When the musical played in Washington 
DC it provoked controversy because of segregation at Washington’s National Theatre.  
Todd Duncan joined Anne Wiggins Brown, who portrayed Bess, in leading the cast’s 
refusal to perform until the National Theatre allowed integrated audiences.  Pressure from 
the cast, the Theatre Guild and George Gershwin resulted in the first integrated audience 
at the National Theatre, an action that did not become a permanent policy for another 
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twenty years. 11  In part because of the prominence he gained from his role in Porgy and 
Bess the baritone Duncan had been the first African American hired by the New York 
City Opera in 1945. 
     Lost in the Stars began its Broadway run in October of 1949 and ran for 273 
performances.12  In Alan Paton’s opinion, the Broadway musical format did not fit his tale 
of a “humble and unsophisticated black priest”13 seeking reconciliation amid the conflicts 
that embroiled his family.  In the case of the film version of Cry, Paton exercised more 
control over the adaptation because he wrote the screenplay.  Working with director 
Zoltan Korda, Paton transferred the stark prose of his novel onto the screen.  Korda, who 
had directed Paul Robeson in Sanders of the River14 and had overseen a number of films 
in the African genre, aimed for the international market, casting African-American actors 
Canada Lee and Sidney Poitier in the leading roles of the black Anglican priests Stephen 
Kumalo and Theophilus Msimango.  The filming of Cry took place in South Africa, 
where the cast and crew confronted the reality of apartheid in its earliest years. 
     Most of the cast and crew, black and white, were South African.  Poitier, in only his 
second film role, traveled to South Africa unaware of how the strictures of apartheid 
would structure his life during his four-month stay.  According to Poitier’s first memoir, 
he and Canada Lee were housed in a country farmhouse outside Johannesburg as a way 
to accommodate them without subjecting them to segregated facilities in the city.  
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Initially they were denied any liquor in keeping with the apartheid proscription against 
selling alcohol to blacks.  Lee surreptitiously pursued a relationship with a wealthy white 
woman, risking arrest for being in a white neighborhood after curfew.  At one point in 
their travels the actors witnessed white mob violence against blacks after an accident 
between the van carrying the blacks and a white motorcyclist.15 
     Early in the production Poitier offended an Afrikaner member of the crew by using the 
bathroom reserved for whites because only the white bathroom was supplied with toilet 
paper.  As a result of this perceived slight the crewmember held a grudge and made 
Poitier and Lee’s departure drive to the airport weeks later a chase scene worthy of the 
movies.  Poitier and Lee had fortuitously befriended the black driver assigned to them; he 
organized his friends to defend the actors.  Provided with pistols and protected by a 
second car that ran interference, the two American actors made their get-away at 110 
miles per hour with a car of Afrikaner vigilantes in hot pursuit.  They made it to the 
airport safe but shaken.  Poitier credited Dickie Niaka, the chauffer, with driving “like a 
man possessed as he dueled a whole system following us in a blue sedan.”  In Poitier’s 
view the frightening episode provided a moment of freedom for his black African 
compatriots.  He felt that “For the first time in his life, in those brief terrifying moments, 
with the smell of death in the air, Dickie Niaka was liberated—because he was tasting 
what it was like to have his destiny in his own hands.”16 
     Aiming for a broad audience in the US, Paton added direct references in the film’s 
script to the links between America and South Africa.  During the scene when Reverend 
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Kumalo is traveling to Johannesburg to inquire after his son, the train travels by the 
towering piles of tailings from the gold mines.  A conversation ensues in which Kumalo 
inquires of his fellow passengers about what becomes of the product of the mines: 
  What do the white men do with gold? 
  They sell it to the white men in America. 
  And what do they do? 
 They have a big hole in the ground and they put it all back again. 
 They say that is what makes the world go around.17 
 
      The black and white film version of Cry drew critical praise but small audiences.  
Upon returning to the US, Canada Lee participated in early antiapartheid activities with 
the American Friends of South African Resistance (AFSAR), the precursor organization 
to the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) before his death at age 45 in June 1952.18  
As for Poitier, his time in South Africa helped set in motion a personal political 
awakening that led to his involvement with the US civil rights movement as his 
successful career made him a wealthy and prominent figure.19  Poitier starred in films 
dealing with race and civil rights, such as The Defiant Ones,20 In the Heat of the Night,21 
and Lilies of the Field22 for which he won the 1963 Academy Award for Best Actor.  
During the 1964 Freedom Summer campaign Poitier, along with Harry Belafonte, visited 
civil rights workers in Mississippi to deliver $60,000 in cash for their voter registration 
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efforts.  Underscoring the seriousness of their mission, the two stars endured a car chase 
by the Ku Klux Klan much like the one Poitier had survived in South Africa.23  Alan 
Paton, who became the leader of the Liberal Party in South Africa, had important 
connections to the early US antiapartheid movement, corresponding with George Houser 
of ACOA and participating in speaking tours and signing fundraising letters for the 
organization until the South African government prevented him from traveling in order to 
silence him.24  
     Cry, the Beloved Country, the most popular literary rendering of South Africa’s racial 
circumstances, established a literary trope in which both black and white South Africans 
seek forgiveness and redemption from their mutual tragedy in which racism represents 
the fall from grace.  This personalized saga held an appeal to the people outside South 
Africa much like Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird,25 published in 1960 and released as 
a movie in 1962, satisfied the desire of many Americans for an exemplary myth of 
personal racial reconciliation made possible by a virtuous white person who acts above 
the realm of politics.  In the shadow of Paton’s parable and the precedent it established 
for subsequent mainstream portrayals of the antiapartheid struggle, there is an evolution 
of plotlines that moved from the white paternalism and restriction of black agency 
implied by Cry to the depiction of the complexities of oppression and resistance.  
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Another transition is evident in the emergence of a group of African-American actors and 
directors concerned with moving beyond the constraints of the original Cry. 
     In the realm of music South African performers played an important role in informing 
the world of South Africa’s situation.  Key among these artists was singer Miriam 
Makeba, who first arrived in New York City in November of 1959.  The then 27 year-old 
woman who would become known as “Mama Africa” served as an important cultural 
ambassador, connecting the South African antiapartheid struggle and the American civil 
rights movement.  Makeba, who, as an infant, had been imprisoned with her mother, 
suffered exile from South Africa and blacklisting in America, yet she influenced music, 
fashion and political expression as a transnational representative of independent Africa.  
From the very outset of her rise to international prominence Makeba’s career became 
intertwined with the antiapartheid struggle.26 
     During the 1950s Miriam Makeba became a well-known singer and performer in 
South Africa.  Appearing with groups such as the Cuban Brothers and the Black 
Manhattan Brothers, Makeba’s voice and presence earned her roles in the jazz opera King 
Kong as well as a South African recording contract.  In 1959, she was featured in Lionel 
Rogosin’s antiapartheid docudrama Come Back, Africa,27 which introduced her to a 
global audience.  Makeba traveled to Italy and Great Britain for the openings of Come 
Back, Africa.  While in London she met Harry Belafonte, who took it upon himself to 
orchestrate her entrance into American show business.  Appearances on The Steve Allen 
Show and at the Village Vanguard nightclub launched Makeba’s career in the US.  She 
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toured with Belafonte, appeared on The Ed Sullivan Show, and through him became 
acquainted with a range of celebrities, including Duke Ellington, Miles Davis, Diahann 
Carrol, Langston Hughes, Cicely Tyson and Marlon Brando.  Makeba dubbed her mentor 
Belafonte “Big Brother”28 for his efforts. 
     When Makeba attempted to return to South Africa in 1960 to attend her mother’s 
funeral, the South African consulate invalidated her passport, effectively exiling her from 
her native land, a result of the post-Sharpeville crackdown by the South African 
government.  Makeba also faced the realities of American Jim Crow segregation, where 
she faced discrimination in accommodations.  When visiting Atlanta to perform at a rally 
with Martin Luther King Jr. in 1961, she and Belafonte were refused service at the 
restaurant in their hotel.  Belafonte and Makeba returned to the restaurant after alerting 
the media in order to confront the segregation policy.  Belafonte made a point of 
comparing apartheid with American segregation: “What can we as Americans say to a 
guest like Miss Makeba?  She comes from a land of oppression, only to find a situation 
like this.”29 
     Makeba not only illuminated the musical world she also made a fashion statement by 
appearing with her hair unprocessed, becoming one of the first famous black women to 
wear her hair in a natural or “Afro” style, thus initiating a trend.  Her bright and flowing 
onstage costumes inspired emulation as well.  Makeba’s rendering of songs from South 
Africa along with music from around the world made her a progenitor of world music.  
Her two-year marriage to fellow South African, trumpeter Hugh Masekela helped to put 
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her at the center of the network of African artists working in the US.  Many African 
diplomats, students and travelers benefited from Makeba’s hospitality.  Makeba came to 
represent the emergence of independent Africa in the early sixties, earning the nickname 
“Mama Africa” and staying in high demand.  In May of 1962 she performed for President 
John F. Kennedy’s birthday celebration held at Madison Square Garden, singing her hits 
“Wimoweh” and “Nomeva,” prior to Marilyn Monroe’s rendition of “Happy Birthday.”30 
     Makeba’s position as one of the first big stars from Africa served to politicize her 
celebrity status, making her relationships susceptible to the fast changing political climate 
of the 1960s.  In the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Makeba was contacted by “some 
of the African delegates at the UN”31 who asked her to excise several Hebrew songs from 
her repertoire, including a duet she performed with Belafonte.  Makeba refused.  
According to Makeba, she informed Belafonte of the request that she rebuffed, but he 
misunderstood her and thought it was she who wanted to drop the Hebrew numbers.  
Belafonte blasted Makeba in the press and dropped her from his tour.  The rift between 
mentor and protégé lasted for a decade.32  As a result of the breach Makeba took up the 
offer of President Sékou Touré to visit independent Guinea. 
     While in Guinea, Makeba renewed her acquaintance with Stokely Carmichael.  
Carmichael, the radical activist from the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC) who had gained fame by calling for “Black Power,” had been traveling in Africa.  
The acquaintance became a relationship and the two married in March 1968.  They lived 
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in Washington, DC, for much of the rest of the year.  As a result of her association with 
her radical husband, then involved with the early phase of the Black Panther Party, 
Makeba lost her recording contract and most of her concert dates in the US.  The first 
major African recording star in America became one of the last victims of 1950s style 
blacklisting.33  Makeba knew of the precedent, stating, “I think of what they did to Paul 
Robeson.  He was not given work because of his political beliefs.”34 
     By 1969, in response to Makeba’s blacklisting and Carmichael’s political frustrations, 
the couple had relocated to Guinea.  During the 1970s she performed in Africa and 
around the world but rarely in the US.  She also represented Guinea at the UN, though 
she did not feel comfortable in the role of an official diplomat.  In 1987 Makeba joined 
Paul Simon’s Graceland tour, which reintroduced her to US audiences.  Makeba returned 
to South Africa in 1990 as apartheid began to be dismantled.  Miriam Makeba also 
contributed her acting and singing skills to the movie Sarafina!  She played a domestic 
working in the home of wealthy whites whose daughter joins in the Soweto uprising, 
enacting on screen the nickname she earned at the outset of her international career, 
Mama Africa.   
     Sports served as another template on which the image of apartheid was cast.  The 
American South has produced many black athletes, but few who rose in the elite world of 
tennis until the 1990s.  The African-American trailblazer in the men’s game was Arthur 
Ashe.  Born in Richmond, Virginia, in 1943, Ashe became involved in tennis at age 10.  
He learned his sport from Dr. Robert Walter Johnson, who had also coached the first 
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female black tennis star, Althea Gibson.  Despite the limits imposed by segregation, Ashe 
became prominent on the amateur youth circuit and earned an athletic scholarship to the 
University of California at Los Angeles.  At UCLA Ashe won the US intercollegiate 
singles championship, which helped lead the university team to the NCAA 
championship.  After graduating in 1966 Ashe played as an amateur while serving in the 
Army.  He won the US Open in 1968 and, after completing his military service, turned 
professional in 1969.  Ashe competed for 11 years, winning at Wimbledon in 1975, the 
year he earned the number one ranking among male tennis players.  His career was cut 
short by a heart ailment, but he continued to captain the US Davis cup team during the 
early 1980s. 
     As a prominent player in international competition, Ashe came to know leading tennis 
players from South Africa such as Cliff Drysdale, Frew McMillan, and Ray Moore.  In 
1969 Drysdale discussed with Ashe and other top players the initial South African Open 
to be held in Johannesburg that fall.  Drysdale explained to Ashe that “They’d never let 
you play,”35 meaning that the government would not grant him a visa even if the Open 
organizers asked him to participate.  Ashe had been unaware that apartheid remained so 
entrenched, so he took it upon himself to challenge the regime by asking for a visa to 
allow him to play.  As Drysdale had predicted, Ashe was rebuffed.  In February of 1969 
Ashe testified to the House Subcommittee on Africa to recount his attempt to gain entry 
into South Africa; in May he explained his efforts in front of a United Nations 
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committee.36  Undeterred by the snub, and against the advice of antiapartheid activists 
such as George Houser who urged Ashe to boycott South Africa,37 Ashe continued to 
apply each year until 1973 when he finally received a visa. 
     At his matches in 1973 and again in 1974 Ashe demanded that the viewing stands be 
integrated, and the South Africans complied during his appearances.  Ashe sought the 
opinions of blacks, coloreds, and Indians who faced discrimination under apartheid as 
well as whites holding a range of opinions about the future of the regime.  Despite the 
acceptance and hospitality he received from his South African hosts, Ashe saw “the sneer 
of superiority on the faces of many whites”38 which to Ashe was akin to the disdain and 
discrimination he had experienced growing up in the American South.  In one 
circumstance he encountered a teenaged Mark Mathabane, who waited for Ashe after 
each match.  One day Ashe asked the future tennis star and author “Why are you 
following me around?” to which Mathabane replied, “Because you are the first one I have 
ever seen.”  Ashe asked “The first what?” to which the precocious Mathabane answered, 
“You are the first truly free black man I have ever seen.”39  A note from Winnie Mandela, 
surreptitiously delivered in a folded newspaper to Ashe as he departed from 
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Johannesburg by plane, urged Ashe not to be presumptuous but to “ask the South 
Africans what you can do to help in their struggle.”40   
     As a result of his experiences in South Africa, Ashe refused to return there to play 
tennis after 1975 and began to support economic and cultural sanctions.  He committed 
himself to the antiapartheid struggle and lent his assistance to TransAfrica.  Ashe had 
been a childhood friend of TransAfrica’s leader Randall Robinson; both had played on 
the little league baseball team coached by Robinson’s father.  Ashe, who had not been 
directly involved with the civil rights struggles being waged during his college years, 
explained his involvement with activism in the 1970s and 1980s this way: 
Like many people with even a modicum of conscience and intelligence, I 
was too confused about what was going on among the leaders of black 
America, especially the younger leaders, to know precisely where to tread.  
South Africa was a clearer issue, and I turned to it almost with relief.41 
 
     Ashe retired as a player after suffering a heart attack in 1979.  In 1980 he was chosen 
to captain the US Davis Cup.  In that capacity he convinced American player John 
McEnroe not to play an exhibition match against Bjorn Borg at Sun City in the South 
African “homeland” of Bophuthatswana. 42  Ashe persuaded McEnroe’s father, his son’s 
chief advisor, to have McEnroe withdraw from the match.  Ashe pointed out that 
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McEnroe’s fame insured that he would attract a great deal of criticism for competing in 
South Africa.  McEnroe sacrificed the prize money being put up by NBC and a South 
African entertainment group; he and Ashe maintained good relations throughout the 
course of Ashe’s captaincy.  43 
     As the situation in South Africa worsened in the 1980s Ashe became even more 
outspoken.  As an active supporter of TransAfrica, he agreed to co-chair, along with 
Harry Belafonte, Artists and Athletes Against Apartheid (AAAA) which, beginning in 
1983, enrolled a diverse group of cultural figures and over thirty organizations who 
pledged not to play or perform in South Africa in response to the United Nation’s call for 
a cultural boycott.44  AAAA was particularly critical of those artists who had performed at 
the Sun City resort in Bophuthatswana.  South Africa had set it up the supposedly 
independent country as part of its program to relocate South African blacks to areas 
deemed traditional homelands in order to take away their South African citizenship.  
Headline entertainers such as Frank Sinatra contested the claims of AAAA and refused to 
participate in the boycott, many others who had previously played in Sun City were 
dissuaded from returning.45 
     The launch of the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM) in November 1984 drew 
Ashe further into antiapartheid activism.  On January 11, 1985 Ashe participated in civil 
disobedience and was arrested at the South African embassy in Washington, DC as part 
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of the FSAM demonstrations.46  In October of that year Ashe was replaced as Davis Cup 
captain, a decision by the US Tennis Association that he attributed in part to his visible 
activism.  Undeterred by the setback, Ashe continued to participate in antiapartheid 
activities with TransAfrica.  In 1989 he appeared before the Association of Tennis 
Professionals, along with Mark Mathabane, to persuade the organization to maintain its 
boycott of South African for tennis tournaments.47 
     The rapid changes that took place in South Africa in 1989 and 1990, which led to the 
release of Nelson Mandela, brought great satisfaction to Ashe.  In 1990 he met Mandela 
after a televised town meeting in New York.  Mandela embraced him and praised his 
three-volume work A Hard Road to Glory: A History of the African-American Athlete,48 
which details the struggles of African-American athletes; Mandela had read the work 
while still in prison.  Ashe also conferred with Mandela as a participant in the 1991 
“Democracy Now” tour to South Africa organized by TransAfrica.49 
     Like Jackie Robinson before him, Ashe used his public profile to bring attention to the 
issue of apartheid, translating his personal racial sojourn in America into the rationale for 
activism to change South Africa.50  Arthur Ashe died of AIDS in 1993.  He contracted the 
illness from a 1983 blood transfusion performed when he underwent heart bypass 
surgery.  TransAfrica’s Arthur R. Ashe, Jr. Foreign Policy Library provides a wealth of 
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materials on Africa and the Caribbean.  In 1996 he was memorialized with a statue placed 
on Monument Avenue in Richmond, Virginia, where his image integrates the boulevard 
devoted to icons of the Confederacy such as Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee.  The 
statue portrays him with books in one hand, a tennis racquet in the other, arms held over 
his head in a pose of triumphant celebration, as he gazes at a group of admiring children.  
The placement of the statue provoked controversy in Richmond and among Ashe’s 
admirers.  Some traditionalists objected to the placement of a new statue among the 
monuments that celebrate the Southern leaders of the Civil War.  Some African-
Americans did not want the statue in such company either, preferring that it be placed in 
front of a proposed Hall of Fame for African-American athletes.  The Richmond City 
Council, deliberating in front of a gallery of onlookers that included whites clad in 
Confederate uniforms and blacks in traditional African garb, determined that the statue 
should be placed on Monument Avenue.51  The Ashe statue commemorates the life of one 
of Richmond’s greatest athletes, activists, and humanitarians.  The controversy it 
provoked and the contrast it presents indicates that the racial divide so central to Ashe’s 
activism remains a living concern. 
 
We're rockers and rappers united and strong  
We're here to talk about South Africa we don't like what's going on  
It's time for some justice, it's time for the truth  
We've realized there's only one thing we can do  
I ain’t gonna play Sun City  
 
Sun City  
By Little Steven 
                                                





     In 1985, with South Africa under a State of Emergency and Ethiopia suffering famine, 
artists in Europe and the US were spurred to use their prestige and visibility to raise 
money and promote awareness about the troubles across Africa.  Bob Geldof, lead singer 
for the Boomtown Rats, initiated the pattern in 1984 with his British production of Do 
They Know Its Christmas?,53 recorded by an ensemble dubbed Band Aid.  Proceeds from 
the recording were used to combat hunger in Africa and elsewhere.  In the US Harry 
Belafonte, seeking to emulate Band Aid, encouraged musicians Michael Jackson and 
Lionel Richie to work with producer Quincy Jones to create We Are the World.54  The 
resulting single and album involved forty-five performers, including Bono, Ray Charles, 
Bob Dylan, Bruce Springsteen, Tina Turner, Dionne Warwick and Paul Simon.  
Columbia Records distributed the single version of We Are The World pro bono.  The 
song was phenomenally popular.  On April 5, 1985 over 5,000 radio stations around the 
world played the song simultaneously.  The song rose to the number one position on the 
pop charts where it remained for four weeks; eventually 7.5 million copies were sold in 
the U.S.  We Are The World raised $50 million dollars for famine relief and supplies for 
Africa.55  Geldof expanded on the effort by organizing “Live Aid,” a star-studded 
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fundraising concert staged in London and Philadelphia simultaneously and telecast live 
around the world on July 13, 1985.56 
     The precedent set by Band Aid and replicated by USA for Africa inspired another 
ensemble effort.  Guitarist Steven Van Zandt, colleague of Bruce Springsteen and known 
as Little Steven, became involved with antiapartheid efforts in 1984 as a result of travels 
to South Africa.  Van Zandt first became aware of apartheid when he heard Peter 
Gabriel’s 1980 song Biko,57 a tribute to the martyred South African black consciousness 
leader which incorporated samples of the songs sung during the funeral processions of 
those killed in clashes with the South African security forces.  Little Steven went to South 
Africa twice in 1984 where he spoke with dissenters and visited the miniature Las Vegas 
known as Sun City.  In March of 1985, after meeting with media raconteur Danny 
Schecter, a New Left veteran who had first traveled to South Africa in 1967,58 Van Zandt 
decided to pursue the creation of the single recording that became Sun City.59  Schecter 
and Van Zandt assembled an international ensemble of fifty-four musicians to record Van 
Zandt’s antiapartheid anthem.  Among the performers were South African exiles, black 
and white, as well as a significant cross section of the top acts of the 1980s including 
Africa Bambaataa, Pat Benatar, Ruben Blades, Jackson Browne, Jimmy Cliff, Miles 
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Davis, The Fat Boys, Peter Gabriel, Run-DMC, and Gil Scott-Heron.  Several 
participants, including Bono, Bob Dylan, Bob Geldof, and Bruce Springsteen, had also 
contributed to the We Are the World effort. 
     Under the title Artists United Against Apartheid, the Sun City single, video, and 
accompanying album, as well as the book and documentary about the making of the 
album, marked a unique collaboration across genres and generations.  Production of the 
MTV-style video, directed by Jonathan Demme, attracted large crowds in Harlem and 
Greenwich Village as fans and antiapartheid activists turned out to see the stars and 
support the struggle.  The single debuted at the United Nations on October 30, 1985, 
under the auspices of the UN Centre Against Apartheid.  The interracial alliance that 
created Sun City, along with its political message and purposes, marked it as distinct from 
the apolitical, feel-good aura of Do They Know It’s Christmas?  and We Are the World.  
Danny Schecter described the effect of the album as “journalism you could jam to.”60 
     As a result of the explicit political edge of Sun City, with lyrics that urged support of 
the cultural boycott and criticized Ronald Reagan’s constructive engagement, calling it 
“nothing but a joke,”61 the Sun City project did not receive the kind of airtime that the 
previous ensemble fundraising pieces enjoyed.  According to Schecter “only half of 
American radio stations played it, many objecting to the explicit attack on President 
Reagan’s policy of constructive engagement.  Some black stations said it was too white, 
while many white stations considered it too black.”62  South Africa understood the intent 
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of the piece and banned the song.  The Public Broadcasting System (PBS) refused to air 
Schecter’s The Making of Sun City documentary, despite the kudos it received from the 
International Documentary Association, claiming that it was a essentially a commercial 
for the album because the artists involved with making the album were also featured in 
the film. 
     Sun City appeared in the wake of renewed student protest on college campuses and as 
the year of picketing at the South African embassy by the Free South Africa Movement 
was coming to an end.  Congressional debate over sanctions against South Africa had 
been a major news item while violent images of South Africa’s state of emergency 
crackdown had been regularly featured in the media.  In this context, the message of Sun 
City took the antiapartheid effort to a new front, combining cultural expression with the 
ethic of intentional philanthropic consumer spending that the antiapartheid movement had 
advocated in other economic activities.  According to Little Steven, sales of the Sun City 
album generated over $1 million for the antiapartheid effort.63  The Africa Fund, the aid 
and assistance arm of the American Committee on Africa, administered the funds.   In 
part because of his involvement with the production of Sun City Danny Schecter 
eventually left his fulltime position with ABC’s 20/20 News magazine to oversee the 
production and distribution of “South Africa Now,” an independent weekly news 
program picked up by many PBS affiliates from 1988-1991.64 
     One performer who participated in We Are the World but did not contribute to Sun 
City was singer-songwriter Paul Simon.  Simon, with his partner Art Garfunkel, had 
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created music that became integral to the soundtrack of the sixties.  The duo moved from 
their teen guise as “Tom and Jerry” in the 1950s to a more somber, often melancholy, 
sound at the height of their popularity in the 1960s.  Simon’s compositions bridged 
personal reflection and social commentary.  In 1963, prior to achieving commercial 
success, he had recorded “He Was My Brother,” a paean to a “freedom writer” who is 
martyred because “he hated what was wrong.”65  A year later, when Simon’s Queens 
College classmate Andrew Goodman was murdered in Mississippi during the 1964 
Freedom Summer voter registration drive, Simon translated his shock and horror at 
Goodman’s death by changing the lyrics to specifically locate “He Was My Brother” in 
Mississippi.66  Simon’s commitment to social relevance, expressed through songs like “A 
Church is Burning”67 which laments racist violence against black churches, and musical 
experimentation, continued to drive his artistic choices in later years. 
     Two factors prompted Simon not to participate in the Sun City project.  He objected to 
the original lyrics of the title song, which had named the names of performers who had 
appeared at Sun City, including Simon’s friend, singer Linda Ronstadt.  In addition, 
Simon had also been engaged in his own exploration of South African music.  A bootleg 
version Gumboots: Accordian Jive Hits, Volume II, a compilation album of South African 
“Mbaqanga” or township jive music, inspired Simon to travel to South Africa to record 
with a number of top South Africa artists, including Lady Smith Black Mambazo and 
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Ray Phiri.  The resulting collaboration became the album Graceland.  Released in 1986, 
Graceland was Simon’s most successful album since the seventies and his most 
controversial musical project.68 
     Graceland, referring to Elvis Presley’s mansion in Memphis, Tennessee, as well as an 
elusive state of grace, received critical acclaim, popular appreciation, and political 
disapproval.  By arranging and recording most of the tracks for Graceland in South 
Africa, Simon had abrogated the terms of the UN cultural boycott, which called upon 
artists not to perform or record in South Africa.  Critics also accused Simon of exploiting 
the South African musicians for personal gain.  He had crossed a line that had not been 
immediately visible to him: he put creativity and the business of music before politics and 
had not shown deference to those who considered themselves the guardians of the 
boycott and the struggle.  Simon’s misstep was compounded by the fact that the songs on 
Graceland made largely personal and not avowedly political statements about life in 
South Africa.  The inclusion of boycott breaker Linda Ronstadt as a back up singer on the 
“Under African Skies” track did not help matters. 
     Nonetheless, the criticism that ensued from the UN Special Committee Against 
Apartheid, the African National Congress, and other antiapartheid activists seemed to 
take Simon by surprise.  In the process of creating the album, Simon, aware that working 
in South Africa could be contentious, had consulted with Quincy Jones and Harry 
Belafonte, as well as several South Africans, about the advisability of the project.  All 
had urged him to proceed.  While in South Africa Simon paid the performers he worked 
with triple the American scale for session artists and contracted to share royalties with 
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those with whom he had collaborated.  Despite these steps, the UN Special Committee 
Against Apartheid added Simon to the list of performers censured for performing in 
South Africa.  Simon was removed after petitioning the Committee, explaining in his 
letter that as a musician  “who has refused to perform in South Africa, I reiterate and 
intend to maintain this position in the context of the UN cultural boycott.”69  Prior to the 
recording of Graceland Simon had twice refused to perform at Sun City, turning down 
substantial offers.  The stance Simon took, however, was not one of complete contrition.  
He continued to argue that he was exercising his artistic freedom, distinguishing his 
actions from artists who had performed at Sun City by saying “To go over and play Sun 
City would be like going over to do a concert in Nazi Germany at the height of the 
Holocaust.  But what I did was to essentially go over and play to the Jews.  That 
distinction was never made.”70 
     Graceland won a Grammy for album of the year in February 1987 and was very 
popular in South Africa.  Despite, or perhaps because of, its success the album remained 
controversial.  The Graceland international tour, the proceeds of which went to the 
supporting artists from South Africa and to charitable causes such as the United Negro 
College Fund and Children of Apartheid, received support and condemnation from 
people concerned with South Africa.  Reverend Allan Boesak, a leader of the United 
Democratic Front (UDF) in South Africa, as well as Nobel Peace Prize laureate Desmond 
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Tutu, endorsed the tour.  Boesak had created the Children of Apartheid fund, which 
provided aid to children jailed by the apartheid regime.  Miriam Makeba and Hugh 
Masakela joined the tour along with several of the acts that had recorded with Simon.  
Each concert concluded with an ensemble rendition of “Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika,” the 
anthem of the ANC.71 The tour was greeted enthusiastically all over the world, including 
two large outdoor concerts in Zimbabwe, where integrated throngs danced and cheered to 
the rhythms of the transnational troupe while video crews recorded the event for an 
American cable television special.  Shows in the US were commercially successful, 
though the audiences during the initial phase of the tour were almost exclusively white.  
Performances in Detroit, Philadelphia, and Atlanta were added in an effort to address this 
self-segregation.  Simon attributed the problem to the notion that Graceland was “a white 
record.”72 
     Yet the UN Committee remained critical of Simon’s tour and Dali Tambo,73 son of 
ANC president Oliver Tambo and founder of Artists Against Apartheid in Britain, 
denounced the album and the tour.  Putting the problem plainly, Tambo asserted that, in 
order to make sure that Simon’s musical endeavors were not twisted into feel-good 
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propaganda by Pretoria there should have been prior consultation.  According to Tambo 
“If Paul Simon had come to us first and discussed this, none of this would have 
happened.”74  Antiapartheid protesters picketed Graceland tour concerts in Great Britain.  
Tambo’s sentiments also resonated with segments of the antiapartheid movement in the 
US, particularly students and young people riled about Simon’s perceived poaching of 
South African music for his own fame and profit. 
     To address the criticism Simon met with a group of students at historically black 
Howard University in January of 1987.  Simon spoke with the group, explaining, as he 
had in his letter to the UN, that his objective was to share the music of South Africa with 
the world, not to exploit.  The Howard audience was not persuaded.  In front of reporters 
and television cameras one student accused Simon of co-opting the Mbaqanga sound, 
charging, “You’re telling me the Gershwin story of South Africa!  Its nothing but 
stealing!”75  Other students questioned Simon’s creative sincerity and political 
understanding.  Simon pointed out that there had been no guarantee that his efforts would 
be such a hit, but much of the audience remained unswayed.  Following the tension-filled 
exchange, reporter Charlayne Hunter-Gault, who had been one of the first black students 
at the University of Georgia, remarked that “it’s the liberals that take all the shit.”76 
     The comparison of Paul Simon to George Gerswhin, though intended as 
condemnation, can also be understood as a compliment.  Like Gershwin, who endured 
censure for caricaturing black life in Porgy and Bess while providing an important 
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opening for black performers in the era of segregation, Paul Simon saw his work succeed 
commercially and afford opportunities to South African musicians whose horizons had 
been limited by the constraints of apartheid.  In particular, the vocal group Ladysmith 
Black Mambazo went on to achieve global renown, appearing on American television 
programs such as Saturday Night Live and Sesame Street.  Ladysmith founder Joseph 
Shabalala viewed the whole phenomenon “as a gift from God.”77  The crescendo of 
criticism that had greeted the release of Graceland diminished in subsequent years while 
the popularity of South African music grew, in large part because of the introduction it 
had gained from Graceland’s success. 
     By 1992, with the ANC leadership out of prison, the dismantlement of apartheid 
underway, and the cultural boycott lifted, Simon traveled to South Africa as part of his 
Born At The Right Time tour.  Although the tour had been approved by the ANC and 
welcomed by Nelson Mandela, and again included South African musicians, more radical 
antiapartheid organizations threatened violent disruption of the concerts.  Simon met with 
one of the aggrieved groups, the Azanian Youth Organization (AZAYO), participating in 
a dialogue like the one he had joined with students at Howard University.  An explosion 
at the offices of one of the contractors assisting the tour frightened the performers and 
potential concertgoers.  As a result attendance at the five shows was less than expected.78  
Simon pursued the tour despite the threats and controversy, stating, “…I feel indebted.  I 
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wanted to come and repay the debt to South African musicians whom I have been 
working with these past six years.”79 
     The Graceland controversy of 1987 came at a time when apartheid had become a 
topic in mainstream movies.  The evolution of representations of the struggle against 
apartheid in film has parallels with and connections to contemporaneous antiapartheid 
activism.  The assertion of black authorship and control is comparable to the process by 
which the emergence of the black-led Free South Africa Movement marked a shift in the 
leadership within the American antiapartheid movement.  The success of divestment and 
boycott efforts, along with the passage of the 1986 Comprehensive Anti Apartheid Act, 
contributed to a changed climate in which apartheid became the topic of a number of 
commercial Hollywood releases.  Initially the stories focused primarily on the white 
characters while later films moved toward a focus on black characters and the struggle for 
self-determination.  This evolution occurred because of the emergence of black directors 
and funders who wanted to confront the inclination of the film industry to aim for the 
white audience in America. 
     Following the release of Cry, the Beloved Country in 1951, the issue of apartheid 
gained little notice in mainstream movies viewed in the United States.  Lionel Rogosin’s 
1959 Come Back, Africa helped to launch the career of Miriam Makeba and became an 
educational tool for the small antiapartheid network of the 1960s, but did not receive 
widespread distribution.80  During the sixties even popular documentaries with South 
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African elements passed over the subject.  In The Endless Summer, released in 1966, 
California surfers find the perfect wave in South Africa but encountered no black people 
on screen.81  Hugh Masekela’s performance in Monterey Pop,82 filmed at the 1967 
Monterey Pop Festival where he appeared between Moby Grape and The Byrds, stands 
out as one of the few appearances by a South African to achieve widespread distribution.  
But Masakela’s set was remarkable for its musicianship, not its politics.83 
     Movies set in South Africa’s pre-apartheid past, such as the 1964 production of Zulu,84 
(in which Zulu Chief Mangosuthu Buthelzi, leader of ANC rival Inkatha Freedom Party, 
plays the role of the nineteenth century Zulu leader Cetewayo)85 ostensibly dealt with the 
politics of the nineteenth, not the twentieth century.  In 1975 action thriller The Wilby 
Conspiracy,86 Sidney Poitier joined Michael Caine, (who had appeared in Zulu).  Poitier 
and Caines’ characters become black and white fugitive buddies, reminiscent of the The 
Defiant Ones, in which Poitier had played an escaped prisoner handcuffed to Tony 
Curtis. 
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     Critic Peter Davis points out that this “buddy film” genre, in which white characters 
attain a new understanding of the dilemma of the black character because the black 
character makes a heroic sacrifice, often costing his life, became the predominant trope in 
the feature films about apartheid made during the 1980s, and continued in several of the 
films of the 1990s.87  The movies made in the late 1980s served as an important venue for 
portraying the oppression of apartheid in a time when Pretoria was strictly censoring 
news from South Africa, while those made after the release of Nelson Mandela situate the 
antiapartheid struggle as history that people should understand in a moral context.  The 
precedents set prior to the eighties changed slowly as filmmakers grew bolder in their 
criticism of apartheid and African-Americans gained greater influence in the production 
of films about South Africa.  Critic Rob Nixon has noted that, because of the power of 
the American media industry, “whenever there is a mass market endeavor to translate 
another culture’s experience into terms accessible to the USA, American preconceptions, 
frames of reference and narrative designs readily take precedence.”88  Nixon’s assessment 
of the manner in which actors and themes familiar to American audiences dominated the 
antiapartheid production is substantiated by the films of the era. 
     British Director Richard Attenborough, who had directed the Oscar winning epic 
Gandhi 89in 1982, turned his attention to South Africa with Cry Freedom,90 released in 
1987.  Attenborough’s adaptation of white South African journalist Donald Woods’ 
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account of his friendship with black consciousness leader Stephen Biko put Cry Freedom 
squarely into the buddy genre of films contending with race relations.  The film, which 
stars American actors Kevin Kline as Woods and Denzel Washington as Biko, portrays 
Biko persuading the skeptical Woods of the justice of the black struggle against 
apartheid.  Biko’s militancy is politically sanitized, and he is portrayed as just a 
reasonable integrationist, not a fiery militant.  The Biko character is murdered about 
seventy minutes into the film, effectively containing his role rather then fully explicating 
it.  The rest of the movie is dominated by Woods’ perilous escape from South Africa.  At 
the time of its release the film provoked controversy among antiapartheid activists who 
criticized it for diminishing black agency and from the South African Government, 
which, after first approving the film for release in South Africa, subsequently banned it in 
part because two of the theaters showing the film were bombed.91 
     Cry Freedom not only borrows the buddy formula from The Defiant Ones, it also 
establishes several conventions that were repeated and modified in the films that follow.  
These include recreation of clashes with the police in township battlegrounds strewn with 
wrecked cars, a scrolling text epilog which refers to the ongoing oppression in South 
Africa, and a buddy relationship between a black and a white character.  At the end of 
Cry Freedom there is a listing of those who had died in detention like Steven Biko, along 
with the trumped up causes of death, such as “self strangulation.” 92  Cry Freedom, like 
several of the movies that followed it, was filmed in the frontline state of Zimbabwe, 
where Robert Mugabe’s regime cooperated with antiapartheid filmmakers. 
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     Another 1987 release was the historical drama Mandela,93 which appeared on the cable 
channel HBO.  Filmed in Zimbabwe, Mandela stars Danny Glover in the role of Nelson 
and Alfre Woodard as Winnie Mandela.  Mandela’s rise to the leadership of the ANC and 
the antiapartheid struggle is faithfully and plausibly chronicled.  The film uses the 
relationship between Nelson and Winnie to humanize their characters and to illustrate the 
pain created by the quarter century Mandela had spent behind bars at that point.  True to 
the situation in South Africa at the time of the film’s release, the movie finishes with the 
1985 statement of Nelson Mandela, read by his daughter Zindzi, in which he refuses to 
renounce armed struggle in exchange for freedom.94  
     The British production of A World Apart,95 released in 1988, is a fictionalized account 
of the sojourn of white antiapartheid campaigner and journalist Ruth First.  First’s 
daughter Shawn Slovo wrote the screenplay, drawing on her own experience as well as 
First’s book about her time in detention titled 117 Days.96  The film is directed by Chris 
Menges, who oversaw photography for previous message films such as The Killing 
Fields97 and The Mission.98  The film’s story, set in 1963, is told through the eyes of a 
thirteen year old in the position that Slovo found herself, watching her mother, portrayed 
by Barbara Hershey, suffer the absence of her exiled father and serve time in jail under 
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the Ninety Day detention act.  The film omits the fact that First was a member of the 
South African Communist Party and that her husband Joe Slovo was the leader of 
Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC.  While First, renamed  “Diana Roth” 
for the film, is shown working as a journalist and hosting integrated parties, the film does 
not provide much background on First or the struggle, focusing instead on the personal 
feelings of her daughter and family.  The movie ends with Roth/First and her daughter 
joining an illegal funeral procession for a fallen comrade, replete with fluttering ANC 
flags and the assemblage singing “Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika” as the security forces close in.  
The final frames transpose a written explanation of the 1982 death of Ruth First, 
assassinated by a letter bomb while living in Mozambique, over the picture of man 
throwing a tear gas canister back at the police.  While the film focuses mainly on the 
travails of the character Diana Roth and her family, not on black agency in the struggle, A 
World Apart does give emphasis to the role of women in South Africa and their active 
resistance to apartheid. 
     In 1989 director Euzhan Palcy chose to film her rendering of A Dry White Season99 in 
Zimbabwe.  Palcy, originally from Martinique, visited South Africa to gain a sense of the 
scene and situation.  Based on the novel by Afikaner André Brink, A Dry White Season 
received plaudits for the way Palcy reworked the buddy formula to balance white and 
black perspectives.  Palcy had as her goal the transmission of the reality of life under 
apartheid, by creating a movie that was “a Hollywood production, but it’s not a 
                                                
99 A Dry White Season, Directed by Euzhan Palcy (1987; MGM). 
 
206 
Hollywood film.”100  Determined to employ South Africa actors, rather than African-
Americans, to play South Africans, Palcy cast Winston Ntshona, Zakes Mokae, and 
Sophis Mgcina, alongside Donald Sutherland, Susan Sarandon, and Marlon Brando.  Set 
in 1976, Dry White Season centers on the relationship between a white schoolteacher, 
played by Sutherland, and his black gardener, Winston Ntshona, as they are pulled into a 
tragic sojourn initiated by the disappearance of the gardener’s son. 
     A Dry White Season reworks the buddy genre so that both the black and white 
partners lose their lives for questioning the apartheid regime.  It is left in the hands of 
another character, the black cab driver, Stanley, who had introduced Sutherland’s 
character to the hellish side of life in South Africa, to avenge the death of his liberal 
white ally, thus joining black sacrifice with black agency.  In another departure from 
precedent, Palcy’s film was the first of the antiapartheid movies to explicitly show 
torture.  Palcy herself became a trailblazer, as Dry White Season was the first film 
produced by a major Hollywood studio to be directed by a black woman.  Included in the 
musical score of the film are contributions from Ladysmith Black Mambazo, Hugh 
Masakela, and the cast of the Broadway musical Sarafina!.  Like its predecessors, Dry 
White Season includes a scrolling text at the end that elaborates the state of the struggle in 
1989. 
     Following the release of Nelson Mandela and the initiation of the dismantlement of 
apartheid, the circumstances of production, as well as the purpose for making apartheid-
themed films, also changed.  No longer were movies the primary window by which mass 
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audiences could glimpse the agony of South Africa.  With legalization of black political 
organizations and the lifting of the cultural boycott it became possible to film in South 
Africa with support of the ANC.  The new films served to inscribe a record in popular 
historical consciousness of the meaning of the struggle.  Many of the same thematic 
dilemmas and questions remained for directors to deal with, and the subject remained 
controversial as directors, black and white, took on the challenge.  
     Apartheid, discredited by the National Party itself, became a safe subject for 
mainstream moviemakers to tackle.  In 1992 Disney released the film version  of 
Sarafina!, a musical about the Soweto uprising.  Sarafina!101  was created by the multi-
talented Mbongeni Ngema, who directed it as a Broadway musical with a cast from South 
Africa in 1988-1989.  The music for Sarafina! was co-written by Hugh Masakela, whose 
playing is featured on the sound track along with Ladysmith Black Mambazo.  The drama 
centers on a student who is inspired by a teacher, played by Whoopie Goldberg, to act 
against the injustice of apartheid.  The film makes great strides toward emphasizing black 
agency as well as showcasing the music and dance of the black townships.  The students 
organize themselves to resist instruction in Afrikaans.  The main character, Sarafina, 
exposes her inner dialogue by speaking to a picture of Nelson Mandela.  In the course of 
demonstrating and fighting the police, Sarafina participates in the necklacing execution, 
performed by hanging a tire filled with gasoline around the neck of the victim, of a black 
constable who works with the white government.  Miriam Makeba appears as Sarafina’s 
mother, a domestic worker who advises her daughter to be cautious but true to herself.  
With the counsel of her mother and the example of her martyred teacher in mind, the 
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Sarafina character forswears violence and throws a gun she had been hiding into a 
swamp. 
     The interruption of the action with spirited dance numbers makes for an incongruous 
juxtaposition of lively music with students fighting and fleeing police.  White characters 
are central to the action only as the oppressive administrators and vicious cops that the 
students are rebelling against, with the main story concentrating on Sarafina’s political 
coming of age. Torture and imprisonment are portrayed, though not as graphically as in A 
Dry White Season.  Director Darrell Roodt broke new ground by contending with the 
issue of black-on-black violence.  It was also the first of the antiapartheid movies filmed 
in Soweto with the cooperation of the ANC and produced by South Africans.  Sarafina! 
ends with the standard text explanation of the current situation as of 1992, which is more 
hopeful than its predecessors as a result of the changed situation. 
     Another film shot primarily in South Africa during the interregnum between 
Mandela’s release and the 1994 election was The Power of One.102  Released in 1992, it 
was directed by John G. Avildsen, who also directed Rocky,103 Lean on Me,104 and The 
Karate Kid.105  Avildsen transposes the trope of the buddy genre onto the cliché of the 
David vs. Goliath fight movie to explore the rise of apartheid in the thirties and forties.  
Avildsen puts to film the novel by Bryce Courtenay,106 which follows the travails and 
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triumphs of P.K, an English-speaking orphan who lands in an Afrikaner boarding school.  
His Zulu nanny garners P.K. the blessing of a traditional healer, who imbues the 
character of P.K. with courage. 
     Abused by his pro-Hitler classmates, P.K. becomes the charge of a gentle German 
émigré pianist who is detained by the British during World War II.  As a result, P.K. 
becomes something of the prison mascot, visiting the compound to take piano lessons 
from Doc and boxing lessons from Geel Peet, portrayed by Morgan Freeman.  The wise 
African boxing mentor teaches his young white protégé to use his brains to overpower his 
opponents.  P.K. learns the languages of the African ethnic groups in the prison and 
becomes their arbiter and choir director.  He leads them in a defiant song with Zulu lyrics 
that rail against the cowardly guards, who, uncomprehending, sway along to the vocal 
harmony. 
     When the truth comes out, the guards beat Geel Peet to death in retaliation for their 
humiliation.  P.K. goes on to become a fighter and antiracist bridge builder who 
challenges the onset of the post-1948 apartheid regime by participating in interracial 
boxing matches as well as clandestine literacy classes for his fellow fighters.  A romance 
with the daughter of an Afrikaner intellectual meant to resemble the architect of 
apartheid, D.F. Malan, serves to expose the faulty tribalism of the whites.  In the 
climactic scene, P.K. and his black boxing buddy confront P.K.’s old boarding school 
tormentor during a police raid on a black township of Alexandra.  Together they prevail 
over the sadistic Afrikaner and continue with their literacy efforts. 
     Much like To Kill A Mockingbird, The Power of One provides the viewer with a white 
savior with whom to relate in the battle of universal good versus racist evil.  One goes 
even further, posing the white savior as a magical peacemaker who knows how to heal 
210 
the tribal divisions in black society as well as confront the injustice of apartheid.  The 
finale of One joins the convention of reading a document, with a black child in the 
literacy project sounding out the American Declaration of Independence, with the 
requisite scrolling text waxing eloquent about the amazing “power of one” as the buddies 
literally walk off into the sunset.  The Power of One turns the antiapartheid epic formula 
inside out, using not only the South African landscape but also apartheid itself as a 
backdrop for a universal story about the power of the individual. 
     In stark contrast to the rosy universalism of The Power of One, Bopha!107 attempts to 
correct to address problems inherent in Cry Freedom and other films.  The title is a Zulu 
term that means "to detain" or "to arrest," and also means "resistance."  The term is 
defined in the beginning of Bopha! by scrolling text, rearranging the convention 
established in the predecessor films, implying motion from words to deeds rather than 
deeds to words.  Released in 1993, Bopha! is based on a play by South African author 
Percy Mtwa.  The play had been produced at Lincoln Center in 1986 and at the Los 
Angeles Theater Center in 1987.  PBS also produced it as a docudrama narrated by 
Sidney Poitier that interwove footage of township violence between rival black groups 
with scenes from the play.  Mtwa traveled with the play in South Africa where he spoke 
with audiences about their experiences.108  
     The commercial movie production debuted Morgan Freeman as director with Arsenio 
Hall as producer.  The film re-united Glover and Woodard who had starred in HBO’s 
Mandela.  Bopha! is set in 1980, with the memory of the 1976 Soweto uprising still 
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smoldering.  Glover portrays a black police captain in a remote homeland that wants his 
teenage son to follow him into the force.  The son rebels and joins his peers in resisting 
Afrikaans instruction and the security forces, including his father.  Glover’s character is 
drawn deeper and deeper into the contradictions of his position as a black enforcer for the 
racist regime.  As the veneer of paternalism is stripped away by the increasingly harsh 
actions of his white superiors, Glover is forced to face his personal failure in contrast to 
the more righteous choice of his son, who becomes a resistance leader.  In the final scene 
Glover attempts to join a funeral rally where his son is speaking.  During his son’s 
rousing call to resistance, Glover’s character is recognized and stabbed for being a 
collaborator.  Unbeknownst to his son, he dies at the back of the crowd, thus symbolically 
making way for the post-Soweto generation to lead the necessary struggle against the 
system that he had tried to accommodate. 
     Bopha! is the most fully realized of the antiapartheid epics in the sense that it justifies 
the strategy and tactics of the post-Soweto era struggle.  Instead of a sensitive white 
liberal having his eyes opened to the plight of blacks, in Bopha! it is a black 
accommodationist who becomes aware of the horror he has facilitated.  Bopha! 
represents the emergence of a conscious and conscientious class of African-American 
actors and artists who used their craft and clout to create a significant political product.  
Bopha! is an important historical statement but did not enjoy the critical or commercial 
success of its predecessors because it came out when American anger about apartheid had 
given way to hope for the successful transition to democracy.  In direct connection with 
the South African situation at the time, the September 1993 premier of Bopha! served as 
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a benefit for the Fund for Democratic Elections in South Africa, which raised money for 
a voter registration drive.109 
     In the wake of the ANC’s rise to power in the 1994 election, the new government 
instituted the unprecedented Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) intended to 
provided catharsis for the victims, as well as victimizers, of the violence of the apartheid 
years.  The TRC, chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, spent the years between 1995 
and 1999 holding hearings at which the accused faced their accusers as they appealed for 
amnesty for their offenses.  In this changed arrangement and atmosphere, director Darrell 
Roodt revisited the most famous and popular of the South African stories, Cry, The 
Beloved Country.110  Roodt’s version of Cry was the first mainstream motion picture to be 
shot in democratic South Africa. 
     Like the original, Roodt’s version of Cry teamed internationally famous actors James 
Earl Jones and Richard Harris in the leading roles, with South African actors playing 
most of the other parts.  The improvements in film making technology that came about 
during the years between the original and the remake enlarge and enliven Roodt’s telling 
of the conflict and healing that take place in the story.  While adhering to Alan Paton’s 
plot and prose, Roodt’s production conveys a sense of hope that, by overcoming the 
problems of the past, a new nation and a new relationship between the races is possible.  
After Jones, as Reverend Kumalo, reconciles with his white counterpart, played by 
Harris, he climbs a hill in order to be by himself to pray.  Meanwhile, Kumalo’s new 
daughter in-law feels her first labor pains.  Though her husband, executed for the murder 
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of the son of Harris’s character, is gone, the possibility of a new generation, implying a 
new nation, lives on in the potential of their child.  As she begins her labor, Kumalo 
reaches the summit of his climb and kneels to pray. 
     The 1995 version of Cry, like the original, ends with a scrolling text of the concluding 
words of Paton’s novel.  Rather than listing specific names or circumstances linked to the 
antiapartheid struggle as did Cry Freedom and A Dry White Season, or hopeful homilies 
about the power of the individual like The Power of One, Cry relies on Paton’s spare 
prose to convey a message of universal reconciliation aimed at the human spiritual 
dilemma. 
For it is the dawn that has come, 
as it has come for a thousand centuries, never failing. 
But when that dawn will come, of our emancipation,  
from the fear of bondage and bondage of fear,  
that is a secret.111 
 
     But the transition to majority rule was no longer a secret because it had come to pass.  
The process by which the change was negotiated is dramatized in the HBO/Showtime 
production of Mandela and de Klerk.112  The film re-unites Sidney Poitier and Michael 
Caine, who had worked together on the Wilby Conspiracy, in the roles of Nelson 
Mandela and F.W. de Klerk.  The film conflates the apartheid endgame into two hours, 
with the two leaders hammering out the details of the transfer of power and finishing with 
the triumph of Mandela’s inauguration in 1994.  Although the story is posed as a sort of 
buddy movie, with Poitier revisiting a South African theme, the film also uses the 
historical events to undo the buddy formula.  While Mandela and de Klerk are forced 
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together by circumstance, they resolve their conflict by democratic means, and, in the 
end, the black man does not have to sacrifice his life for the white.  Though the film is 
workman-like in its presentation, with no special flourishes other than being filmed on 
location in Capetown, it moves beyond the buddy formula because it is based on real 
political events.  In the final scene the point is made that South Africa has achieved 
democracy.  Rather than a scroll over, Poitier as Mandela reflects back on the night 
following his inauguration to his concluding words at the 1964 Rivonia trial: 
During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African 
people.  I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against 
black domination.  I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free 
society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal 
opportunities.  It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve.  But if 
need be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.113 
 
The bold declaration runs through the Mandela character’s thought, but he drops the last 
line.  Martyrdom is no longer required, because the ideal has begun to be achieved. 
     In the post-apartheid era the antiapartheid epics live on as a reminder of the struggle 
and the way in which the medium packaged the message.  Appraised separately, each of 
the antiapartheid films portrays the complexities and nuances of the struggle over 
apartheid from a different perspective.  Weighed together, they provide an important 
record of how the outside world perceived apartheid and how that perception grew 
beyond some of the limits imposed by Hollywood and the tastes of the US market.  The 
evolution of films from the original Cry, the Beloved Country through Mandela and de 
Klerk is the story of how the image of South Africa and apartheid grew from Paton’s 
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stark personal morality tale to the actual transfer of power from the National Party to the 
ANC. 
     Music, sports, and movies created a cultural landscape in which Americans could 
comprehend apartheid in light of their own ideas and experiences.  The transformation of 
the venues for transmission of ideas and ideologies through popular culture accelerated 
the way in which Americans learned about apartheid.  In the 1950s and 1960s the flow of 
information was slowed by the South African government’s control of the media and 
because little demand for news and culture had been detected by those in a position to 
market such things.  By the 1980s the ability of the news media to project the South 
African crisis around the globe helped create a demand for dramatized explanations of 
the problem and the way that people were confronting it, especially during the period 
when the apartheid regime severely censored the news in the late 1980s. 
     The effect of popular culture on the evolution of American civil religion has always 
been derived from multiple influences.  Historian James Campbell has made the point in 
his study of the African Methodist Episcopal church in the US and South Africa that 
“African and African-American identities are and have always been mutually 
constituted.”114  This principle can be extended to encompass the cultural process by 
which similar though distinct racial dynamics in the US and South Africa were refracted 
in the cultural products and venues by which Americans came to know about South 
Africa, as well as how South Africans to learned about racism in the US. 
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     Illustrative of this dynamic is the transformation described by Afrikaner policeman 
Eric Taylor in Long Day’s Journey into Night,115 the 1999 documentary about South 
Africa’s TRC.  In his application for amnesty Taylor, who was involved in the 
assassination of antiapartheid activists Matthew Goniwe and Fort Calata, cited Nelson 
Mandela’s autobiography and the film Mississippi Burning116 as key factors in his change 
of heart.  In Taylor’s words Mississippi Burning “was also about apartheid.”117  The 1988 
film about the 1964 murder of civil rights activists James Cheney, Andrew Goodman, 
and Michael Schwerner drew criticism at the time of its release for many of the same 
reasons that Cry Freedom did not satisfy critics and activists.  In Mississippi Burning 
black voices and agency are muffled; it is the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
rather than the black-led civil rights movement, that is portrayed as the central player in 
changing Mississippi and the South.  The dichotomy in Mississippi Burning between the 
racist local police who participated in the murder of the civil rights activists in 
Mississippi and the noble FBI who investigate the murders resonated with Eric Taylor, a 
paladin of apartheid, moving him to seek amnesty and forgiveness before the TRC. 
     Eric Taylor also cited his commitment to Christianity as an inspiration for his police 
work in the apartheid era as well as motivation to go before the TRC.  The cultural 
commonality of a Christian worldview, shared by many blacks and whites in South 
Africa, and by many South Africans and Americans, helps to explain the continuing 
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appeal of Paton’s Cry, the Beloved Country.  Cry is the South African story that makes 
personal the problems of a country with a black majority contending with the legacy of 
settler colonialism.  While it can be interpreted as a story written from the viewpoint of a 
paternalistic white liberal, it also enables readers and viewers to empathize across racial 
and class lines.  The resurrection of hope through reconciliation in the wake of the 
suffering caused by the deaths of two young men, one white and one black, appeals to a 
broad audience because it is posed as a personal rather than a political parable. 
     Rather than racism leading to the social Armageddon that riots against segregation in 
America and apartheid in South Africa once seemed to portend, Cry promises that peace 
can come on a one-to-one basis in the context of a common faith.  Hope becomes 
practical when Reverend Kumalo and James Jarvis make a gentleman’s agreement to 
work together to repair Kumalo’s leaky church roof.  The symbolic value of a black man 
and a white man shaking hands, agreeing to rebuild a church after surviving a mutual 
tragedy, resonates with the very sentiments that the American civil rights movement drew 
upon.  The voluntary alliance portrayed in Cry not only is a more appealing relationship 
than the coercive shackling together of black and white portrayed in The Defiant Ones, it 
fits with the renewed notion of an American civil religion based on a common humanity 
that can overcome racial division.  Given this shared cultural context, it is not surprising 
that a tale of hope, as implied by Paton’s full title, Cry the Beloved Country: A Story of 
Comfort in Desolation, has remained more alluring to audiences118 who prefer it to the 
existentialist angst expressed by Weill and Anderson’s musical title Lost in the Stars. 
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If They’re Not Free, We’re Not Free: 
Antiapartheid Activism and the Integration of American Civil Religion 
 
Our foreign policy must be characterized by mutual respect, 
not by gunboat diplomacy, big stick diplomacy and threats. 
Our Nation at its best feeds the hungry. 
Our Nation at its worst, 
at its worst, will mine the harbors of Nicaragua;  
at its worst will try to overthrow their government, 
at its worst will cut aid to American education and increase the aid to El Salvador; 
at its worst, our Nation will have partnership with South Africa. 
That is a moral disgrace.  It is a moral disgrace.  It is a moral disgrace. 
 
Jesse Jackson, 19841 
 
We were 180 years as a nation before segregation was eliminated here. 
Thank God the world was more patient with us than we have been with South Africa. 
 
Jerry Falwell, 19852 
 
It isn’t a question of economics or politics, it’s a moral issue. 
Are you for goodness or evil?  Are you for freedom or oppression? 
 
Desmond Tutu, 1986 3 
 
     “We oppose apartheid too…Jerry Falwell”4 read the sign on the steps of Thomas Road 
Baptist Church.  The message on the sign, placed there by Falwell, was directed to the 
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three hundred protesters, led by the Reverend Jesse Jackson, who had marched to the 
steps of Falwell’s church to protest its pastor’s position on South Africa.  The marchers 
held signs that charged Falwell with advocating racism because of his opposition to 
economic sanctions against the apartheid regime.  Falwell, as a guest of the South African 
government, had traveled to South Africa for five days in August of 1985 and met with 
various officials including President P.W. Botha.  He returned to the US determined to 
mobilize his organization and constituency to support President Ronald Reagan’s policy 
of constructive engagement and help the President prevent the implementation of 
economic sanctions against South Africa.5 
     Falwell made himself the center of a political firestorm by praising the South African 
government and criticizing the antiapartheid movement in South Africa and the US.  
Disparaging those who advocated economic sanctions legislation, Falwell claimed that 
the black South Africans he met urged him to advocate more, not less, US investment.  
Falwell advocated increased investment by US corporations as the way to encourage the 
reform of apartheid while maintaining the strategic Cold War alliance with South Africa.  
Most controversial was Reverend Falwell’s lambasting of 1984 Nobel Peace Prize 
laureate Desmond Tutu.  In Falwell’s view the South African clergyman was not 
representative of sentiments among black South Africans.  According to Falwell, “If 
Bishop Tutu maintains that he speaks for the black people of South Africa, he is a 
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phony.” 6  Reverend Falwell’s inflammatory statements provoked several weeks of media 
attention, amplifying public debate regarding American policy toward South Africa. 
Falwell’s trip to South Africa coincided with President P.W. Botha’s August 15, 1985, 
“Rubicon Speech” in which Botha evinced a belligerent and intransigent defense of 
apartheid, dashing expectations that he would announce an acceleration of reform.7  
Falwell’s defense of Botha in the wake of the South African leader’s defiant 
pronouncements against change intensified criticism of the Reagan administration’s 
position.  Long-standing critics of apartheid were joined by moderate Republicans in the 
House and Senate who spoke out against South Africa and the Reagan administration by 
signaling their intent to support the economic sanctions bill then being considered by 
Congress. 8 
     As a result of the controversy spokespersons for the administration began to dis-
tinguish Reagan’s position from Falwell’s by acknowledging Bishop Tutu’s importance 
in any resolution of the South African conflict.9  Falwell himself apologized for his 
statement by qualifying his criticism of the Bishop, stating that he did not question Tutu’s 
religious credentials, just claims that he spoke for all South Africans.  During a televised 
face-off with Falwell on ABC’s Good Morning America program August 21 Jesse 
Jackson framed the issue in a domestic historical context.  Jackson tied Falwell’s support 
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for the Botha regime to his resistance to desegregation in the US, stating, “Falwell, you 
supported apartheid in southern America until it was over.  Now you’re supporting 
apartheid in southern Africa while its still alive.” 10 
     Following the August 31 march to Thomas Road Baptist Church, Jackson convened a 
large public meeting at the Court Street Baptist Church, a historically black congregation 
in Lynchburg.  Falwell also attended and addressed the assembly, reiterating his anti-
sanctions message.  Jackson condemned Falwell’s stance, reminding his audience, 
“When I went to South Africa, I could not speak with the President.”  Speaking to 
Falwell, Jackson continued, “Since you know him and I know you, tell him [Botha] that 
justice delayed is justice denied.  Tell Botha that the blood of the innocent is on his 
hands.” 11  Jackson preached to Falwell’s congregation the following day, and on 
September 4 they appeared on the ABC News television program Nightline. 
     The debate between Jackson and Falwell on Nightline, moderated by anchor Ted 
Koppel and interspersed with a video glossary of terms and events pertinent to the 
discussion, laid out the clashing points of view that the two most prominent political 
preachers of the era represented.  Both of the activist ministers grounded their positions 
on apartheid in their own versions of American civil religion.  Jackson blended the 
vocabulary of the civil rights movement with biblical references, placing Botha in the 
same lineage as “Pharaohs and Nebuchadnezzars” while calling for the application of 
nonviolent action via economic sanctions in order to pressure South Africa to end 
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apartheid.  Falwell attempted to change the subject by invoking the terminology of the 
Cold War.  He bemoaned the “blood red river of communism” he saw flowing though 
Africa and lamented what he claimed was the antiapartheid movement’s lack of concern 
about the Soviet role in fomenting unrest in South Africa.  Falwell tried to shift the topic 
of the debate but could not evade the moral problem presented by apartheid.  Though 
neither advocate convinced the other, they shook hands, agreed that South Africa 
presented a moral dilemma for Christians and Americans, and parted by saying “God 
Bless You.” 12 
     The clash between Jackson and Falwell symbolized the way in which the struggle over 
US policy towards South Africa represented a deeper conflict within the context of 
American civil religion.  Historian Andrew Manis has argued that the contestation of the 
meaning and application of civil religion during the last half of the twentieth century was 
a clash between “ a homogeneous civil religion of exclusion” that defended segregation, 
and “a pluralistic civil religion” 13 growing from the era of the civil rights movement.  The 
debate between Falwell and Jackson, both southerners and both Baptists, extended the 
ongoing conflict between these two visions of America into the realm of foreign policy 
formulation.  Further, as theologian Richard Hughes argues, one of the historic roles 
played by Jackson, the civil rights movement, and other African-American activists has 
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been to speak and act “on behalf of marginalized people around the globe — people who 
live today in a world defined in so many ways by American wealth and power.” 14 
     The antiapartheid movement applied the methods, symbols, and vocabulary utilized 
during the American civil rights struggle to an issue of transnational significance.  By 
extending the moral logic of the civil rights movement, antiapartheid activists were able 
to invoke themes of equality and freedom central to the idealistic vocabulary of American 
political discourse.  Participation of blacks and whites in the antiapartheid movement 
helped to integrate the rites and practices of civic participation and protest, at once 
exporting American ideals while consolidating the domestic gains of the civil rights 
movement in the symbolic terms of American civil religion.  The movement for African-
American civil rights challenged the reigning civil religion of the southern US by 
consolidating the realignment of the sites and symbols of the entire American civil 
religion.  The pluralistic and inclusive notion of multicultural politics demonstrated by 
American antiapartheid activism extended the ethos of the civil rights movement into the 
area of foreign policy.  The application of the tactics and strategies first advanced by the 
civil rights movement to the effort to change US policy toward South Africa marked a 
political coming of age for African Americans as well as a recognition that concern for 
human rights does not stop at the water’s edge. 
     The concept of an American civil religion as posed by sociologist Robert Bellah has 
provoked controversy since he initiated the debate in 1967.  Bellah contended that there 
are “certain common elements of religious orientation that the great majority of 
Americans share” which are “expressed in a set of beliefs, symbols, and rituals that I am 
                                                




calling the American civil religion.”  The major symbols of American civil religion arose 
from the American Revolution and the Civil War eras, which Bellah called the first and 
second “times of trial.”  He viewed the 1960s, particularly the struggle over civil rights 
and the Vietnam War, as a third time of trial, predicting that “a successful negotiation of 
this third time of trial—the attainment of a viable and coherent world order—would 
precipitate a major new set of symbolic forms.” 15 
     The new forms Bellah predicted arose directly from the civil rights movement.  Mass 
marches and nonviolent civil disobedience have become standard rites of the expression 
of dissent.  Historian Robert Ellwood contends, “The great demonstrations for civil rights 
or against the war and the draft took on a quality that was almost liturgical in their 
ultimate, climactic use of charged symbols to sum up in a moment what might take an 
hour to explain in a teach-in.” 16  These were the rituals that the antiapartheid movement 
revived and re-applied.  Drawing from trends and traditions established by the civil rights 
movement, as well as the greater access to power for African-Americans developed by 
overcoming segregation, the antiapartheid movement was able to assert influence and 
make a lasting mark on American political culture.  Antiapartheid activism was a key 
element in establishing the concept of multiculturalism as the paradigm in which 
American civil religion would develop in the 1990s and beyond. 
     The argument over the legitimacy of South African religious spokespeople such as 
Desmond Tutu and the role of the US in regard to apartheid reflects the struggle over the 
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meaning of American civil religion in the post-civil rights movement era.  In order to 
understand the ways in which the contestation of American civil religion and American 
antiapartheid activism intersected and intertwined it is necessary to address three 
questions.  How did the effort to influence American foreign policy regarding South 
Africa become entwined with the changes in American civil religion?  What specific rites 
and rituals did antiapartheid activists create and utilize to place their activism in the 
context of American civil religion?  Did American antiapartheid efforts change the 
practice of the American civil religion? 
     To address these questions this chapter analyzes several key events and trends in the 
development of the antiapartheid movement that took place during the most intensive 
period of activity between 1984 and 1990.  Measures directly related to apartheid such as 
the activism of Jesse Jackson and Jerry Falwell, political activity that contributed to the 
passage of the 1986 Comprehensive Antiapartheid Act, the initiation of the Martin Luther 
King Jr. holiday, the emergence of “African American” as the preferred term for blacks 
in the US, and the significance of the 1990 Nelson Mandela tour of the US are evaluated. 
     The manner in which American activists responded to apartheid in South Africa while 
confronting the legacy of segregation at home contributed to the evolution of 
multicultural politics in the US.  The key accomplishments of the antiapartheid 
movement, such as divestment, and government-imposed sanctions, served to heighten 
awareness of the connection between American foreign policy and racial politics in the 
US.  Antiapartheid activism transformed key elements of American civil religion, 
integrating the specific demand for racial justice with a universal embrace of liberty.  US 
antiapartheid activism produced a successful foreign policy dissent movement that also 
reflected the struggle over the definition of race in American political, social, and cultural 
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life.  At its height in the mid-1980s the antiapartheid movement represented an accession 
to power for a black-led movement able to influence American foreign policy as well as 
the final unified act by the revived civil rights coalition that temporarily cohered around 
the issue of apartheid.  It achieved its greatest impact when it defined South Africa’s 
conflict in terms familiar to Americans. 
     Both Jesse Jackson and Jerry Falwell were polarizing figures with a history of 
controversial political statements and alliances.  Jesse Jackson had drawn attention and 
created acrimony for claiming to have cradled the dying Dr. King in his arms when King 
was shot April 4, 1968.17  Subsequently, Jackson made headlines, as well as enemies, 
with his activism in Chicago, the Democratic Party, and his international involvements.  
By 1985 he could claim to represent over three million voters who had voted for him in 
the1984 Democratic primaries as well as much of the black constituency of the 
Democratic Party.  His speech to the Democratic convention that summer raised the 
profile of multicultural politics in a manner comparable to the way William Jennings 
Bryan’s “Cross of Gold” speech had lifted the banner of populism in 1896.  Jackson 
described America as a patchwork quilt, a vision that embraced diversity while 
celebrating inclusion: 
America is not like a blanket - one piece of unbroken cloth, the same 
color, the same texture, the same size.  America is more like a quilt - many 
patches, many pieces, many colors, many sizes, all woven and held 
together by a common thread.  The white, the Hispanic, the black, the 
Arab, the Jew, the woman, the Native American, the small farmer, the 
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businessperson, the environmentalist, the peace activist, the young, the 
old, the lesbian, the gay and the disabled make up the American quilt. 18 
 
     During the 1984 campaign Jackson had delivered a strong antiapartheid message that 
grew from his personal concern about the issue.  Jackson first traveled to South Africa in 
July of 1979.  Initially the South African government had denied him a visa, but had 
relented under pressure from the Carter administration.  During his twelve-day sojourn 
Jackson spoke to large crowds of black South Africans, exhorting them to engage in 
nonviolent civil disobedience to end apartheid.  He addressed a meeting of the South 
African Council of Churches, met with representatives of the government - though not 
President P.W. Botha - and arranged a meeting where he attempted to heal the rift 
between black leaders with different positions, including Anglican Church leader 
Desmond Tutu, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi representing the Zulu organization Inkatha, and 
Nthato Motlana of the Soweto Civic Association.19  Jackson countered critics, South 
African and American, who had assailed his intervention in the situation by asserting, “I 
am at home here – I was taken from here 350 years ago against my will.  I’m a world 
citizen and injustice anywhere threatens justice everywhere else.”20  Upon his return to 
the US Jackson briefed President Carter about his trip. 
     Jerry Falwell, who launched his Moral Majority organization in 1979 to mobilize 
fundamentalist Christians, became an important player in the Republican Party as a result 
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of his constituency’s support for Ronald Reagan in the 1980 election.  Falwell’s poor 
record on civil rights made him a less than ideal spokesperson for Reagan’s policy of 
constructive engagement with South Africa.  During the early years of his ministry 
Falwell had been a segregationist, going so far as to have a group of black teenage civil 
rights protesters who attempted to conduct a kneel-in on the steps of his Thomas Road 
Church, removed by police. 21 
     Falwell, the civil rights movement, and the antiapartheid struggle, all had a memorable 
day March 21, 1965.  Two weeks earlier on “Bloody Sunday,” civil rights protesters had 
been beaten at the Edmund Pettus Bridge in Selma, Alabama.  On March 21, civil rights 
protesters, including 23 year-old Jesse Jackson,22 assembled to restart the interrupted 
Selma to Montgomery March.  It was also the fifth anniversary of the Sharpeville 
Massacre in South Africa.  That Sunday evening Falwell preached a sermon titled 
“Ministers and Marchers” in which he acknowledged the earnestness of Christians 
involved with the civil rights movement but questioned the motives of their leaders. 
     Falwell declared “I do question the sincerity and non-violent intentions of some civil 
rights leaders such as Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Mr. James Farmer, and others, who are 
known to have left-wing associations.”  Falwell went on to challenge the affiliations of 
the civil rights movement at large, charging “It is very obvious that the Communists, as 
they do in all parts of the world, are taking advantage of a tense situation in our land, and 
are exploiting every incident to bring about violence and bloodshed.”  Falwell, who used 
his jeremiad to lament the involvement of Christian ministers in social activism rather 
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than a more narrowly defined evangelism, made clear his stand against the civil rights 
movement: “I believe these demonstrations and marches have done more to damage race 
relations and to engender hate than to help!” 23  While Falwell bemoaned the involvement 
of other ministers in politics, he had taken his first public step toward his own political 
engagement.  Falwell’s logic and vocabulary in 1965 was quite similar to the language he 
used in 1985 to defend the Reagan administration’s South Africa policy.  Having cast off 
his reluctance to participate in politics, he clung to a strident anticommunism to justify 
his opposition to sanctions against South Africa. 
     In his debate with Jackson and in his accusations against Tutu and the antiapartheid 
movement, Falwell mounted a holding action against the growing rebellion in South 
Africa and the accompanying activism in the US.  He used the October 1985 issue of 
Moral Majority Report to reiterate the position he took in his debate with Jackson but had 
to reformulate his defense of the apartheid regime after the Reagan administration recast 
its position in a September 9 Executive Order designed to head off imposition of 
sanctions by Congress.24  Reagan’s Executive Order 12532 stopped US government loans 
to the South African government, prevented the sale of computers to South African 
security agencies, limited cooperation on nuclear power programs, and banned the sale of 
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South African Kruggerrand gold coins in the US.25  In order to prevent passage of much 
more punitive Congressional sanctions the Reagan administration seemed to abandon 
constructive engagement in order to take small but punitive action against the apartheid 
regime.  Meanwhile, Falwell and his Moral Majority organization were left behind as the 
administration attempted to co-opt the language of the antiapartheid movement. 
     A Harris Poll conducted in the week following the Jackson-Falwell debate on Night-
line found that 76% of respondents thought Falwell’s criticism of Tutu was wrong.26  
Facing this attitude in the field of foreign policy gave impetus for the Moral Majority to 
change course.  While concentrating his efforts on oversight of his rapidly expanding 
Liberty University, Falwell transformed his organization into the more broadly focused 
Liberty Federation in 1986.  Falwell announced his retirement from politics in 1987 and 
disbanded the Liberty Federation in 1989.27 
     Jerry Falwell could not stop sanctions against antiapartheid because he ran up against 
public opinion regarding South Africa, which he could not dissuade with his Cold War 
accusations.  The long simmering concern about South Africa that had burst into the 
headlines with the November 21, 1984 arrest of TransAfrica leader Randall Robinson and 
other prominent African Americans at the South African embassy in Washington, DC, 
had engendered an important political force.  Popular protest around the country, pressure 
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for institutional and governmental divestment, activism among students and church 
people, and a movement toward passing sanctions legislation in Congress combined to 
make US policy toward South Africa a key lightning rod issue for foreign policy dissent 
in 1985 and 1986. 
     The 1984 civil disobedience at the South African embassy served as the initiation of 
the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM), in which TransAfrica played the leading role.  
FSAM’s initial action launched a year of picketing and civil disobedience in Washington, 
DC, and inspired protests around the country.  TransAfrica’s initiative galvanized the US 
antiapartheid movement at the outset of the second Reagan administration in a way that 
linked protest to legislative action to impose economic sanctions on South Africa. 28 
     By the spring of 1985 a new surge of student activism mobilized many campuses, 
bringing attention to the call for colleges and universities to divest themselves of stocks 
doing business in or with South Africa.  Twenty years after the Students for a Democratic 
Society demonstrated at Chase Manhattan Bank in New York City,29 students across the 
country brought protest and civil disobedience to their campuses.  As a way to illustrate 
their demand for divestment the students built shanties meant to resemble the shacks built 
by poor blacks in South Africa.  The shanty tactic began at Cornell University in April 
1985 and spread to over 40 campuses by 1986.30  Students built shantytowns from castoff 
materials and used them as sites of protest and political education.  Shanties attracted 
student support and provoked confrontation.  In April 1985 Berkeley police attacked the 
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shanties at 2:30 am, initiating a daylong melee that led to over one hundred arrests and 
many injuries.  At the University of Utah and Johns Hopkins University shanties were set 
ablaze by counter demonstrators. 31 
     At Dartmouth College, students affiliated with the conservative Dartmouth Review 
newspaper attacked the shanties on campus with sledgehammers in the early morning 
hours of January 21, the day after the first celebration of the Martin Luther King Jr. 
national holiday.  The Dartmouth incident led to a drawn-out disciplinary proceeding for 
the perpetrators while sparking a new level of activism by students, faculty and the 
administration in response to the concerns of minority students.32  The response by 
Dartmouth to the destruction of the antiapartheid shanties presaged the conflict over 
multiculturalism and “political correctness” that became the key topic of campus 
controversies in the 1990s.  
     The initiation of the King Holiday recognized the role of African Americans and the 
significance of the civil rights movement in the nation’s history.  Originally proposed by 
Democratic Congressman John Conyers of Michigan in 1968, Congress had passed 
legislation to create the holiday in 1983 to coincide with the 20th anniversary of the 
March on Washington.33  The bipartisan support for the holiday, with the notable 
exception of Republican Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina who attempted to 
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filibuster the Senate vote on the bill, foreshadowed the coalition that took shape in 1986 
to enact sanctions on South Africa. 
     President Ronald Reagan had initially expressed some ambivalence about the holiday.  
Responding to a reporter’s question at an October 19, 1983 press conference about 
King’s alleged alliances with Communists Reagan replied, “We'll know in about 35 
years, won't we?”  Reagan was referring to the materials gathered via FBI surveillance of 
King that had been sealed until 2027.34  President Reagan promised to accede to the will 
of Congress stating, “I believe the symbolism of that day is important enough that I'll 
sign that legislation when it reaches my desk.” 35  Upon signing the King Holiday into law 
on November 2, 1983, Reagan laid claim to the significance of King’s legacy, stating, 
“As a democratic people, we can take pride in the knowledge that we Americans 
recognized a grave injustice and took action to correct it.  And we should remember that 
in far too many countries people like Dr. King never have the opportunity to speak out at 
all.”36  Reagan’s opaque reference to dissenters like King in other countries was broad 
enough to possibly include the Soviet Union as well as South Africa.  The new holiday 
was celebrated for the first time on January 20, 1986. 
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     By the spring of 1986 the situation in South Africa had deteriorated even further, crea-
ting pressure for the imposition of stiffer congressional sanctions.  On May 19 Pretoria 
had lashed out with air attacks at ANC bases and offices in the southern Africa states, 
while continuing a state of emergency at home that relied on increasingly repressive 
tactics that led to many deaths and detentions.  Major American banks called in their 
loans and voluntary corporate withdrawal from South Africa accelerated.  Meanwhile, by 
1986, 131 colleges and universities, along with 19 state governments, 68 cities and 
counties, and numerous churches and unions had implemented restrictions on 
institutional investment that affected nearly $220 billion of pension and endowment 
funds.37  In this atmosphere congressional support for sanctions swelled.  On June 12 the 
House of Representatives, by a voice vote, passed a comprehensive sanctions bill 
sponsored by Democratic Representative Ronald Dellums that called for a complete 
embargo of and disinvestment from South Africa.  The Republican minority had hoped to 
let the bill pass without recording their opposition on the assumption that is would not be 
matched by the Senate.  In the opinion of Representative Dellums the House vote “placed 
a marker on the wall below which the House of Representatives will never be able to 
go.”38  Two days later, in another indication of the movement’s strength, an antiapartheid 
rally in New York City held to mark the tenth anniversary of the Soweto Uprising 
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attracted over 40,000 demonstrators.39  In August the Senate, by an 84 -14 margin, passed 
a milder version of sanctions that banned private bank loans and prohibited new 
investment.  The House-Senate conference committee accepted the Senate’s version.  On 
September 26 President Reagan vetoed the final bill, known as the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act of 1986.40 
     The Reagan administration had worked throughout the summer of 1986 to stave off 
Congressional action.  On July 22, 1986, the President addressed the nation via television 
to make his case for maintaining his policies toward South Africa.  But the political and 
economic pressures had converged to sway the votes of many Republicans who no longer 
wanted to be identified with what many of them had come to see as tyrannical racism.  
By a 317 to 83 vote the House overturned the President’s veto on September 29.  On 
October 2, with Randall Robinson, Jesse Jackson and Coretta Scott King looking on from 
the gallery and members of the Congressional Black Caucus working the floor of the 
chamber, the Republican-controlled Senate overrode the President’s veto by a vote of 78-
21.41  Democratic Senator Paul Sarbanes of Maryland described the enactment of the 
Comprehensive Antiapartheid Act of 1986 (CAAA) as “the last nonviolent option for 
change in South Africa.” 42 
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     Enactment of the CAAA was the key foreign policy defeat for the Reagan Ad-
ministration and the high watermark for Congressional Black Caucus influence on 
foreign policy.  The years following the passage of sanctions posed new difficulties for 
the antiapartheid movement.  In light of the decline of unity that occurred after 1986 it is 
necessary to temper George Fredrickson’s assertion that the antiapartheid movement was 
“Birmingham and Selma on a world scale.”43  In a sense, passage of sanctions served, as 
had the Selma to Montgomery march, as a final major unified act before the movement 
declined.  Activism continued, more universities and municipalities divested, and the 
terms of debate shifted from whether to pressure or constructively engage South Africa as 
to how best to coerce the apartheid regime.  But the clarity of focus and accord created by 
the focus on sanctions legislation in 1985 and 1986 was never regained.  The 
achievement of Congressional sanctions and institutional divestment made it difficult to 
maintain momentum and unity further action. 
     The movement’s focus and public profile diminished gradually.  The shift by the 
Reagan administration from a policy of constructive engagement to a regional strategy 
aimed at supporting South Africa by providing arms and assistance to anti-government 
forces in Angola and Mozambique, facilitated by the 1985 repeal of the Clark 
Amendment that had banned such aid, caught movement lobbyists off guard.44  While the 
enactment of sanctions by the British Commonwealth countries and the European 
Economic Community helped to drive home global disapproval of apartheid to the 
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government in Pretoria,45 in February of 1987 the Reagan administration vetoed 
imposition of sanctions by the United Nations. 46 
     In 1987 a spring mobilization in Washington, DC, attempted to merge several currents 
of the US dissent from the Reagan Administration’s foreign policy.  The April 25-27 
Mobilization for Justice and Peace in Central America and Southern Africa culminated a 
six month process aimed at increasing the visibility of the opposition of segments of the 
labor movement and many religious communities to Reagan’s policies toward the Third 
World.  Framed as a call from individual labor and religious leaders, the mobilization 
combined a Saturday mass march on the Capitol with a Monday civil disobedience 
blockade at the CIA.  Over 75,000 demonstrators, many of them students who had built 
shanties and worked for divestment, marched down Pennsylvania Avenue that rainy 
Saturday. 
     Despite the appearance of unity during preparation for the mobilization a number of 
strains and controversies surfaced, particularly in relation to the support of the labor 
movement and the involvement of antiapartheid organizations.47  Because the AFL-CIO 
generally supported anticommunist Cold War policies those labor groups that chose to 
support the April 25 mobilization suffered condemnation by the labor federation’s 
president Lane Kirkland and the union leaders most closely allied with him.  In March 
Kirkland sent a letter to state and local labor councils urging them not to support or 
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participate in the mobilization.  Six days prior to the march Kirkland, along with Albert 
Shanker of the American Federation of Teachers and John Joyce of the International 
Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsman, took out an ad in the New York Times titled 
“Avoiding the Wrong Crowd.”  The ad portrayed the march, which featured speakers 
from liberation movements in Central America and southern Africa, as procommunist 
because of its call for a cutoff of military aid to the governments of El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Guatemala and its support for the government of Nicaragua.48  Despite the 
attempt to smear the march, none of the twenty-four union presidents nor any of the fifty 
religious leaders retracted their endorsements of the mobilization. 49 
     The relationships of the antiapartheid groups, including TransAfrica and the American 
Committee on Africa, with the rest of the coalition, also proved to be difficult.  Most of 
the organizations represented on the steering committee were primarily concerned with 
the Reagan administration’s policy in Central America.  An unrealistic expectation that 
the antiapartheid groups would be able to mobilize the black community led to frustration 
with the small black turnout for the demonstration.  According to the post-mobilization 
evaluation, the antiapartheid groups “complained that without national materials listing 
steering committee organizations or endorsers, they had no way to project any anti-
apartheid presence in the organizing nationally or locally.”50  Representatives of the ANC 
as well as the Southwest African People’s Organization (SWAPO) spoke at the April 25 
rally.  The attempt to draw together the two most significant foreign policy dissent 
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movements of the mid-1980s met with limited success and did not transform into a 
lasting alliance.  It presaged both the promise and problems of building multicultural 
political coalitions. 
     One of the keynote speakers at the April 25 rally was Jesse Jackson, whose presence 
helped to strengthen the mobilization’s connection to concern about southern Africa.  
Jackson was then preparing for his 1988 presidential campaign, during which he again 
raised the issue of South Africa on the campaign trail.  During the 1988 primary election 
season Jackson won over 7 million votes, coming to the convention with 1,218 delegates.  
At the 1988 Democratic Party convention in Atlanta, Jackson included southern Africa in 
his speech: 
We have basic challenges - freedom in South Africa.  We have already 
agreed as Democrats to declare South Africa to be a terrorist state.  But 
don't just stop there.  Get South Africa out of Angola; free Namibia; 
support the front line states.  We must have a new humane human rights 
consistent policy in Africa. 51 
 
Jackson had again raised the issue of apartheid in a nationally televised prime time 
speech. 
     As in 1984, the Democrats suffered a defeat in the 1988 presidential election.  The 
Dukakis campaign had gone poorly and Vice President George H. W. Bush was elected 
the forty-first President of the United States.  As had been the case four years earlier, the 
prospects for Democrats and their allies were gloomy.  Once again, the initiative to stake 
out the political terms and territory for the new cycle came from black activists.  At a 
December 19, 1988 press conference to promote the March 1989 National Black Agenda 
                                                





conference, Jackson announced his intention to try to make “African-American”52 the 
term of choice, superceding black.  Jackson asserted, “This is deeper than just name 
recognition.  Black tells you about skin color and what side of town you live on.  African-
American evokes discussion of the world.” 53  For Jackson and his allies the term African 
American connected African heritage with the antiapartheid activism of the 1980s. 
     Jackson gave his name and fame to a project that had already begun in piecemeal fash-
ion.  Many black-oriented radio stations and newspapers as well as elementary school 
textbooks had already adopted the term.  Arthur Ashe had chosen to use it in his 1988 
book A Hard Road to Glory: a History of the African-American Athlete.54  Another 
proponent of the change, Historian Mary Frances Berry, argued, “This doesn’t mean that 
everything will be wonderful and all the poor people will get taken care of.  But with the 
devastating problems in the community now, building self-esteem can’t be all bad, it’s 
not going to make things worse.”55  While some in the black community were not 
receptive to the change, and others voiced concerns about the unintended exclusion of 
people from the Caribbean and South America, the initiative of Jackson and his allies 
marked a watershed moment in the evolution of ethnic identity for all Americans.  
Psychologist Roderick Watts pointed out “ ‘African-American’ reflects a post-modern 
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black consciousness, it has a self-affirming quality that seems to fit right now.”56  New 
York Times writer Isabel Wilkerson asserted that a key factor driving the effort to make 
African-American the generally accepted term was “involvement in the fight to end racial 
separation in South Africa that led to the search for a clear group identity.” 57 
     Group identity and movement relationships came to the fore the following year when 
the new leadership of the National Party in South Africa, facing world-wide 
condemnation, continued unrest, and a deteriorating economic position, changed course 
and initiated what turned out to be the dismantlement of apartheid.  The February 11, 
1990 release of Nelson Mandela, televised live to much of the world, was greeted as the 
political resurrection of a man who had spent 27 years hidden from world view.  Jesse 
Jackson was the first American to greet Mandela upon his release.58  Journalist Richard 
Lacayo explained the special significance of Mandela’s visit to the black community: 
“For many blacks who have begun to call themselves African Americans, he is a flesh 
and blood example of what an African can be.”59  Mandela’s world tour in the summer of 
1990 served as celebration for those who had long opposed apartheid and provided the 
ANC with an opportunity to raise money while advocating that the US and other 
countries maintain pressure on the South African government, including sanctions.  It 
also marked the culmination of the broad unity that had fueled the successes of the 
antiapartheid movement but did not outlast it. 
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     Mandela’s triumphant first visit to America covered eight cities in twelve days.  The 
festivities in New York included a parade in Manhattan and rallies at Yankee Stadium, 
Riverside Church, and Harlem’s Africa Square.  In his autobiography Mandela recounts 
that his wife Winnie reminded him “Harlem is the Soweto of America.”60  Included in 
Mandela’s itinerary in New York was a June 21 nationally televised town meeting from 
the Aaron Davis Hall of the City College of New York’s Harlem Campus.  In front of a 
predominantly African-American audience of over one thousand people, including many 
of the most prominent activists and supporters of the American antiapartheid movement, 
Mandela squared off with ABC’s Ted Koppel, the moderator of the event. 
     While fielding questions from the audience, exhibiting his fluency in Afrikaans, as 
well as fencing with Koppel, Mandela established himself as a uniquely appealing 
television personality, diplomatic yet forceful and unwavering in his defense of the 
ANC’s position.  At one point, after dealing with sustained questioning about the ANC’s 
relationship to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Mandela managed to wrest 
control of the exchange from Koppel, stating bluntly “Mr. Koppel, You are entirely 
mistaken – I expect you to be consistent.”  After an uncomfortable silence, Mandela 
queried the usually voluble anchor, asking, “I don’t know if I have paralyzed you,”61 
which brought cheers and sustained applause from the majority of the crowd. 
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     Koppel had introduced the town meeting, by way of explanation to Mandela, as “a 
very old and honorable American tradition.” 62  The forum did resemble a town meeting, 
but one adapted to the television age and reflective of the multicultural reality 
antiapartheid activism had helped to shape.  Koppel, the son of German-Jewish 
immigrants who had fled the Holocaust,63 held forth with the man who would become 
South Africa’s first black president, in front of an integrated audience that represented the 
diversity, as well as the political divisions, of New York City in 1990.  Arrayed behind 
Koppel and Mandela were, along with Winnie Mandela, David Dinkins, the first African-
American mayor of New York, Harry and Julie Belafonte, Jesse Jackson, Randall 
Robinson, Arthur Ashe, Ossie Davis, Spike Lee, and Steven Van Zandt.  Many of the 
members of the audience were attired in a rainbow of African robes and headwear, 
emphasizing in a visual way their identification with the cultures of Africa. 
     The questions regarding the ANC’s relationship with the PLO and Libya’s Muammar 
Qaddafi were asked in the context of the several incidents where blacks and Jews in New 
York had clashed violently in the months preceding Mandela’s visit.  In response, 
Mandela’s expressed gratitude to all those who had supported the ANC, including Yasser 
Arafat and Muammar Qaddafi.  He also testified about his gratitude to Jewish allies of the 
ANC in South Africa and around the world.  The response of the audience was 
overwhelmingly positive.  Despite his twenty-seven years of imprisonment in another 
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country, Mandela seemed to understand “the old and honorable tradition” of the town 
meeting, and the new dynamics of multiculturalism in America, as well as anyone. 
     The town meeting, practiced since the colonization of New England and idealized by 
the painter Norman Rockwell to illustrate “Freedom of Speech,”64 is a rite of American 
civil religion.  The use of such symbolism in the age of television, with reporters and 
anchor people serving in the role of secular officiants, is indicative of the way old forms 
have been adapted to new forums.  Nelson Mandela’s exchanges with Ted Koppel were 
among the most stage-managed, as well as the most widely accessible, moments of the 
Mandela tour.  Mandela’s ability to inject spontaneity into the assembly and connect with 
the congregation on a political and emotional level speaks not only to his gifts as a 
speaker and politician, but also to the long preparation for just such an event established 
by the antiapartheid movement.  Mandela’s advocacy of self-determination for the black 
majority in South Africa resonated with those demanding self-determination within the 
American polity as well. 
     The effort to influence American foreign policy regarding South Africa inevitably be-
came entwined with the changes in American civil religion because antiapartheid 
activists invoked themes of equality and freedom central to the idealistic vocabulary of 
American political discourse.  The pluralistic and inclusive strategy of multicultural 
politics demonstrated by American antiapartheid activism extended the ethos of the civil 
rights movement into the area of foreign policy.  The application of the tactics and 
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strategies first advanced by the civil rights movement to the effort to change US policy 
toward South Africa marked a political coming of age for African Americans, who were 
able to assert influence on foreign policy because the nadir of the crisis in South Africa 
coincided with the new zenith of African-American influence in America.  As affirmation 
of this special relationship, President Clinton appointed Jesse Jackson to head the 
American delegation charged with monitoring the 1994 all-race elections that elected 
Nelson Mandela president of South Africa.65  In addition, antiapartheid activist Gay 
McDougall was the only American and one of only five international members to serve 
on South Africa's 16-member Independent Electoral Commission, which organized and 
administered the 1994 elections.  McDougall, an African-American human rights lawyer 
who had led the South Africa Project of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under 
Law, served to further tie the American struggle for civil rights to the institution of free 
elections in South Africa.66 
     The specific rites and rituals created by antiapartheid activists placed their activism in 
the context of American civil religion.  The circumstance of the newly established Martin 
Luther King Jr. National Holiday cast the destruction of the Dartmouth shanties as a 
racially motivated attack and thus helped to shape the terms of discussion about race and 
racism in America and the world.  Shantytowns on college campuses and demonstrations 
at the South African embassy placed tactics born of the civil rights movement into a 
transnational perspective.  The prominence achieved by the 1984 and 1988 Jesse Jackson 
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presidential campaigns, combined with the passage of the 1986 Comprehensive 
Antiapartheid Act, to establish a firm connection between the concerns of the African-
American community and foreign policy toward South Africa.  Republican Senator 
Robert Dole’s comment that “this has now become a civil rights issue”67 in the wake of 
the passage of sanctions by the Senate in 1986 underscored the reason that many 
Republicans objected to the continuation of Reagan’s constructive engagement policy.  
Jackson’s 1988 assertion that “African-American” should supercede black as the 
preferred name for those of African descent consolidated the sentiment that had gathered 
around the antiapartheid movement and focused it on an issue of identity politics.  This 
was an achievable change that has become generally accepted.68 
     American antiapartheid efforts changed the practice of the American civil religion by 
integrating an African-American perspective into the formulation of foreign policy, the 
last realm of governmental power to accept and acknowledge African-American 
influence.  Antiapartheid activism was a key element in establishing the concept of 
multiculturalism as the paradigm in which American civil religion would develop in the 
1990s and beyond.  The conflict between Jerry Falwell and Jesse Jackson represented a 
broader trend that Falwell’s Cold War fundamentalism could no longer contain.  While 
both men might have been viewed as political hucksters by their opponents, and as the 
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leading acolytes of their professed views by their supporters, their debate was indicative 
of the greater shift in the civil religion they were contesting.  Jesse Jackson had helped set 
the tone that the antiapartheid movement had built upon in his 1984 Democratic 
Convention address when he adapted a Sunday school song to his political agenda: “Our 
flag is red, white and blue, but our nation is a rainbow — red, yellow, brown, black and 
white - and we're all precious in God's sight.” 69 
     The inclusiveness emphasized by Jesse Jackson’s rhetoric about the Rainbow 
Coalition dovetailed well with Desmond Tutu’s appeal to cast the antiapartheid struggle 
as a moral one.  “Are you for goodness or evil?  Are you for freedom or oppression?” 70  
asked the Nobel Peace Prize laureate in his appeal to the conscience of Americans.  A 
positive rhetoric of inclusion, combined with a practical program of sanctions understood 
as the transnational application of nonviolence, drew greater support than the negative 
and defensive Cold War geopolitical position articulated by Falwell and Reagan.  
Participation of blacks and whites in the antiapartheid movement helped to integrate the 
rites and practices of civic participation and protest, rewriting the script of American civil 
religion, adding new rituals while forcing reappraisal and reflection on how the national 
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Now Face to Face?  Opposing Apartheid, Proposing Multiculturalism 
 
We could not have made an acquaintance through literature with human giants such as 
George Washington, Abraham Lincoln and Thomas Jefferson and not been moved to act 
as they were moved to act.  We could not have heard of and admired John Brown, 
Sojourner Truth, Frederick Douglass, W.E.B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Martin Luther 
King Jr., and others, and not be moved to act as they were moved to act.  We could not 
have known of your Declaration of Independence and not elected to join in the struggle 
to guarantee the people life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. 
 
Address to the Joint Session of the Houses of Congress of the USA 
Nelson Mandela, Washington, D.C., June 26, l990.1 
 
A man in white skin can never be free while his black brother is in slavery, 
‘And we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain. 
And this government of the people, by the people and for the people 
Shall not perish from the Earth.’ 
Abraham Lincoln said that on November 19, 1863 at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. 
And he was right.  I believe that too.” 
 
Ballad for Americans 
Music: Earl Robinson 
Words: John LaTouche 
Performed by Paul Robeson 
First Broadcast November 5, 19392 
 
     Nelson Mandela’s 1990 speech to a joint session of the US Congress marked the first 
time an African leader addressed the American legislature.  Mandela’s appearance before 
Congress, a highlight of his American tour, followed speeches in the preceding months 
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by Polish Solidarity leader Lech Walesa and Czech President Vaclav Havel.3  The 
collapse of Communism that had coincided with the demise of apartheid marked a 
watershed in world politics and US foreign relations.  The veneration of Mandela on the 
same level with anticommunist heroes Walesa and Havel placed the South African 
struggle within the context of the fight against despotism that had been used to justify 
American Cold War policies, even though it had been Cold War calculations that 
hindered the imposition of economic sanctions by the US against South Africa. 
     Mandela’s invocation of Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln along with African-
American heroes bolstered the legitimacy of the African National Congress as well as 
communicated the ideals of that struggle to Americans.  In an emblematic sense 
Mandela’s speech served as the capstone of the long effort of antiapartheid forces in 
America to integrate US society by transforming the symbols of civil religion.  
Expressing admiration for John Brown associated the ANC’s adoption of armed struggle 
with Brown’s Harper’s Ferry raid; both were tactical failures in the short-term that 
contributed to long-term strategic changes in race relations.  By equating the significance 
of the three presidents memorialized on Mount Rushmore with post Civil War African-
American radicals like Du Bois, Garvey, and King, Mandela melded himself with the 
heritage of agitation for change from both an integrationist and Pan-Africanist 
perspective. 
     Among the “others” to whom Mandela expressed gratitude, Paul Robeson surely 
stands out as a forerunner and model for American antiapartheid activists.  The opinion 
                                                
3 See Foreign Leaders Addressing Congress at 
http://clerk.house.gov/histHigh/Special_Exhibits/foreignJointMeeting.php  
(accessed 1 December 2003). 
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of Jack O’Dell, who admired Robeson’s political courage and became an associate of 
Martin Luther King as well as Jesse Jackson, is indicative of the continuity that 
connected the internationalist efforts of Jesse Jackson in the 1980s with those of 
Robeson.  O’Dell, who served as foreign affairs advisor for Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition, 
viewed Jackson’s internationalism as descended from Robeson and his contemporaries, 
stating “The Rainbow Coalition is placing America in touch with the world…in the way 
that the Henry Wallace Campaign, Paul Robeson, and Dr. W.E.B. Du Bois made the 
supreme effort to do in 1948.  We are their children.  We are keeping the faith.”4 
     The current of internationalism that linked the antiapartheid movement of the 1980s 
with the precedent set by Robeson and Du Bois represents an important thread of 
continuity during the Cold War.  Historian Michael Lind argues that the domestic 
factions of the Cold War were delineated in the 1948 election to which O’Dell refers.5  
While the faction that descended from the Henry Wallace campaign was effectively 
contained in the 1950s when the Council on African Affairs collapsed, the spirit of 
Wallace’s Progressives and the CAA found new life during the upsurge of the civil rights 
movement of the sixties and the antiapartheid activism that followed.  The ideals as well 
as the divisions that came in the wake of the Wallace campaign presaged the tension 
between the universalism of the integrationist dream and the transnational black 
solidarity of the Pan-African ideal that marked the evolution of the American 
antiapartheid movement. 
                                                
4 Jack O’Dell as cited in Morton Kondracke in “Jesse’s World: President Jackson’s 
Foreign Policy,” New Republic, 25 April 1988, 11. 
 
5 Michael Lind, Up From Conservatism: Why the Right is Wrong For America (New 
York: The Free Press, 1996), 24. 
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     Antiapartheid activism in the US produced a successful foreign policy dissent 
movement that also reflected the struggle over the definition of race in American 
political, social, and cultural life.  It achieved its greatest impact when it defined South 
Africa’s conflict in terms familiar to Americans.  The development of transnational 
advocacy against apartheid and the evolution of a nonviolent stance that supported 
liberation movements during the first three decades of antiapartheid activism shaped and 
inspired the widespread movement of the 1980s.  The tension between advocates of 
universalist integrationism and proponents of a particularist Pan-Africanism produced a 
unique style of advocacy that blended highly visible direct action with a decentralized, 
grassroots activism that targeted financial connections to apartheid where ever they 
occurred.  The three antiapartheid organizations analyzed in this study all influenced, and 
were influenced by, this dynamic. 
     The American Committee on Africa provided continuity and consistency to 
antiapartheid efforts from the 1950s through the 1990s.  ACOA experimented with 
different arrangements for recognizing the demands of Pan-Africanist activists and 
cooperating with a variety of black-led organizations.  ACOA refined liberal 
internationalist opposition to apartheid through innovative tactics such as pressure for 
institutional divestment, boycotts, and stockholder resolutions.  Growing beyond the 
expedience of its early anti-communism to a position that emphasized applying the moral 
commitment of the civil rights movement to the corresponding struggle against apartheid, 
ACOA created a new type of transnational advocacy.  The experiment in solidarity that 
ACOA launched in 1953 achieved concrete results in the US in the 1980s.  Through long 
experience ACOA built transnational connections between antiracist struggles, and in the 
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process exemplified the modus vivendi that would become crucial to multicultural 
politics. 
     The South Africa Program of the American Friends Service Committee blended 
commitment to revolutionary nonviolence with the global reputation of the Committee.  
The evolution of AFSC’s nonviolent solidarity with the antiapartheid liberation 
movement was based on the principle that the stark divide between oppressor and 
oppressed in South Africa compelled the organization to choose sides.  Liberation 
pacifism, a significant new interpretation of nonviolence, evolved from AFSC’s internal 
debate over how to oppose South African apartheid.  Combining the active reconciliation 
of Quaker diplomacy with the solidarity of liberation pacifism contributed an important 
element to the effort to end apartheid.  AFSC’s contacts with exiled liberation 
movements, its popular education efforts in areas of the US underserved by other national 
antiapartheid organizations, and its nomination of Desmond Tutu for the Nobel Peace 
Prize made it significant to the antiapartheid coalition. 
     TransAfrica utilized a network of black elected officials to mobilize opposition to 
policies favorable to apartheid, combining high profile direct action in Washington, DC, 
with grassroots lobbying and support from prominent African-Americans.  TransAfrica 
conveyed Pan-Africanist concerns with a politically viable voice, situating itself to take 
advantage of the political space created by the legacy of the civil rights movement and 
the 1984 presidential campaign of Jesse Jackson.6  TransAfrica’s role in creating and 
leading the Free South Africa Movement marked the culmination of a long struggle to 
assert an effective African-American voice in the realm of US foreign policy debate.  The 
                                                
6
 Karin L. Stanford, Beyond the Boundaries: Reverend Jesse Jackson in International 
Affairs (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997), 27. 
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imposition of sanctions on South Africa by Congress marked the zenith of TransAfrica’s 
efforts, a victory that illuminated the strengths and weaknesses of the strategic 
essentialism that had inspired the black-led FSAM.  The racial solidarity that had focused 
the energy of the FSAM did not last beyond the ending of apartheid, and thus the 
essentialism of the black lobby for Africa and the Caribbean proved to be a successful 
tactic but not sustainable as a long-term strategy. 
      The passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 marked the end of 
constructive engagement and the first major foreign policy defeat for the Reagan 
administration, culminating many years of struggle.  Political scientist Peter Schraeder 
argues that the passage of sanctions arose from four factors: the increased political power 
of African Americans, Republican anxiety about the issue of race in foreign policy, the 
strength of grass roots antiapartheid groups such as those chronicled in this dissertation, 
and the change in public opinion regarding the ongoing crisis in South Africa.7  When 
Republicans in the Conservative Opportunity Society began to criticize the Reagan 
Administration’s policy of constructive engagement the makings of a significant though 
temporary coalition took shape.8  They joined with Democrats and moderate Republicans 
like Senator Lowell Weicker of Connecticut who described the overriding of Reagan’s 
veto as “today’s generation saying ‘no’ to the incipient holocaust of our time.” 9 
                                                
7 Peter J. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis 
and Change (New York: Cambridge, 1994), 230. 
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Westview Press, 1999), 130. 
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     The development of transnational advocacy against apartheid and the evolution of a 
pacifist stance that nonetheless supported the political goals of armed liberation 
movements shaped and inspired the widespread movement of the 1980s.  The lasting 
impact of opposition to apartheid registered in the altered terms of American civil 
religion, which was reinforced by representations of the antiapartheid struggle in popular 
culture.  The adoption of the term African American itself as the preferred term for 
describing Americans of African descent resulted in large part from the assertion of a 
Pan-African consciousness that had been raised by the South Africa issue.  Thus the 
significance of American antiapartheid activism lies in its contribution to the ending of 
apartheid as well as its impact on American race relations. 
     Antiapartheid organizations in the US played multiple roles.  They acted as 
nongovernmental organizations on the world scene, attempting to influence global 
opinion and specific policies aimed at South Africa.  They worked as lobbying 
organizations in the US and organized mass mobilizations while contributing to the 
redefining of racial politics in this country.  It is from among the antiapartheid activist 
sects and movement halfway houses that the integration of American civil religion arose; 
the registering of their concerns and demands in the American political vocabulary is 
their lasting success.  That the symbolic victories of activist movements can be easily co-
opted and undermined does not detract from the significance of the struggle to transform 
the terms of debate.  Historian Doug Rossinow, in his study of the relationship of the 
New Left and Christianity, asserts, “the new left’s greatest historical significance lies not 
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in its impact but in its meaning, including its meaning for the larger political world from 
which it emerged.”10   
     The representation of South Africa’s antiapartheid struggle in American popular 
culture is the venue by which many Americans became aware of the issue.  Music, sports, 
and movies constituted a cultural landscape in which Americans could comprehend 
apartheid in light of their own ideas and experiences.  The transformation of the venues 
for transmission of ideas and ideologies through popular culture accelerated the way in 
which Americans learned about apartheid.  In the 1950s and 1960s the flow of 
information was slowed by the South African government’s control of the media.  By the 
1980s the ability of the American news media to project the South African crisis around 
the globe helped create a demand for dramatized explanations of the problem and the way 
people were confronting it, especially during the period when the apartheid regime 
severely censored the news in the late 1980s. 
     The lasting effect of opposition to apartheid registered in the altered terms of 
American civil religion.  Clashes between Jesse Jackson and Jerry Falwell symbolized 
the way in which the struggle over US policy towards South Africa represented a deeper 
conflict.  The antiapartheid movement applied the methods, symbols, and vocabulary 
utilized during the American civil rights struggle to an issue of transnational significance.  
By extending the moral logic of the civil rights movement, antiapartheid activists were 
able to invoke themes of equality and freedom central to the idealistic vocabulary of 
American political discourse.  Participation of blacks and whites in the antiapartheid 
movement helped to integrate the rites and practices of civic participation and protest, at 
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once exporting American ideals while consolidating the domestic gains of the civil rights 
movement by transforming the symbols of American civil religion.   
     The new forms of civil religion predicted by Robert Bellah arose directly from the 
civil rights movement.  Creative direct actions, such as those pursued by the major 
antiapartheid organizations and activists around the country, served as a tool for building 
support for antiapartheid policies as well as influencing the course of American civil 
religion.  Drawing from trends and traditions established by the civil rights movement, as 
well as the greater access to power for African-Americans developed by overcoming 
segregation, the antiapartheid movement was able to assert influence and make a lasting 
mark on American political culture.  The adoption of the term African American as the 
preferred term for describing Americans of African descent resulted from the assertion of 
a Pan-African consciousness that arose in large part from antiapartheid activism.  
Antiapartheid activism was a key element in establishing the concept of multiculturalism 
as the paradigm in which American civil religion would develop in the 1990s. 
     The 1990 Mandela tour marked a watershed in American political culture.  The event 
was a success in terms of producing a sense of solidarity with the changes underway in 
South Africa.  In another sense it marked the last incident of the unity that had peaked 
domestically with the signing of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  Nelson Mandela, 
imprisoned for twenty-seven years and thus kept from the public’s view, emerged from 
prison as a representative of an earlier historical moment.  The applause that greeted him 
can be seen as adulation commensurate to his courage and fortitude.  It can also be 
understood as the last burst of modernist political energy and unity before a new set of 
issues and concerns established the postmodern dynamic of multiculturalism.  Thus the 
multicultural arrangement as a political modus vivendi was the product of political 
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moment that now is past.  Like the term African American, the meaning of 
multiculturalism is subject to changing interpretations and is thus unstable. 
     A new permanent exhibit titled “African Voices,” which opened in December of 1999 
at the National Natural History Museum of the Smithsonian Institution, exemplifies this 
situation.  Corporate underwriters of the exhibit include Shell Oil and Coca Cola, two 
companies that were targeted for boycott during anti-apartheid years.  According to the 
introduction to the exhibit, “African Voices” demonstrates “the diversity, dynamism, and 
global influence of Africa’s peoples and cultures over time in the realms of family, work, 
community, and the natural environment.”11  The updated display is a vast improvement 
on past portrayals of Africans and non-Europeans because it depicts real people and 
current issues, rather than using mottled brown mannequins wearing dusty examples of 
native garb displayed in a style similar to the dioramas of stuffed animals and dinosaur 
bones.  Among the displays are explanations of the transatlantic slave trade and the role 
of Americans of African descent in the history of Washington, DC. 
     The final alcove, titled ‘Global Africa,” focuses on the 1994 election of Nelson 
Mandela as the first black president of South Africa.  A quote from Mandela’s 
inauguration address is placed at the end of the display: “Never and never again shall the 
laws of our land rend our people apart or legalize their oppression and repression.”12  
Mandela’s words are placed alongside with a phrase from the poetry of Maya Angelou 
that is given the final place of honor at the exhibit’s exit: “I rise, Bringing the gift that my 
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ancestors gave.  I am the dream and hope of the slave.”  Angelou, who spent time as an 
expatriate in Ghana13 and who once performed as “Bess” in a traveling production of 
Gershwin’s Porgy and Bess,14 and Mandela are held up as exemplars of Africa and its 
descendents.  By blending African and African-American voices the exhibit illustrates the 
concept that the two identities are “mutually constituted,”15 as historian James Campbell 
has argued.  The commemoration of the election of Mandela uses the culmination of the 
antiapartheid struggle as the greatest accomplishment of the diaspora while lending 
positive reinforcement to the Du Boisian notion of “twoness.”  Given the setting, 
however, its inscription in a museum suggests the possibility of ossification as well as a 
model worthy of emulation. 
     The American antiapartheid movement mattered.  It mattered because it contributed to 
the demise of de jure racism in South Africa and because it furthered the unraveling of 
racism in the US.  The worldwide antiapartheid movement contributed to a major victory 
for human rights.  Over the course of four decades American antiapartheid activism put 
Martin Luther King’s vision of “an international alliance of people of all nations against 
racism”16 into action.  The transnational dimension of American antiapartheid activism 
provided impetus for the multicultural politics that sprang from the effort to realize 
                                                
13 See Angelou’s account of her time in Africa in Maya Angelou, All God’s Children 
Need Travelin’ Shoes (Franklin Center, PA; Franklin Press, 1986). 
 
14 Hollis Alpert, The Life and Times of Porgy and Bess: The Story of an American 
Classic (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1990), 189. 
 
15 James T. Campbell, Songs of Zion: The African Methodist Episcopal Church in the 
United Sates and South Africa (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 
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16 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., (Address to the South Africa Benefit of the American 
Committee on Africa at Hunter College, New York City, 10 December, 1965) Records, 
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King’s global united front against racism.  The American contribution to defeat of South 
African apartheid accentuated the ability of antiapartheid forces in South African to 
capitalize on the end of the Cold War.  The rationale for supporting anticommunist 
authoritarian regimes collapsed along with communism, and thus the regime in South 
Africa could no longer resist the outcry against its racism. 
     Yet the global colorline described by W.E.B Du Bois persists in South Africa, the 
United States, and the world.  While apartheid has ended, its political legacy lingers on.  
Du Bois’ interpretation of the division of the world based on color remains a central 
problem.  The integration of American civil religion via multiculturalism assures that, in 







ARCHIVES AND RECORDS 
 
American Friends Service Committee Archive, Philadelphia, Pa. 
 
American Committee on Africa Records, Amistad Research Center, Tulane University, 
New Orleans. 
 
TransAfrica Records, Washington, DC. 
 





Jackson, John Lindsey. "The Student Divestment Movement: Anti-Apartheid Activism 
on U.S. College and University Campuses." Dissertation, Ohio State University, 
1990. 
 
Metz, Steven Kent. "The Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Formulation of American 
Policy toward South Africa, 1969-1981." polisci, 1985. 
 
Morgan, Edward P. The 60s Experience: Hard Lessons About Modern America. 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991. 
 
Solop, Frederic I. "From the Margins to the Mainstream: The Anti-Apartheid Movement 
and the Politics of Agenda-Setting in the United States." Dissertation, Rutgers, 
1990. 
 
Soule, Sarah Anne. "The Student Anti-Apartheid Movement in the United States: 
Diffusion of Protest Tactics and Policy Reform." Dissertation, Cornell, 1995. 
 
 
ARTICLES AND PAPERS 
 
Borstelmann, Thomas.. "Hedging Our Bets and Buying Time: John Kennedy and Racial 
Revolutions in the American South and Southern Africa." Diplomatic History 24, no. III 
(2000): 435-63. 
 
Counts, Cecelie, Sylvia Hill, and Sandra Hill. "Notes on Building International Solidarity 
in the Us." The Black Scholar 15, no. 6 (1984): 44-52. 
 




CrossRoads. "That Covenant Was Kept: Lessons of the Us Anti-Apartheid Movement." 
CrossRoads: Contemporary Political Analysis and Left Dialogue April, no. 50 
(1995). 
 
Culverson, Donald R. "The Politics of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the United 
States, 1969-1986." Political Science Quarterly 111, no. 1 (1996): 127-49. 
 
Fierce, Milfred C. "Selected Black American Leaders and Organizations and South 
Africa 1900-1977: Some Notes." Journal of Black Studies, 17, no. III (1987): 
305-26. 
 
Gates, Henry L.. "Belafonte's Balancing Act." The New Yorker, August 26 1996, 133-43. 
 
Giugni, Marco G. "Was It Worth It? The Outcomes." In Annual Review of Sociology, 
371-94. Palo Alto: Annual Reviews, 1998. 
 
Haines, Corrie. "Reagan's Cold War Policy: Constructive Engagement with South 
Africa." Community College Humanities Review XX, no. Fall (1999): 240-57. 
 
Haines, Corrie. "The United Nations Challenge to Racial Discrimination in South Africa, 
1946 - 1950." African Studies 60, no. 2 (2001): 185-204. 
 
Hirsch, Eric L. "Sacrifice for the Cause: Group Processes, Recruitment, and Commitment 
in a Student Social Movement." American Sociological Review 55, no. II (1990): 
243-54. 
 
Diplomatic History, "Symposium: African Americans and US Foreign Relations." 20, no. 
4 (1996). 
 
Hoskins, Lewis M. "South Africa: Policy Alternatives for the United States." Paper 
presented at the Wingspread Conference, April 1975, Wingspread, Racine, 
Wisconsin 1975. 
 
Ingle, H. Larry. "The American Friends Service Committee, 1947-1949: The Cold War's 
Effect." Peace and Change 23, no. 1 (1998): 27-48. 
 
Kilson, Martin. "African Americans and Africa." Dissent 39, no. 3 (1992): 361-69. 
 
McAlister, Melani. “A Cultural History of the War Without End,” Journal of American 
History, September 2002, Vol. 89, No. 2, p. 439-455. 
 
Maren, Michael. "The Africa Lobby; Building a Constituency against Apartheid." Africa 
Report (1984). 
 
Metz, Steven. "The Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Populist Instinct in American 
Politics." Political Science Quarterly Volume 101, no. 3 (1985): 379 - 95. 
 
Romano, Renee. "No Diplomatic Immunity: African Diplomats, the State Department, 
267 
and Civil Rights, 1961-1964 " Journal of American History 87, no. 2 (2000): 546-
79. 
 
Stultz, Newell M. "Evolution of the United Nations Anti-Apartheid Regime." Human 
Rights Quarterly Volume 13, no. 1 (1991): 1-23. 
 
Storey, Peter. "Remembering the Ecumenical Struggle against Apartheid." Word and 
World: Theology for Christian Ministry, Spring 1998, 187-93. 
 
Taylor, Rupert, Jacklyn Cock, and Adam Habib.  




FILMS AND VIDEOS 
 
Come Back, Africa, Directed by Lionel Rogosin (1959; self-distributed). 
 
A Dry White Season, directed by Euzhan Palcy 1989(1987; MGM). 
  
The Endless Summer, Directed by Bruce Brown, (1966; Image Entertainment). 
 
Monterey Pop, Directed by D.A. Pennebaker, (1967; Pennebaker Hegedus Films). 
 
Sanders of the River, Directed by Zoltan Korda (1935; London). 
 
Cry, The Beloved Country, Directed by Zoltan Korda (1951; London Films). 
 
Band Aid - "Do They Know It's Christmas?”  The Story of the Official Band Aid Video 
(Vestron Video: 1985). 
 
The Wilby Conspiracy, Directed by Ralph Nelson (1975; United Artists). 
 
Zulu, Directed by Cy Endfield (1964: Diamond Films Ltd.). 
 
Cry Freedom, Directed by Richard Attenborough (1987; Marble Arch Productions). 
 
Mandela, Directed by Philip Saville (1987; HBO) 
 
Sarafina!, Directed by Darrell Roodt (1991; Disney). 
 
The Power of One, Directed by John G. Avildsen (1992; Warner). 
 
Bopha!, Directed by Morgan Freeman (1993; Paramount). 
 
Mandela and de Klerk, Directed by Joseph Sargent (1997;HBO/Showtime). 
 
268 
Long Day’s Journey into Night: Directed by Frances Reid and Deborah Hoffmann, 





Max O. Preeo, Lost in the Stars: Original Cast Album (reissue) 2001, UMG Recordings, 
Liner Notes. 
 





Abel, Richard L. Politics by Other Means: Law in the Struggle against Apartheid, 1980-
1994. New York: Routledge, 1994. 
 
Abraham, Kinfe. Politics of Black Nationalism from Harlem to Soweto. Trenton, NJ: 
Africa World Press, 1991. 
 
Abrams, Irwin. The Nobel Peace Prize and the Laureates: An Illustrated Biographical 
History, 1901-1987. Boston: G.K. Hall, 1988. 
 
Albert, Judith Clavir, and Stewart Edward Albert, eds. The Sixties Papers: Documents of 
a Rebellious Decade. New York: Praeger, 1984. 
 
Alden, Chris. Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security 
State. London: Macmillan, 1996. 
 
Alexander, Peter. Alan Paton: A Biography. Oxford England; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994. 
 
Alexander, Titus. Unraveling Global Apartheid: An Overview of World Politics. 
Cambridge: Polity/Blackwell Publishers, 1996. 
 
Jennifer Allen, “The Apostle of Angst,” Esquire, June 1987, in The Paul Simon 
Companion: Four Decades of Commentary (New York: Schirmer Books, 1997), 
179. 
 
Allott, Antony N., and International Commission of Jurists (1952- ). The Trial of Beyers 
Naudé: Christian Witness and the Rule of Law. London: Search Press [etc.], 1975. 
 
Alpert, Hollis. The Life and Times of Porgy and Bess: The Story of an American Classic. 
1st ed. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1990. 
 
American Business Consultants., and Counterattack (Organization). Red Channels: The 
Report of Communist Influence in Radio and Television. New York, N.Y.: 
American Business Consultants, 1950. 
269 
 
Anderson, Carol. Eyes Off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American 
Struggle for Human Rights, 1944-1955. Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003. 
 
Anderson, Jervis. A. Philip Randolph: A Biographical Portrait. 1st University of 
California Press ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. 
 
Anderson, Jervis. Bayard Rustin: Troubles I've Seen. New York: HarperCollins, 1997. 
 
Anderson, Maxwell, and Alan Paton. Lost in the Stars: The Dramatization of Alan 
Paton's Novel Cry, the Beloved Country. New York: W. Sloane Associates, 1950. 
 
Andrain, Charles F., and David E. Apter. Political Protest and Social Change: Analyzing 
Politics. New York: New York University Press, 1998. 
 
Angelou, Maya. All God's Children Need Traveling Shoes. 1st ed. Franklin Center, Pa.: 
Franklin Library, 1986. 
 
Appiah, Anthony, and Henry Louis Gates. Africana: The Encyclopedia of the African and 
African American Experience. 1st ed. New York: Basic Civitas Books, 1999. 
 
Appiah, Kwame Anthony. "African Identities." In Social Postmodernism: Beyond 
Identity Politics, edited by Linda Nicholson and Steven Seidman. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
 
Aronowitz, Stanley. The Politics of Identity: Class, Culture, Social Movements. New 
York: Routledge, 1991. 
 
Ashe, Arthur. A Hard Road to Glory: A History of the African-American Athlete. 3 vols. 
New York, N.Y.: Amistad: Distributed by Penguin USA, 1993. 
 
Ashe, Arthur, and Neil Amdur. Off the Court. New York: New American Library, 1981. 
 
Ashe, Arthur, and Arnold Rampersad. Days of Grace: A Memoir. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1993. 
 
Attenborough, Richard. Richard Attenborough's Cry Freedom: A Pictorial Record. 1st 
Amer. ed. New York: Knopf: Distributed by Random House, 1987. 
 
Bacon, Margaret Hope. The Quiet Rebels: The Story of the Quakers in America. 
Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1985. 
 
Bacon, Margaret Hope. Let This Life Speak: The Legacy of Henry Joel Cadbury. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987. 
 
Baker, Lee D. From Savage to Negro: Anthropology and the Construction of Race, 1896-
1954. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. 
270 
 
Baker, Pauline H. The United States and South Africa: The Reagan Years, South Africa 
Update Series. New York, N.Y.: Ford Foundation: Foreign Policy Association, 
1989. 
 
Baldwin, Lewis V. To Make the Wounded Whole: The Cultural Legacy of Martin Luther 
King. Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1992. 
 
Banner-Haley, Charles T. The Fruits of Integration: Black Middle-Class Ideology and 
Culture, 1960-1990. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1994. 
 
Barber, Lucy G. Marching on Washington: The Forging of an American Political 
Tradition. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. 
 
Barbour, Hugh, and et.al., eds. Quaker Crosscurrents: Three Hundred Years of Friends 
in the New York Yearly Meetings. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995. 
 
Beinhart, William, and Saul Dubow, eds. Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth-
Century South Africa, Rewriting Histories. New York: Routledge, 1995. 
 
Bellah, Robert et. al. Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American 
Life. New York: Harper and Row, 1985. 
 
Bellah, Robert N. The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. 
 
Bellah, Robert N., and Phillip E. Hammond. Varieties of Civil Religion. Cambridge: 
Harper and Row, 1980. 
 
Berry, Torriano, and Venise T. Berry. The 50 Most Influential Black Films: A 
Celebration of African-American Talent, Determination, and Creativity. New 
York: Citadel Press/Kensington, 2001. 
 
Bissel, Richard E. South Africa and the United States: The Erosion of an Influence 
Relationship. Edited by Alvin J. Rubenstein, Studies of Influence in International 
Relations. New York: Praeger, 1982. 
 
Blee, Kathleen M., and France Winddance Twine. Feminism and Antiracism: 
International Struggles for Justice. New York: New York University Press, 2001. 
 
Bondurant, Joan V. Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict. Rev. ed. 
Berkeley,: University of California Press, 1965. 
 
Borstelmann, Thomas. Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern 
Africa in the Early Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
 
Borstelmann, Thomas.. The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in 
the Global Arena. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001. 
271 
 
Bouton, Jim, and Leonard Shecter. Ball Four Plus Ball Five. New York: Stein and Day, 
1981. 
 
Bowser, Benjamin P., and Raymond George Hunt. Impacts of Racism on White 
Americans. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1996. 
 
Boyle, Sheila Tully, and Andrew Bunie. Paul Robeson: The Years of Promise and 
Achievement. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001. 
 
Boynton, Graham. Last Days in Cloud Cuckooland: Dispatches from White Africa. New 
York: Random House, 1997. 
 
Branch, Taylor. Parting the Waters: America in the King Years 1954-1963. New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1986. 
 
Branch, Taylor. Pillar of Fire : America in the King Years 1963-65. New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1998. 
 
Breckinridge, Scott D. CIA and the Cold War: A Memoir. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993. 
 
Breskin, David, Cheryl McCall, and Roger Hilburn. We Are the World. New York, NY: 
Perigee Books, 1985. 
 
Bright, Charles, and Susan Harding, eds. Statemaking and Social Movements. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1984. 
 
Brink, Andrâe Philippus. A Dry White Season. 1st U.S. ed. New York: Morrow, 1980. 
 
Britton, Burnett. Gandhi Arrives in South Africa. Canton, Me.: Greenleaf Books, 1999. 
 
Brock, Peter, and Nigel Young. Pacifism in the Twentieth Century. Syracuse University 
Press: Syracuse University Press, 1999. 
 
Brode, Douglas. Denzel Washington: His Films and Career. Secaucus, N.J.: Carol Pub. 
Group, 1997. 
 
Brown, Judith M., and Martin Prozesky, eds. Gandhi and South Africa: Principles and 
Politics. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996. 
 
Brown, Ruth Murray. For a "Christian America": A History of the Religious Right. 
Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2002. 
 
Bryan, G. McLeod. Naudé, Prophet to South Africa. Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1978. 
 
Bullard, Robert D., J. Eugene Grigsby, Charles Lee, and Joe R. Feagin. Residential 
Apartheid: The American Legacy, CAAS Urban Policy Series V. 2. Los Angeles, 
CA: CAAS Publications, 1994. 
272 
 
Burner, David. Making Peace with the Sixties. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1996. 
 
Burns, Stewart. To the Mountaintop: Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Sacred Mission to Save 
America, 1955-1968. 1st ed. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2003. 
 
Burrow, Rufus. James H. Cone and Black Liberation Theology. Jefferson N.C.: 
McFarland and Company, Inc., 1994. 
 
Byrd, Robert O. Quaker Ways in Foreign Policy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1960. 
 
Calhoun, Craig, ed. Social Theory and the Politics of Identity. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Blackwell, 1994. 
 
Callan, Edward. Cry, the Beloved Country: A Novel of South Africa: [a Study], Dwayne’s 
Masterwork Studies No. 69. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1991. 
 
Campbell, Horace. Rasta and Resistance: From Marcus Garvey to Walter Rodney. 
Trenton: Africa World Press, 1987. 
 
Campbell, James T. Songs of Zion: The African Methodist Episcopal Church in the 
United States and South Africa. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
 
Carmichael, Stokely, and Michael Thelwell. Ready for Revolution: The Life and 
Struggles of Stokely Carmichael (Kwame Ture). New York: Scribner, 2003. 
 
Carroll, Peter M. It Seemed Like Nothing Happened: The Tragedy and Promise of 
America in the 1970s. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982. 
 
Carson, Claybourne. In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981. 
 
Caute, David. The Year of the Barricades: A Journey through 1968. New York: Perennial 
(Harper and Row), 1988. 
 
Chafe, William H. Never Stop Running: Allard Lowenstein and the Struggle to Save 
American Liberalism. New York: Basic Books, 1993. 
 
Chappell, David L. Inside Agitators: White Southerners in the Civil Rights Movement. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. 
 
Church, Forrest. The American Creed: A Spiritual and Patriotic Primer. New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 2002. 
 
CIIR. Catholic Institute for International Relations:  South Africa in the 1980s: State of 
Emergency. London: Russell Press, 1987. 
273 
 
Clark, Bronson P. Not by Might: A Viet Nam Memoir. 1st ed. Glastonbury, CT (Suite 
222, 2842 Main St., Glastonbury 06033): Chapel Rock Publishers, 1997. 
 
Clay, William L. Just Permanent Interests: Black Americans in Congress, 1870-1991. 
New York: Amistad Press, 1992. 
 
Cochran, David Carroll. The Color of Freedom: Race and Contemporary American 
Liberalism. Albany: The Sate University of New York, 1999. 
 
Cohen, Robert. When the Old Left Was Young: Student Radicals and America's First 
Mass Student Movement, 1929-1941. New York: Oxford, 1993. 
 
Coker, Christopher. The United States and South Africa, 1968-1985. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1986. 
 
Cone, James H. Black Theology and Black Power. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Press, 1997, 
1969. 
 
Consultation, Friends World Committee for, ed. No Time but This Present: Studies 
Preparatory to the Fourth World Conference of Friends 1967. Headly Brothers, 
England: Friends World Committee for Consultation, 1967. 
 
Cooney, Robert, and Peace Press. The Power of the People: Active Nonviolence in the 
United States. Culver City, Calif.: Peace Press, 1992. 
 
Cortright, David, and George A. Lopez, eds. Economic Sanctions: Panacea or 
Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World? Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995. 
 
Countess, Imani, Loretta Hobbs, Doug McAdam, William Minter, and Linda Williams. 
Making Connections for Africa: Report from a Constituency Builder's Dialogue. 
Washington, DC: APIC, 1997. 
 
Crawford, Neta, and Audie Klotz. How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa, 
International Political Economy Series. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999. 
 
Crenshaw, Kimberlâe. Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the 
Movement. New York: New Press: Distributed by W.W. Norton & Co., 1995. 
 
Crocker, Chester. High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough 
Neighborhood. New York: Norton, 1992. 
 
Cromartie, Michael, ed. Peace Betrayed? Essays on Pacifism and Politics: Ethics and 
Public Policy Center, 1990. 
 
Cromwell, Adelaide M., ed. The Dynamics of the African/Afro-American Connection: 




Crouch, Stanley. The All-American Skin Game, or, the Decoy of Race: The Long and the 
Short of It, 1990-1994. New York: Pantheon, 1995. 
 
Crowe, Avis, and Dyckman W. Vermilye. The Ministry of Presence: Without Agenda in 
South Africa, Pendle Hill Pamphlet 293. Wallingford, Pa.: Pendle Hill 
Publications, 1990. 
 
Cruse, Harold. The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual. 1st Quill ed. New York: Quill, 1984. 
 
Cruse, Harold. Plural but Equal: A Critical Study of Blacks and Minorities and America's 
Plural Society. 1st ed. New York: William Morrow, 1987. 
 
Culver, John C., and John Hyde. American Dreamer: The Life and Times of Henry A. 
Wallace. 1st ed. New York: Norton, 2000. 
 
Culverson, Donald. Contesting Apartheid: U.S. Activism, 1960-1987. Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1999. 
 
Cummings, Richard. The Pied Piper: Allard K. Lowenstein and the Liberal Dream. New 
York: Grove Press, 1984. 
 
Curry, Constance. Silver Rights. Chapel Hill: Algonquin Books, 1995. 
 
Peter Davis, In Darkest Hollywood: Exploring the Jungles of Cinema’s South Africa 
(Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1996), 47-61 
 
D'Emilio, John. Lost Prophet: The Life and Times of Bayard Rustin. New York: Free 
Press, 2003. 
 
D'Souza, Dinesh. Falwell, before the Millennium: A Critical Biography. Chicago: 
Regnery Gateway, 1984. 
 
Darnovsky, Marcy, Barbara Epstein, and Richard Flacks, eds. Cultural Politics an Social 
Movements. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995. 
 
Davis, Peter. In Darkest Hollywood: Exploring the Jungles of Cinema's South Africa. 
Randburg, South Africa, Athens: Ravan Press;Ohio University Press, 1996. 
 
Davis, R. Hunt, and Gwendolen M. Carter. "South Africa." In Intervention in the 1980s: 
U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World, edited by Peter J. Schraeder. Boulder, 
Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989. 
 
De Klerk, F. W. The Last Trek--a New Beginning: The Autobiography. London: 
Macmillan, 1998. 
 
Deburg, William L. Van. Black Camelot: African-American Culture Heroes in Their 
Times. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997. 
275 
 
DeConde, Alexander. Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History. Boston: 
Northeastern University Press, 1992. 
 
Delgado, Richard, ed. Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1995. 
 
Dellums, Ronald V., and H. Lee Halterman. Lying Down with the Lions: A Public Life 
from the Streets of Oakland to the Halls of Power. Boston: Beacon Press, 2000. 
 
Denniston, Robin. Trevor Huddleston: A Life. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999. 
 
DeRoche, Andrew. Black, White, and Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953 to 
1998. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2001. 
 
DeRoche, Andrew. Andrew Young: Civil Rights Ambassador, Biographies in American 
Foreign Policy No. 10. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2003. 
 
Derrida, Jacques, ed. For Nelson Mandela. New York: Seaver Books, 1987. 
 
Dittmer, John. Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi, Blacks in the 
New World. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994. 
 
Dittmer, John, George C. Wright, W. Marvin Dulaney, and Kathleen Underwood. Essays 
on the American Civil Rights Movement. 1st ed. College Station: Published for 
University of Texas at Arlington by Texas A&M University Press, 1993. 
 
Dorinson, Joseph, and Joram Warmund. Jackie Robinson: Race, Sports, and the 
American Dream. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998. 
 
Douglass, R. Bruce. Reflections on Protest: Student Presence in Political Conflict. 
Richmond: John Knox Press, 1967. 
 
Downs, Donald Alexander. Cornell '69: Liberalism and the Crisis of the American 
University. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. 
 
Driggs, Sarah Shields, Richard Guy Wilson, Robert P. Winthrop, and Historic Monument 
Avenue and Fan District Foundation. Richmond's Monument Avenue. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 
 
Du Bois, W. E. B., David W. Blight, and Robert Gooding-Williams. The Souls of Black 
Folk, Bedford Series in History and Culture. Boston: Bedford Books, 1997, 1903. 
 
Du Bois, W. E. B., and Eric J. Sundquist. The Oxford W.E.B. Du Bois Reader. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
 
Duberman, Martin Bauml. Paul Robeson. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988. 
 
276 
Du Bois, W.E.B. "The Color Line Belts the World." In W.E.B. Du Bois: A Reader, edited 
by David Levering Lewis, 42-43. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1995. 
 
Dudziak, Mary L. Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy. 
Edited by Gary Gerstle William Chafe, Linda Gordon, Politics and Society in 
Twentieth Century America. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. 
 
Dyck, Harvey L., ed. The Pacifist Impulse in Historical Perspective. Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1996. 
 
Edgar, Robert E., ed. Sanctioning Apartheid. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1990. 
 
Edgar, Robert R., ed. An African American in South Africa: The Travel Notes of Ralph J. 
Bunche, 28 September 1837 - 1 January 1938. Athens: Ohio University Press, 
1992. 
 
Edgar, Robert R., and Luyanda ka Msumza, eds. Freedom in Our Lifetime: The Collected 
Writings of Anton Muziwakhe Lembede. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 
1996. 
 
Eeden, Guillaume van. Give South Africa a Chance. New York: Vantage Press, 1987. 
 
Egerton, John. Speak Now against the Day: The Generation before the Civil Rights 
Movement in the South. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994. 
 
Ehrman, John. The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs 1945 - 
1994. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995. 
 
Ellis, Stephen, and Tsepo Sechaba. Comrades against Apartheid: The ANC and the South 
African Communist Party in Exile. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992. 
 
Ellwood, Robert. The Sixties Spiritual Awakening: American Religion Moving from 
Modern to Postmodern. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994. 
 
Engelhardt, Tom. The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning 
of a Generation. New York: Basic Books, 1995. 
 
Epstein, Barbara. Political Protest and Cultural Revolution: Nonviolent Direct Action in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. 
 
Eschen, Penny M. Von. Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 
1937-1957. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997. 
 
Eskridge, William N. Gaylaw: Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999. 
 
Evans, Sara. Personal Politics: The Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights 
Movement and the New Left. New York: Knopf, 1979. 
277 
 
Fager, Chuck. Quaker Service at the Crossroads: American Friends, the American 
Friends Service Committee, and Peace and Revolution. Falls Chruch, VA: Kimo 
Press, 1988. 
 
Fager, Chuck. Without Apology: The Heroes, Heritage, and Hope of Liberal Quakerism. 
Media, PA: KIMO Press, 1996. 
 
Fager, Chuck. ed. Sustaining Peace Witness in the Twenty-First Century:  
Papers from the 1997 Quaker Peace Roundtable First Month 17-19, 1997. Wallingford, 
Pa.: Pendle Hill Publications, 1997. 
 
Fairclough, Adam. To Redeem the Soul of America: The Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference and Martin Luther King, Jr. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 
1987. 
 
Falkenburg, Claudia, and Andrew Solt, eds. A Really Big Show. New York: Viking 
Studio Books, 1992. 
 
Falkner, David. Great Time Coming: The Life of Jackie Robinson, from Baseball to 
Birmingham. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. 
 
Falwell, Jerry. Strength for the Journey. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. 
 
Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press, 1963. 
 
Fanon, Frantz. Toward the African Revolution: Essays. New York: Grove Press, 1967. 
 
Farber, David. The Age of Great Dreams: America in the 1960s. New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1994. 
 
Farmer, James. Freedom - When? New York: Random House, 1965. 
 
Farmer, James. Lay Bare the Heart: An Autobiography of the Civil Rights Movement. 
New York: Arbor House, 1985. 
 
Findlay, James F. Church People in the Struggle: The National Council of Churches and 
the Black Freedom Movement, 1950-1970. New York: Oxford, 1993. 
 
First, Ruth. 117 Days. New York,: Stein and Day, 1965. 
 
FitzGerald, Frances. Cities on a Hill: A Journey through Contemporary American 
Cultures. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986. 
 
Flacks, Richard. Making History: The Radical Tradition in American Life. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1988. 
 
Flacks, Richard, and Jack Whalen. Beyond the Barricades: The Sixties Generation Grows 
278 
Up. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989. 
 
Fletcher, James A., and Carleton Mabee, eds. A Quaker Speaks from the Black 
Experience: The Life and Selected Writings of Barrington Dunbar. New York: 
New York Yearly Meeting of Friends, 1979. 
 
Forman, James. The Political Thought of James Forman. Detroit: Black Star Publishing, 
1970. 
 
Forman, James. The Making of Black Revolutionaries: A Personal Account. New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1972. 
 
Forman, James. High Tide of Black Resistance and Other Political and Literary Writings. 
Seattle: Open Hand Publishing, Inc., 1994. 
 
Frady, Marshall. Jesse: The Life and Pilgrimage of Jesse Jackson. 1st ed. New York: 
Random House, 1996. 
 
Franklin, John Hope, and Alfred A. Moss. From Slavery to Freedom: A History of 
African Americans. 8th ed. New York: A.A Knopf, 2000. 
 
Franklin, V.P. Black Self-Determination: A Cultural History of African-American 
Resistance. New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1984. 
 
Frazier, E. Franklin. Black Bourgeoisie: The Rise of a New Middle Class. New York: 
Free Press, 1957. 
 
Frederikse, Julie. The Unbreakable Thread: Non-Racialism in South Africa. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990. 
 
Fredrickson, George M. The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-
American Character and Destiny, 1917-1914. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1971. 
 
Fredrickson, George M. White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South 
African History. New York: Oxford, 1981. 
 
Fredrickson, George M. The Arrogance of Race: Historical Perspectives on Slavery, 
Racism, and Social Inequality. Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1988. 
 
Fredrickson, George M. Black Liberation: A Comparative History of Black Ideologies in 
the United States and South Africa. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
 
Fredrickson, George M. The Comparative Imagination: On the History of Racism, 




Freeman, Jo, and Victoria Johnson, eds. Waves of Protest: Social Movements since the 
Sixties: Roman and Littlefield, 1999. 
 
Friedland, Michael B. Lift Up Your Voice Like a Trumpet: White Clergy and the Civil 
Rights and Antiwar Movements, 1954-1973. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1998. 
 
Friedly, Michael, and David Gallen. Martin Luther King Jr: The FBI File. New York: 
Carroll and Graf Publishers, Inc., 1993. 
 
Friedman, Murray. What Went Wrong? The Creation and Collapse of the Black-Jewish 
Alliance. New York: The Free Press, 1995. 
 
Gandhi, M.K. Satyagraha in South Africa. Stanford, CA: Academic Reprints, 1954. 
 
Gara, Larry, and Lenna Mae Gara, eds. A Few Small Candles: War Resisters of World 
War Ii Tell Their Stories. Kent: Kent State University Press, 1999. 
 
Garrow, David J. The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.: From "Solo" to Memphis. 1st ed. 
New York: W.W. Norton, 1981. 
 
Garrow, David J.. Bearing the Cross : Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference. 1st ed. New York: W. Morrow, 1986. 
 
Garrow, David J.. We Shall Overcome: The Civil Rights Movement in the United States in 
the 1950's and 1960's. Brooklyn, N.Y.: Carlson Pub., 1989. 
 
Gates, Robert M. From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and 
How They Won the Cold War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996. 
 
Gerhart, Gail M. Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology, 
Perspectives on Southern Africa, 19. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1978. 
 
Gershoni, Yekutiel. Africans on African-Americans: The Creation and Uses of an 
African-American Myth. New York: NYU Press, 1997. 
 
Gershwin, George, DuBose Heyward, and Ira Gershwin. Porgy and Bess. New York: 
Gershwin Pub. Corp., 1935. 
 
Gerstle, Gary. American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000. 
 
Gevisser, Mark, and Edwin Cameron. Defiant Desire. New York: Routlege, 1995. 
 




Gilroy, Paul. The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1993. 
 
Ginger, Ann Fagan, and Eugene M. Tobin. The National Lawyers Guild: From Roosevelt 
through Reagan. 1988: Temple University Press, 1988. 
 
Gish, Steven D. Alfred B. Xuma; African, American, South African. New York: New 
York University Press, 2000. 
 
Gitlin, Todd. The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking 
of the New Left. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. 
 
Gitlin, Todd. The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage. Toronto: Bantam Books, 1987. 
 
Giugni, Marco, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, eds. How Social Movements Matter. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999. 
 
Glaude, Eddie S. Is It Nation Time?: Contemporary Essays on Black Power and Black 
Nationalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. 
 
Goldfield, Michael. The Color of Politics: Race and the Mainsprings of American 
Politics. New York: The New Press, 1997. 
 
Goodman, David. Faultlines: Journeys into the New South Africa. Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1999. 
 
Goodwin, June, and Ben Schiff. Heart of Whiteness: Afrikaners Face Black Rule in the 
New South Africa, 1995. 
 
Gosse, Van. Where the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War America and the Making of a New 
Left. New York: Verso, 1993. 
 
Gossett, Thomas F. Race: The History of an Idea in America. New York: Oxford, 1997, 
1963. 
 
Guelke, Adrian. South Africa in Transition: The Misunderstood Miracle, International 
Library of African Studies; V.10. London; New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 
1999. 
 
Guidry, John A., Michael D. Kennedy, and Mayer N. Zald. Globalizations and Social 
Movements: Culture, Power, and the Transnational Public Sphere. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2000. 
 
Gwyn, Douglas. The Covenant Crucified: Quakers and the Rise of Capitalism. 
Wallingford, PA: Pendle Hill Publications, 1995. 
 
Hadden, Jeffrey K., and Anson D. Shupe. Televangelism, Power, and Politics on God's 
Frontier. 1st ed. New York: H. Holt, 1988. 
281 
 
Hadden, Jeffrey K., The Politics of Religion and Social Change. 1st ed, Religion and the 
Political Order ; V. 2. New York: Paragon House, 1988. 
 
Hadden, Jeffrey K., and Charles E. Swann. Prime Time Preachers: The Rising Power of 
Televangelism. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1981. 
 
Hadley, Herbert M. Quakers World Wide: A History of the Friends World Committee for 
Consultation. York, England: Friends World Committee for Consultation/William 
Sessions Ltd., 1991. 
 
Hain, Peter. Sing the Beloved Country: The Struggle for the New South Africa. Chicago: 
Pluto Press, 1996. 
 
Hanes Walton, Jr., and Robert C. Smith. American Politics and the African American 
Quest for Universal Freedom. New York: Longman, 2000. 
 
Hansberry, Lorraine. To Be Young, Gifted and Black: An Informal Autobiography. New 
York: Signet, 1969. 
 
Harding, Susan Friend. The Book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist Language and 
Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000. 
 
Harris, Fredrick C. Something Within: Religion in African-American Political Activism. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
 
Harris, William Hamilton. Keeping the Faith: A. Philip Randolph, Milton P. Webster, 
and the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 1925-1937, Blacks in the New 
World. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977. 
 
Hastings, Tom H. Meek Ain't Weak: Nonviolent Power and People of Color. Lanham, 
Md.: University Press of America, 2002. 
 
Hauck, David. Two Decades of Debate: The Controversy over Us Companies in South 
Africa. Washington DC: Investor Responsibility Research Center, 1983. 
 
Hawk, Beverly G., ed. Africa's Media Image. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992. 
 
Hayden, Tom. Reunion: A Memoir. New York: Random House, 1988. 
 
Height, Dorothy I. Open Wide the Freedom Gates: A Memoir. 1st ed. New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2003. 
 
Hellman, John. American Myth and the Legacy of Vietnam. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986. 
 
Henry, Charles P. Ralph Bunche: Model Negro or American Other? New York: New 
York University Press, 2000. 
282 
 
Hentoff, Nat. Peace Agitator: The Story of A.J. Muste. New York, London: The 
Macmillan Co.; Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1963. 
 
Hero, Alfred O., and John Barratt, eds. The American People and South Africa: Publics, 
Elites and Policymaking Processes. Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1981. 
 
Hickey, Dennis, and Kenneth C. Wylie. An Enchanting Darkness: The American Vision 
of Africa in the Twentieth Century. East Lansing: Michigan State University 
Press, 1993. 
 
Higam, John, ed. Civil Rights and Social Wrongs: Black-White Relations since World 
War Ii. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. 
 
Hinson, E. Glenn. Love at the Heart of Things: A Biography of Douglas V. Steere. 
Wallingford, PA: Pendle Hill Publications, 1998. 
 
Hirson, Baruch. Year of Fire, Year of Ash: The Soweto Revolt - Roots of Revolution? 
London: Zed Press, 1979. 
 
Hochschild, Adam. Half the Way Home: A Memoir of Father and Son. New York: 
Viking, 1986. 
 
Hochschild, Adam.. The Mirror at Midnight: A South African Journey. New York: 
Viking, 1990. 
 
Hochschild, Adam.. King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in 
Colonial Africa. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1998. 
 
Holland, Heidi. The Struggle: A History of the African National Congress. New York: 
George Braziller, Inc., 1990. 
 
Hope, Marjorie, and James Young. The South African Churches in Revolutionary 
Situation. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1981. 
 
Hopkins, Jeffrey, ed. The Art of Peace: Nobel Laureates Discuss Human Rights, Conflict 
and Reconciliation. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 2000. 
 
Horne, Gearld. Black and Red: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Afro-American Response to the 
Cold War, 1944-1963. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986. 
 
Horne, Gerald. Communist Front? The Civil Rights Congress, 1946-1956. Rutherford, 
New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1988. 
 
Horne, Gerald. Black Liberation/Red Scare: Ben Davis and the Communist Party. 




Horne, Gerald, and Mary Young. W.E.B. Du Bois: An Encyclopedia. Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 2001. 
 
Houser, George M. Erasing the Color Line. Rev. ed. New York, N.Y.,: Fellowship 
Publications, 1947. 
 
Houser, George M. No One Can Stop the Rain: Glimpses of Africa's Liberation Struggle. 
New York: The Pilgrim Press, 1989. 
 
Houser, George M. "Freedom's Struggle Crosses Oceans and Mountains: Martin Luther 
King Jr. And the Liberation Struggles in Africa and America." In We Shall 
Overcome: Martin Luther King Jr. And the Black Freedom Struggle, edited by 
Peter J. Albert and Ronald Hoffman. New York: Pantheon, 1990. 
 
Howard, Fred Lee, and Jonathan Scott Lee, eds. I Am Because We Are: Readings in 
Black Philosophy. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1995. 
 
Howarth, David R., and Aletta J. Norval. South Africa in Transition: New Theoretical 
Perspectives. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998. 
 
HRWatch, Human Rights. No Neutral Ground: South Africa's Confrontation with the 
Activist Churches, An Africa Watch Report. New York: Human Rights Watch, 
1989. 
 
Huddleston, Trevor. Naught for Your Comfort. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 
1956. 
 
Huddleston, Trevor. Return to South Africa: The Ecstasy and the Agony. Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Company, 1991. 
 
Hughey, Michael W. Civil Religion and Moral Order: Theoretical and Historical 
Dimensions, Contributions in Sociology, Number 43. Westport, CT, 1983. 
 
Hunter, Allen. Rethinking the Cold War, Critical Perspectives on the Past. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1998. 
 
Hunter, James Davison. Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. New York: Basic 
Books, 1991. 
 
Hunton, Dorothy. Alphaeus Hunton: The Unsung Valiant. Richmond Hill, NY: Self-
Published, 1986. 
 
Hutchinson, Earl Ofari. Blacks and Reds: Race and Class in Conflict, 1919-1990. East 
Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1995. 
 
Huttenback, Robert A. Gandhi in South Africa: British Imperialism and the Indian 
Question 1906-1914. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971. 
 
284 
Institute, Lincoln. Transafrica: A Lobby of the Left. Washington, DC: The Lincoln 
Institute, 1985. 
 
Isaacs, Harold R. Emergent Americans: A Report on "Crossroads Africa". New York: 
The John Day Company, 1961. 
 
Isserman, Maurice. If I Had a Hammer: The Death of the Old Left and the Birth of the 
New Left. New York: Basic Books, 1987. 
 
Itzkin, Eric. Gandhi's Johannesburg: Birthplace of Satyagraha. Johannesburg: 
Witwatersrand University Press, 1999. 
 
Jackson, Laura, Paul Simon: The Definitive Biography of the Legendary 
Singer/Songwriter. New York: Citadel Press Books, 2002. 
 
Jaffrey, Zia. AIDS in South Africa: The New Apartheid. London: Verso, 2001. 
 
Jakoubek, Robert E., and Emory University. Children's Reading Program. Walter White 
and the Power of Organized Protest, Gateway Civil Rights. Brookfield, Conn.: 
Millbrook Press, 1994. 
 
Janken, Kenneth Robert. Rayford W. Logan and the Dilemma of the African-American 
Intellectual. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1993. 
 
Jasper, James M. The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social 
Movements. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
 
Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. Changing Differences: Women and the Shaping of American 
Foreign Policy, 1917-1994. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1995. 
 
Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. Peace Now! American Society and the Ending of the Vietnam 
War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999. 
 
Jensen, Kenneth M., and Kimber M. Schraub, eds. Pacifism and Citizenship: Can They 
Coexist?, Dialogues from Public Workshops: 5. Washington, DC: US Institute of 
Peace, 1991. 
 
Jhally, Sut, and Justin Lewis. Enlightened Racism: The Cosby Show, Audiences, and the 
Myth of the American Dream. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992. 
 
Johnston, Hank, and Bert Klandermans. Social Movements and Culture, Social 
Movements, Protest, and Contention V. 4. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1995. 
 
Jones, Bartlett C. Flawed Triumphs: Andy Young at the United Nations. Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 1996. 
 
Jonson, Sterling. Black Globalism: The International Politics of a Non-State Nation. 
285 
Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate, 1998. 
 
Juckes, Tim J. Opposition in South Africa: The Leadership of Z.K. Matthews, Nelson 
Mandela, and Stephen Biko. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995. 
 
K'Meyer, Tracy Elaine. Interracialism and Christian Community in the Postwar South: 
The Story of Koinonia Farm. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1997. 
 
Kahin, George McTurnan. The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 
1955. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1955. 
 
Kairos, and Theologians. The Kairos Document: Challenge to the Church - a Theological 
Comment on the Political Crisis in South Africa. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans, 1986. 
 
Kaiser, Ernest, ed. Freedomways Reader: Afro-America in the Seventies. New York: 
International Publishers, 1977. 
 
Kapur, Sudarshan. Raising up a Prophet: The African-American Encounter with Gandhi. 
Boston: Beacon Press, 1992. 
 
Kasrils, Ronnie. 'Armed and Dangerous’ My Undercover Struggle against Apartheid. 
Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1993. 
 
Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks 
in International Politics. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998. 
 
Keppel, Ben. The Work of Democracy: Ralph Bunche, Kenneth B. Clark, Lorraine 
Hansberry, and the Cultural Politics of Race. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1995. 
 
Keyser, Lester J., and André Ruszkowski. The Cinema of Sidney Poitier: The Black 
Man's Changing Role on the American Screen. 1st ed. San Diego, Ca., London: 
A. S. Barnes; Tantivy Press, 1980. 
 
Khatri, Daryao S., and Anne O. Hughes. American Education Apartheid--Again? 
Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2002. 
 
Kilson, Martin, and Adelaide Hill, eds. Apropos of Africa. New York: Doubleday, 1971. 
 
Kissinger, Henry. White House Years: Little, Brown and Company, 1979. 
 
Klandermans, Bert. The Social Psychology of Protest. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 
1997. 
 
Klein, Naomi. No Logo: Money, Marketing, and the Growing Anti-Corporate Movement. 
New York: Picador USA, 1999. 
 
286 
Kleinman, Mark L. A World of Hope, a World of Fear: Henry A. Wallace, Reinhold 
Niebuhr, and American Liberalism. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2000. 
 
Klinker, Philip A., and Rogers M Smith. The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of 
Racial Equality in America. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999. 
 
Klotz, Audie. Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid. New 
York: Cambridge, 1995. 
 
Kohn, Howard. We Had a Dream: A Tale of the Struggle for Integration in America. 
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998. 
 
Kolko, Gabriel. Confronting the Third World: Us Foreign Policy, 1945-1980. New York: 
Pantheon, 1988. 
 
Krenn, Michael L. Black Diplomacy: African Americans and the State Department 1945-
1969. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999. 
 
Lapchick, Richard Edward, and St. Martin's Press/Tor Archive (Brown University). 
Broken Promises: Racism in American Sports. 1st ed. New York: St. 
Martin's/Marek, 1984. 
 
Larana, Enrique, et. al., ed. New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity. 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994. 
 
Lazerson, Joshua N. Against the Tide: Whites in the Struggle against Apartheid. Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1994. 
 
Leach, Graham. South Africa: No Easy Path to Peace. Boston: Routledge, 1986. 
 
Lee, Harper. To Kill a Mockingbird. New York: Warner, 1960. 
 
LeMay, G.H.L. The Afrikaners: An Historical Interpretation. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Blackwell, 1995. 
 
Lemelle, Sidney, and Robin D.G. Kelley, eds. Imagining Home: Class, Culture and 
Nationalism in the African Diaspora. New York: Verso, 1994. 
 
LeoGrande, Wlliam M. Our Own Backyard:  The United States in Central America, 
1977-1992. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998. 
 
Leonard, Richard. Apartheid Whitewash: South Africa Propaganda in the United States. 
New York: The Africa Fund, 1989. 
 
Lerumo, A. Fifty Fighting Years: The Communist Party of South Africa 1921-1971. 
London: Inkululeko Publications, 1971. 
 
Lester, Joan Steinau, and Eleanor Holmes Norton. Eleanor Holmes Norton: Fire in My 
287 
Soul. New York: Atria Books, 2003. 
 
Levine, Lawrence W. Black Culture and Black Consciousness: Afro-American Folk 
Thoughts from Slavery to Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. 
 
Levy, Peter B. The New Left and Labor in the 1960s. Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press, 1994. 
 
Lewis, David L. W.E.B. Du Bois: Biography of a Race, 1868-1919. 1st ed. New York: H. 
Holt, 1993. 
 
Lewis, David L. W.E.B. Du Bois: The Fight for Equality and the American Century, 
1919-1963. 1st ed. New York: H. Holt, 2000. 
 
Lewis, John, and Michael D'Orso. Walking with the Wind: A Memoir of the Movement. 
New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1998. 
 
Lewy, Guenter. Peace and Revolution: The Moral Crisis of American Pacifism. Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1987. 
 
Lind, Michael. Up from Conservatism: Why the Right Is Wrong for America. New York: 
The Free Press, 1996. 
 
Lind, Michael. The Next American Nation: The New Nationalism and the Fourth 
American Revolution. New York: Free Press Paperbacks, 1996. 
 
Lobban, Michael. White Man's Justice: South African Political Trials in the Black 
Consciousness Era. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. 
 
Lockwood, Edgar. South Africa's Moment of Truth. New York: Friendship Press, 1988. 
 
Lofland, John. Polite Protesters: The American Peace Movement of the 1980s. Edited by 
Harriet Hyman Alonso, Charles Chatfield and Louis Kreisberg, Syracuse Studies 
on Peace and Conflict Resolution. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1993. 
 
Logan, Willis H., ed. The Kairos Covenant: Standing with South African Christians. New 
York: Friendship Press/Meyer-Stone Books, 1988. 
 
Long, Robert Emmet. Multiculturalism. New York: H.W. Wilson, 1997. 
 
Lorini, Alessandra. Rituals of Race: American Public Culture and the Search for Racial 
Democracy, Carter G. Woodson Institute Series in Black Studies. Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1999. 
 
Love, Janice. The U.S. Anti-Apartheid Movement: Local Activism in Global Politics. New 
York: Praeger, 1985. 
 
Lowenberg, Anton D., and William H. Kaempfer. The Origins and Demise of South 
288 
African Apartheid: A Public Choice Analysis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1998. 
 
Lowenstein, Allard. Brutal Mandate: A Journey to South West Africa. New York: The 
MacMillan Company, 1958. 
 
Luker, Ralph E. The Social Gospel in Black and White: American Racial Reform, 1885-
1912. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991. 
 
Luthuli, Albert. Let My People Go: The Autobiography of Albert Luthuli. New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1962. 
 
Lutuli, Albert. For Freedom in South Africa:  Statements by Chief Albert J. Lutuli on 
Receipt of Nobel Peace Prize in December 1961. New York: United Nations 
Centre Against Apartheid, 1981. 
 
Lynch, Hollis R. Black American Radicals and the Liberation of Africa: The Council on 
African Affairs, 1937-1955, Africana Studies and Research Center. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Africana Studies and Research Center, 1978. 
 
Lynn, Conrad J. There Is a Fountain: The Autobiography of a Civil Rights Lawyer. 
Westport, Conn.: L. Hill, 1979. 
 
Lynn, Susan. Progressive Women in Conservative Times: Racial Justice, Peace, and 
Feminism, 1945 to the 1960s. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 
1992. 
 
Makeba, Miriam. Makeba: My Story. Edited by with James Hall. New York: New 
American Library, 1987. 
 
Mandela, Nelson. Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela. 
Boston: Little Brown, 1993. 
 
Manis, Andrew Michael. Southern Civil Religions in Conflict: Civil Rights and the 
Culture Wars. Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 2002. 
 
Marable, Manning. W.E.B. Du Bois, Black Radical Democrat, Twayne's Twentieth-
Century American Biography Series No. 3. Boston: Twayne, 1986. 
 
Marsh, Dave. Sun City by Artists United against Apartheid: The Making of the Record. 
New York: Cloverdale Press, 1985. 
 
Martin, Marvin. Arthur Ashe: Of Tennis and the Human Spirit. New York: Franklin 
Watts, 1999. 
 
Martin, Walter. "Friends and Africa." In No Time but This Present, edited by Fourth 
World Conference of Friends, 145-54. Birmingham, England: Friends World 
Committee for Consultation, 1967. 
289 
 
Marty, Martin E. The One and the Many: America's Struggle for the Common Good. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997. 
 
Marvin, Carolyn, and David W. Ingle. Blood Sacrifice and the Nation: Totem Rituals and 
the American Flag. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
 
Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. American Apartheid: Segregation and the 
Making of the Underclass. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993. 
 
Massie, Robert Kinloch. Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the 
Apartheid Years. New York: Nan A. Talese/Doubleday, 1997. 
 
Mathabane, Mark. Kaffir Boy: The True Story of a Black Youth's Coming of Age in 
Apartheid South Africa. New York: Macmillan, 1986. 
 
Mathabane, Mark. Kaffir Boy in America: An Encounter with Apartheid. New York: 
Scribner's, 1989. 
 
Matthews, Z.K. Freedom for My People - the Autobiography of Z.K. Matthews: Southern 
Africa 1901 to 1968. London: Rex Collings, 1981. 
 
May, Lary. Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age of Cold War. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989. 
 
Mayekiso, Mzwanele. Township Politics: Civic Struggles for a New South Africa. New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1996. 
 
Mayson, Cedric. A Certain Sound: The Struggle for Liberation in Southern Africa. 
London: Epworth Press, 1984. 
 
Mbali, Zolile. The Churches and Racism: A Black South African Perspective. New York: 
SCM Press, 1987. 
 
McAdam, Doug. Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. 
 
McAlister, Melani. Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle 
East, 1945-2000, American Crossroads; 6. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2001. 
 
McCarthy, Michael. Dark Continent: Africa as Seen by Americans, Contributions in 
Afro-American and African Studies, #75. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983. 
 
McCartney, John T. Black Power Ideologies: An Essay in African-American Political 
Thought. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992. 
 
McGarvey, Patrick J. CIA: The Myth and the Madness. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972. 
290 
 
McGirr, Lisa. Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right. Edited by 
William Chafe, Gary Gerstle and Linda Gordon, Politics and Society in 
Twentieth-Century America. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. 
 
Meconis, Charles A. With Clumsy Grace: The American Catholic Left, 1961-1975. New 
York: Seabury Press, 1979. 
 
Meier, August, and Elliot Rudwick. CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement, 1942-
1968. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. 
 
Meli, Francis. A History of the ANC: South Africa Belongs to Us. Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989. 
 
Melucci, Alberto. Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in 
Contemporary Society. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989. 
 
Mendl, Wolf. Prophets and Reconcilers: Reflections on the Quaker Peace Testimony, 
Swarthmore Lecture; 1974. London: Friends Home Service Committee, 1974. 
 
Meriwether, James Hunter. Proudly We Can Be Africans: Black Americans and Africa, 
1935-1961, The John Hope Franklin Series in African American History and 
Culture. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002. 
 
Mermelstein, David, ed. The Anti-Apartheid Reader: The Struggle against White Racist 
Rule in South Africa. New York: Grove Press, 1987. 
 
Merret, Christopher. A Culture of Censorship: Secrecy and Intellectual Repression in 
South Africa. Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1995. 
 
Merwe, Hendrik van der. Peacemaking in South Africa: A Life in Conflict Resolution. 
Cape Town: Tafelberg Publishers, 2000. 
 
Merwe, Hendrik W. van der, Nancy C.J. Charton, D.A. Kotze, and Ake Magnusson, eds. 
African Perspectives on South Africa, 1978. 
 
Merwe, Hendrik W. van der. South Africa Morality and Action - Quaker Efforts in a 
Difficult Environment, Studies in Quakerism. Chicago: Progressive Publisher, 
1981. 
 
Merwe, Hendrik W. van der. Pursuing Justice and Peace in South Africa. New York: 
Routledge, 1989. 
 
Meyer, David S., and Sidney Tarrow, eds. The Social Movement Society: Contentious 
Politics for a New Century. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 
Inc., 1998. 
 
Meyer, David S., Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett. Social Movements: Identity, 
291 
Culture, and the State. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
 
Michener, James A. The Covenant. New York: Fawcett Crest, 1980. 
 
Miller, James. Democracy Is in the Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago. 
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. 
 
Minter, William. "Action against Apartheid." In Reflections on Protest: Student Presence 
in Political Conflict, edited by Bruce Douglass. Richmond: John Knox Press, 
1967. 
 
Minter, William. King Solomon's Mines Revisited: Western Interests and the Burdened 
History of Southern Africa. New York: Basic Books, 1986. 
 
Minter, William. Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and 
Mozambique. London: Zed Books, 1994. 
 
Mjagkij, Nina. Light in the Darkness: African Americans and the YMCA 1852-1946. 
Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1994. 
 
Mokoena, Kenneth, ed. South Africa and the United States. New York: The New Press, 
1993. 
 
Moore-Gilbert, Bart. Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics. New York: 
Verso, 1997. 
 
Morris, Aldon D. The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities 
Organizing for Change. New York, 1984. 
 
Morris, Aldon D., and Carol McClurg Mueller, eds. Frontiers in Social Movement 
Theory. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992. 
 
Mullane, Deirdre. Crossing the Danger Water: Three Hundred Years of African-
American Writing. 1st Anchor Books ed. New York: Anchor Books: Doubleday, 
1993. 
 
Mutambirwa, James. South Africa: The Sanctions Mission. London: Zed Books Ltd., 
1989. 
 
Myers, R. David, ed. Toward a History of the New Left: Essays from within the 
Movement. Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Publishers, 1989. 
 
Myrdal, Gunnar. An American Dilemma. Vol. 1 and 2. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1944. 
 
Naison, Mark. Communists in Harlem During the Depression. Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 1983. 
 
NARMIC/AFSC. Automating Apartheid - US Computer Exports to South Africa and the 
292 
Arms Embargo: NARMIC/American Friends Service Committee, 1982. 
 
Naudé, Beyers, Charles Villa-Vicencio, and John W. De Gruchy. Resistance and Hope: 
South African Essays in Honour of Beyers Naudé. Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans, 
1985. 
 
Naudé, Beyers, Charles Villa-Vicencio, Carl Nichaus, and Hlophe Bam. Many Cultures, 
One Nation: Festschrift for Beyers Naudé. 1st ed. Cape Town: Human & 
Rousseau, 1995. 
 
Navasky, Victor S. Naming Names. New York: Viking Press, 1980. 
 
Nesbitt, Prexy. Apartheid in Our Living Rooms: U.S. Foreign Policy and South Africa, 
Midwest Research Monograph Series: 3. Chicago: Midwest Academy, 1986. 
 
Neuhaus, Richard John. Dispensations: The Future of South Africa as South Africans See 
It. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1986. 
 
Newman, Daisy. A Procession of Friends: Quakers in America. [1st ] ed. Garden City, 
N.Y.,: Doubleday, 1972. 
 
Newman, Richard. Black Power and Black Religion. West Cornwall, CT: Locust Hill 
Press, 1987. 
 
Newton, Huey P. Revolutionary Suicide. [1st ] ed. New York,: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1973. 
 
Nixon, Rob. Homelands, Harlem, and Hollywood: South African Culture and the World 
Beyond. New York: Routledge, 1994. 
 
Noer, Thomas J. Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in 
Africa, 1948 - 1968. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1985. 
 
North, James. Freedom Rising. New York: Macmillan, 1985. 
 
Norval, Aletta J. Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse. New York: Verso, 1996. 
 
O'Meara, Dan. Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National 
Party 1948-1994. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1996. 
 
O'Reilly, Kenneth. Nixon's Piano: Presidents and Racial Politics from Washington to 
Clinton. New York: Free Press, 1995. 
Oberschall, Anthony. Social Movements: Ideologies, Interests, and Identities. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1993. 
 




Olson, Lynne. Freedom's Daughter: The Unsung Heroines of the Civil Rights Movement 
from 1830 to 1970. New York: Scribner, 2001. 
 
Omi, Michael, and Howard Winant. Racial Formation in the United States: From the 
1960s to the 1990s. New York: Routledge, 1994. 
 
Orkin, Mark, and Community Agency for Social Enquiry (South Africa). Sanctions 
against Apartheid. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990. 
 
Orkin, Mark, Community Agency for Social Enquiry (South Africa), and Institute for 
Black Research (Durban South Africa). Disinvestment, the Struggle, and the 
Future: What Black South Africans Really Think. 1st ed. Johannesburg: Ravan 
Press, 1986. 
 
Ostwalt, Conrad Eugene. Secular Steeples: Popular Culture and the Religious 
Imagination. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003. 
 
Padmore, George. Pan-Africanism or Communism. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971. 
 
Paton, Alan. Too Late the Phalarope. New York: Scribner, 1953. 
 
Paton, Alan. The Long View. New York: Praeger, 1968. 
 
Paton, Alan. For You Departed. New York: Scribner, 1969. 
 
Paton, Alan. Creative Suffering: The Ripple of Hope. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1970. 
 
Paton, Alan. Ah, but Your Land Is Beautiful. New York: Scribner, 1982. 
 
Paton, Alan. Beyond the Present: The Story of Women for Peace, 1976-1986. Houghton 
South Africa: Published by the Brenthurst Press for Women for Peace, 1986. 
 
Paton, Alan. Journey Continued: An Autobiography. New York: Scribner, 1988. 
 
Paton, Alan. Save the Beloved Country. 1st American ed. New York: Scribner's, 1989. 
 
Paton, Alan, and Dan Weiner. South Africa in Transition. New York: Scribner, 1956. 
 
Peake, Thomas R. Keeping the Dream Alive: A History of the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference from King to the Nineteen Eighties. New York: P. Lang 
Pub., 1987. 
 
Peterson, Robert W., ed. South Africa and Apartheid. New York: Facts on File, 1975. 
 
Pfeffer, Paula F. A. Philip Randolph, Pioneer of the Civil Rights Movement. Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990. 
 
Pieterse, Jan Nederveen. White on Black: Images of Africa and Blacks in Western 
294 
Popular Culture. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992. 
 
Plimpton, Ruth T. Operation Crossroads Africa. New York: The Viking Press, 1962. 
 
Plummer, Brenda Gayle. Rising Wind: Black Americans and Us Foreign Affairs, 1935-
1960. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996. 
 
Plummer, Brenda Gayle. Window on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 
1945-1988. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003. 
 
Poitier, Sidney. This Life. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980. 
 
Poitier, Sidney. The Measure of a Man: A Spiritual Autobiography. 1st ed. San Francisco, 
CA: Harper, 2000. 
 
Powers, Richard Gid. Not without Honor: The History of American Anticommunism. New 
York: The Free Press, 1995. 
 
Prados, John. Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World 
War Ii through Iranscam. New York: William Morrow, 1988. 
 
Rampersad, Arnold. Jackie Robinson: A Biography. 1st ed. New York: Knopf, 1997. 
 
Ramphele, Mamphela. Across Boundaries: The Journey of a South African Woman 
Leader, 1996. 
 
Randall, Peter, ed. Towards Social Change: Report of the Social Commission of the Study 
Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society. Johannesburg: Christian Institute of 
Southern Africa, 1971. 
 
Richards, Yevette. Maida Springer: Pan-Africanist and International Labor Leader. 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000. 
 
Richburg, Keith B. Out of America: A Black Man Confronts Africa. New York: Basic 
Books, 1997. 
 
Richey, Russell E., and Donald G Jones, eds. American Civil Religion. New York: 
Harper and Row, 1974. 
 
Robeson, Eslanda Good. African Journey. New York: The John Day Company, 1945. 
 
Robeson, Paul. Here I Stand. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. 
 
Robinson, Jackie, and Alfred Duckett. I Never Had It Made. Hopewell, N.J.: Ecco Press, 
1995. 
 
Robinson, Jackie, and Jules Tygiel. The Jackie Robinson Reader: Perspectives on an 
American Hero. New York: Dutton, 1997. 
295 
 
Robinson, Joann Ooiman. Abraham Went Out: A Biography of A.J. Muste. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1981. 
 
Robinson, Randall. The Emancipation of Wakefield Clay. London: Bogle-L'Overture 
publications Limited, 1978. 
 
Robinson, Randall. Defending the Spirit: A Black Life in America. New York: Dutton, 
1998. 
 
Robinson, Rachel, and Lee Daniels. Jackie Robinson: An Intimate Portrait. New York: 
Abrams, 1996. 
 
Robinson, Sharon. Stealing Home: An Intimate Family Portrait by the Daughter of Jackie 
Robinson. 1st ed. New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1996. 
 
Rossinow, Douglas C. The Politics of Authenticity: Liberalism, Christianity, and the New 
Left in America. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. 
 
Rouner, Leroy S., ed. Civil Religion and Political Theology. Edited by Leroy S. Rouner, 
Boston University Studies in Philosophy and Religion. Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1986. 
 
Rucht, Dieter, ed. Research on Social Movements: The State of the Art in Western Europe 
and the USA. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. 
 
Rueter, Theodore, ed. The Politics of Race: African Americans and the Political System. 
Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995. 
 
Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York: Pantheon, 1978. 
 
Said, Edward W. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994. 
 
Sale, Kirkpatrick. SDS. New York: Random House, 1973. 
 
Sales, Bill. Southern Africa/Black America - Same Struggle/Same Fight. New York: 
Black Liberation/Brothers and Sisters Press, 1977. 
 
Sales, William W. From Civil Rights to Black Liberation: Malcolm X and the 
Organization of Afro-American Unity. Boston: South End Press, 1994. 
 
Salzman, Jack, and Cornel West, eds. Struggles in the Promised Land:  Toward a History 
of Black-Jewish Relations in the United States. New York: Oxford, 1997. 
 
Sampson, Anthony. Mandela: The Authorized Biography. 1st American ed. New York: 
Knopf: Distributed by Random House, 1999. 
 
Saul, John S., and Stephen Gelb. The Crisis in South Africa: Class Defense, Class 
296 
Revolution. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981. 
 
Sawyer, Mary R. Black Ecumenism: Implementing the Demands of Justice. Valley Forge, 
Pa.: Trinity Press International, 1994. 
 
Sayres, Sohnya, ed. The Sixties Without Apology. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1984. 
 
Schechter, Danny. The More You Watch, the Less You Know: News Wars, (Sub)Merged 
Hopes/Media Adventures. A Seven Stories Press first ed. New York: Seven 
Stories Press, 1997. 
 
Schlesinger, Arthur Meier. The Disuniting of America: [Reflections on a Multicultural 
Society]. Knoxville, Tenn.: Whittle Direct Books, 1991. 
 
Schraeder, Peter J. United States Foreign Policy Towards Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis 
and Change. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
 
Schuettinger, Robert L., ed. South Africa-the Vital Link. Washington, DC: Council on 
American Affairs, 1976. 
 
Schultz, George P. Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State, A Robert 
Stewart Book. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993. 
 
Scott, Michael. A Time to Speak. 1st ed. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1958. 
 
Scott, Michael, and United Nations. Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of 
South Africa. [from old catalog]. Civilisation Indivisible. London,: Africa Bureau, 
1953. 
 
Scott, William R. The Sons of Sheba's Race: African-Americans and the Italo-Ethiopian 
War, 1935-1941. Edited by Hine et.al., Blacks in the Diaspora Series. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993. 
 
Seeger, Daniel A. The Seed and the Tree: A Reflection on Nonviolence, Pendle Hill 
Pamphlet 269. Wallingford, Pa.: Pendle Hill Publications, 1986. 
 
Sharp, Gene. Politics of Nonviolent Action. Boston: P. Sargent Publishers, 1973. 
 
Sharp, Gene. Gandhi as a Political Strategist. Boston: P. Sargent, 1978. 
 
Sharp, Gene. ""What Is Required to Uproot Oppression? Strategic Problems of the South 
African Resistance"." In Gene Sharp, 161-80. Boston: P. Sargent Publishers, 
1980. 
 
Shepherd, George W. The Study of Race in American Foreign Policy and International 




Shepherd, George W. Anti-Apartheid: Transnational Conflict and Western Policy in the 
Liberation of South Africa. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977. 
 
Shepherd, George W. They Are Us: Fifty Years of Human Rights Advocacy. Philadelphia, 
Pa.: Xlibris Corp., 2002. 
 
Shridharani, Krishnalal. War without Violence: A Study of Gandhi's Method and Its 
Accomplishments. New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1939. 
 
Singh, Robert. The Congressional Black Caucus: Racial Politics in the U.S. Congress. 
Edited by Richard G. Niemi and Barbara Sinclair, Contemporary American 
Politics. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1998. 
 
Skinner, Elliot P. African Americans and U.S. Policy toward Africa 1850 - 1924. 
Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1992. 
 
Skinner, Elliott P. "African American Perspectives on Foreign Policy." In From 
Exclusion to Inclusion: The Long Struggle for African American Political Power, 
edited by Ralph C. Gomes and Linda Faye Williams. Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1992. 
 
Small, Melvin, and William D. Hoover, eds. Give Peace a Chance: Exploring the 
Vietnam Antiwar Movement. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992. 
 
Smith, Jackie G., Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco. Transnational Social Movements 
and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State. 1st ed, Syracuse Studies on 
Peace and Conflict Resolution. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1997. 
 
Smith, Jackie G., and Hank Johnston. Globalization and Resistance: Transnational 
Dimensions of Social Movements. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002. 
 
Smith, Robert Charles. We Have No Leaders: African-Americans in the Post-Civil Rights 
Era, Suny Series in Afro-American Studies. Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1996. 
 
Solop, Frederic I. "Public Protest and Public Policy: The Anti-Apartheid Movement and 
Political Innovation." Policy Studies Review 9, no. 2 (1990): 307-26. 
 
Southern, David W. Gunnar Myrdal and Black-White Relations: The Use and Abuse of 
an American Dilemma, 1944-1969. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1987. 
 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics. New York: 
Routledge, 1988. 
 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty, Donna Landry, and Gerald M. MacLean. The Spivak 




Sprinker, Michael, ed. Edward Said: A Critical Reader. Cambridge USA: Blackwell, 
1992. 
 
Stanford, Karin L. Beyond the Boundaries: Reverend Jesse Jackson in International 
Affairs. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997. 
 
Staniland, Martin. American Intellectuals and African Nationalists 1955-1970. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991. 
 
Stokes, Curtis, Theresa Meléndez, and Gernice Rhodes-Reed. Race in 21st Century 
America. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2001. 
 
Stone, Gregory, and Douglas Lowenstein, eds. Lowenstein: Acts of Courage and Belief. 
New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983. 
 
Stowe, Harriet Beecher, and Darryl Pinckney. Uncle Tom's Cabin, or, Life among the 
Lowly. New York: Signet Classic, 1998. 
 
Stuckey, Sterling. Going through the Storm: The Influence of African American Art in 
History, 1993. 
 
Study, and Commission. "South Africa: Time Running Out." The Study Commission on 
U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, 1981. 
 
Sullivan, Leon. Moving Mountains: The Principles and Purposes of Leon Sullivan. 
Valley Forge: Judson Press, 1998. 
 
Summy, Ralph, and Michael E. Salla, eds. Why the Cold War Ended: A Range of 
Interpretaions. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995. 
 
Susman, Warren I. Culture as History: The Transformation of American Society in the 
Twentieth Century. New York: Pantheon, 1984. 
 
Sutherland, Bill, and Matt Meyer. Guns and Gandhi in Africa. Trenton, NJ: Africa World 
Press, 2000. 
 
Suzman, Helen. In No Uncertain Terms. New York: Knopf, 1993. 
 
Tatum, Lyle, ed. The Peace Testimony of Friends in the 20th Century. Philadelphia: 
Friends Coordinating Committee on Peace, 1967. 
 
Tatum, Lyle, ed. South Africa, Challenge and Hope. New York: Hill and Wang, 1982. 
 
Teres, Harvey M. Renewing the Left: Politics, Imagination, and the New York 
Intellectuals. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
 
299 
Thomas, A.M. The American Predicament: Apartheid and United States Foreign Policy. 
Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate, 1997. 
 
Timmerman, Kenneth R. Shakedown: Exposing the Real Jesse Jackson. Washington, 
D.C., Lanham, MD: Regnery Pub. ;Distributed to the trade by National Book 
Network, 2002. 
 
Tracy, James. Direct Action: Radical Pacifism from the Union Eight to the Chicago 
Seven. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. 
 
Ture, Kwame, and Charles V. Hamilton. Black Power: The Politics of Liberation. New 
York: Vintage Books, 1992, 1967. 
 
UN. The United Nations and Apartheid. New York: United Nations Department of Public 
Information, 1994. 
 
Unger, Irwin. The Movement: A History of the American New Left, 1959-1972. New 
York: Harper and Row, 1974. 
 
Van Deburg, William L. Black Camelot: African-American Culture Heroes in Their 
Times, 1960-1980. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1997. 
 
Van Deburg, William L. New Day in Babylon: The Black Power Movement and 
American Culture, 1965-1975. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. 
 
Villa-Vicencio, Charles. The Spirit of Freedom: South African Leaders on Religion and 
Politics, Perspectives on Southern Africa; 52. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1996. 
 
Villiers, Les di. In Sight of Surrender: The U.S. Sanctions Campaign against South 
Africa, 1946-1993. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995. 
 
Waldmeir, Patti. Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New 
South Africa. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997. 
 
Walker, Clarence E. Deromanticizing Black History: Critical Essays and Reappraisals: 
University of Tennessee Press, 1991. 
 
Walker, Clarence Earl. We Can't Go Home Again: An Argument About Afrocentrism. 
Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
 
Wallis, Jim, and Joyce Hollyday, eds. Crucible of Fire: The Church Confronts Apartheid: 
Orbis Books, 1989. 
 
Walters, Ronald. "Gammon to Howard: The African American Conference on Africa." 
Paper presented at the Gammon to Howard: the African American Conference on 
Africa, Howard University 1972. 
 
300 
Walters, Ronald W. U.S. - South Africa Relations: A Legislative Review. Washington, 
DC: Howard University/The Congressional Black Caucus Foundation, 1985. 
 
Walters, Ronald W. Pan-Africanism in the African Diaspora: An Analysis of Modern 
Afrocentric Political Movements. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1993. 
 
Walters, Ronald W., and Robert C. Smith. African American Leadership. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1999. 
 
Webb, Pauline, ed. A Long Struggle: The Involvement of the World Council of Churches 
in South Africa. Geneva, Switzerland: WCC Publications, 1994. 
 
Weill, Kurt, Maxwell Anderson, and Alan Paton. Lost in the Stars : A Musical Tragedy. 
New York, Winona, MN: Chappell; Hal Leonard Pub. Corp., 1988. 
 
Wentzel, Jill. The Liberal Slideaway. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race 
Relations, 1995. 
 
Westerfield, H. Bradford, ed. Inside the CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from 
the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1995. 
 
White, Graham J., and J. R. Maze. Henry A. Wallace: His Search for a New World 
Order. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995. 
 
White, Walter Francis. A Rising Wind. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Doran and 
Company inc., 1945. 
 
Walters, Ronald W. A Man Called White: The Autobiography of Walter White. New 
York,: Viking Press, 1948. 
 
Walters, Ronald W. How Far the Promised Land? New York: Viking Press, 1955. 
 
Wierzbicki, Alfred Marek. The Ethics of Struggle for Liberation: Towards a 
Personalistic Interpretation of the Principle of Non-Violence. Frankfurt am Main; 
New York: Peter Lang, 1992. 
 
Wilkins, Roy, and Tom Mathews. Standing Fast: The Autobiography of Roy Wilkins. 1st 
Da Capo Press ed. New York: Da Capo Press, 1994. 
 
Willett, Cynthia, ed. Theorizing Multiculturalism: A Guide to the Current Debate. 
Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1998. 
 
Wills, Garry. The Second Civil War; Arming for Armageddon. [New York]: New 
American Library, 1968. 
 




Wilson, Sondra K. In Search of Democracy: The NAACP Writings of James Weldon 
Johnson, Walter White, and Roy Wilkins (1920-1977). New York: Oxford 
University, 1999. 
 
Wolf, Louis, and et. al, eds. Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa. Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart, 
1979. 
 
Woodard, Komozi. A Nation within a Nation: Amiri Baraka (Leroi Jones) and Black 
Power Politics. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999. 
 
Woods, Donald. Biko. New York: Paddington Press, 1978. 
 
Woods, Donald. Asking for Trouble: The Autobiography of a Banned Journalist. 1st 
American ed. New York: Atheneum, 1981. 
 
Woods, Donald. South African Dispatches: Letters to My Countrymen. 1st ed. New York: 
H. Holt, 1987. 
 
Woods, Donald, and Richard Attenborough. Filming with Attenborough: The Making of 
Cry Freedom. 1st ed. New York: Holt, 1987. 
 
Worden, Nigel. The Making of Modern South Africa: Third Edition. Vol. Third Edition, 
Historical Association Studies: Blackwell Publishers, 2000. 
 
Wright, Richard. The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference. Jackson: 
University Press of Mississippi, 1956. 
 
Wuthnow, Robert. The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and Faith since 
World War Ii. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988. 
 
Young, Andrew. An Easy Burden: The Civil Rights Movement and the Transformation of 
America. New York: HarperCollins, 1996. 
 
Young, Perry Deane. God's Bullies: Native Reflections on Preachers and Politics. 1st ed. 
New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1982. 
 
Zunes, Stephen, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher. Nonviolent Social Movements: A 
Geographical Perspective. Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 1999. 
 
